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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Objective 
Undergraduate debt is an area of higher education policy that has drawn intensive 
scholarly and practical interest. American student loan debt has officially exceeded one 
trillion dollars since late 2011, as witnessed by headlines such as these: “40 million 
Americans now have student loan debt,” “How the $1.2 Trillion College Debt Crisis Is 
Crippling Students, Parents and the Economy,” and “College Debt Is Crippling Black 
Graduates’ Ability to Gain Wealth” (Berman, 2015; CNN, 2014; Denhart, 2013). The size of 
the debt stems in part from the fact that from academic year (AY) 2000–2001 to 2010–
2011, in constant 2011–2012 dollars, federal grant disbursements grew from $10.4 billion 
to $37.8 billion (4,059 to 10,517 recipients, in thousands) while federal loan disbursements 
grew from $43.3 billion to $108.6 billion (7,544 to 19,174 recipients, in thousands; 
U.S.D.O.E. National Center for Education Statistics, 2013). Baccalaureate degree holders 
with over $40,000 in debt grew from 2% (AY 2003–2004) to 18% (AY 2011–2012), in 
constant 2012 dollars. In addition, the rebuilding of the economy and labor markets after 
the Great Recession increased students' need to borrow to finance education and 
decreased the likelihood of their being able to meet repayment requirements. The year 
2011 saw the highest cohort default rate on federal student loans in more than 15 years 
(College Board, 2012). Further, the percentage of total outstanding student loan debt held 
by consumers that was 90 days or more delinquent grew from 6.1% in 2003 to 11.0% in 
2012 (U.S.D.O.E. National Center for Education Statistics, 2013).  
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High payments and default on undergraduate debt have consequences; they are of 
national concern if aversion to debt deters students from making optimal 
postbaccalaureate decisions on postbaccalaureate educational aspirations, enrollment, and 
early-career occupation. With regard to aspirations and enrollment, on average, the 
economic return on earning a postbaccalaureate degree is growing. Researchers have 
found that, over the past five decades, people who hold postbaccalaureate degrees have 
increased their wages relative to all workers and specifically in comparison with 
baccalaureate degree holders (Acemoglu & Autor, 2010; Avery & Turner, 2012; Lindley & 
Machin, 2011). Lindley and Machin (2011) also found that an increase in demand for 
postbaccalaureate degree holders was driving this change. Moreover, early-career 
occupations in low-salary or nonprofit industries can often lead to positive social 
externalities (Preston, 1989) and higher personal job satisfaction and nonpecuniary 
benefits even when controlling for salary (Benz, 2005). Potentially, with more 
undergraduate debt, people will be less likely to make decisions that yield the most 
happiness/satisfaction or benefit to society.  
This apprehension to the negative effects of debt exacerbated by the 
disproportionate numbers of African American and Latino students who hold excessive 
debt burdens (Price, 2004), as these students are less likely to pursue postbaccalaureate 
education (Carter, 1999; Malcom & Dowd, 2012; Mullen, Goyette, & Soares, 2003; Sibulkin 
& Butler, 2011). Public-sector and low-salary industries have been seen as havens for 
women and African Americans entering the labor market (Cooper, Gable, & Austin, 2012). 
At the same time, there is growing evidence that increased debt makes students less likely 
to work in low-salary industries (Rothstein & Rouse, 2011). Female and African American 
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students choosing high-salary occupations is not inherently bad; however, as discussed in 
the Contributions to Theory and Practice section below, this shift could deplete certain 
fields of a diverse supply of potential workers. For example, Motoko Rich observed in the 
New York Times that, while United States public schools have become majority minority 
(Pew Hispanic, 2014; U.S. Department of Education, 2014a), more than 80% of teachers are 
White (Rich, 2015). Rich posited that this disparity is due to the fact that minority college 
graduates “may carry significant debt and have high expectations for future salaries” (para. 
12) which would lead them away from entering the education field.  
Research Questions 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to expand our general understanding of how 
undergraduate loans influence and potentially constrain students’ postbaccalaureate 
decision-making. I seek to answer the following research questions: 
1. To what extent does undergraduate student loan debt affect postbaccalaureate 
educational aspirations, educational enrollment, and early-career occupational 
choice? 
2. How do underrepresented students conceptualize undergraduate debt and their 
repayment options? How does this change closer to time of repayment? 
Background 
Undergraduate financial aid in the United States generally takes three forms: 
federal/state grants, loans, and education tax benefits. Grants are direct transfers; students 
are not required to repay them. Eligibility for federal and state grants is often means-
tested, though in recent decades merit-based state grants have gained popularity, 
particularly in the southeastern region of the United States (Doyle, 2006). Grants consist of 
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federal grants, institutional grants, private and employer grants, and state grants (College 
Board, 2014). Loans can be disbursed by the federal government or through private 
entities, which normally require families to meet additional creditworthiness measures, 
such as higher credit score. Loans consist of federal subsidized loans, federal unsubsidized 
loans, Parent PLUS loans, Perkins and other federal loans, and nonfederal loans (College 
Board, 2014). Tax benefits generally include parents’ eligibility to claim their child as a 
dependent on their federal income taxes (until the student is 23, as long as the student is 
enrolled in higher education); varying amounts of tax deductibles (e.g., American 
Opportunity Tax Credit, interest on student loans; College Board, 2014). This category also 
includes savings plans, such as state 529 plans, which allow families to save for a child’s 
eventual higher education costs. The benefit of these plans is that families do not have to 
pay taxes on these funds as long as the funds are used on educational expenses. These tax 
credits generally benefit middle- and upper-income families (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 
2013).  
Federal financial aid comprises Pell grants, funds to veterans and military members, 
other federal grants, education tax benefits, federal work-study, Direct Loans (subsidized 
and unsubsidized), PLUS loans, and other federal loans. Students qualify for the 
overwhelming majority of financial aid, federal and state, by completing the Free 
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). From the information shared in the FAFSA, 
the federal government calculates a student’s Expected Family Contribution (EFC), the 
amount of money the student and her family are expected to be able to contribute to her 
education, and sends that information to the institutions the student has selected. Some 
institutions also require the student to complete a separate financial aid form, which asks 
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more in-depth questions, or to submit additional tax information in order to accurately 
estimate student eligibility for aid. Once the EFC is calculated and additional information 
taken into consideration, an institution subtracts the EFC from the total Cost of Attendance 
(COA) for the student. COA can fluctuate depending on the decisions of the student (e.g., if 
the student chooses to live on-campus versus off-campus). The amount of COA that 
remains after factoring in the EFC is the student’s financial need. This is the amount of 
money the student will have to find from some extra source in order to attend the 
institution; financial aid generally covers it. Federal loans are the dominant source of 
financial aid. In AY 2013–2014, the three top sources of undergraduate student aid were 
federal loans (34% of all student aid), institutional grants (21% of all student aid), and 
federal Pell grants (18% of all student aid; College Board, 2014). 
The research on the causal effect of grants, tax credits, and information access on 
financial aid is promising. Multiple researchers have found that a $1,000 decrease in the 
net cost, due to a grant or tax benefit, to a student and his/her family causes a 3- to 6-
percentage point increase in undergraduate enrollment (e.g., Abraham & Clark, 2006; 
Bound & Turner, 2002; Dynarski, 2002; Kane, 2007; Leslie & Brinkman, 1988; Seftor & 
Turner, 2002). Studies focusing on the Pell grant specifically do not find as strong a 
relationship; the complicated nature of applying for the Pell grant through the FAFSA is 
often thought to account for the discrepancy (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). Bettinger 
and colleagues (2009) found that families randomly assigned to receive personalized 
information about eligibility for financial aid and personal help with completing the FAFSA 
increased the percentage of students enrolling in higher education, with suggestive 
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evidence of an increase in receiving Pell grants and gaining more college credit once 
enrolled. 
In contrast, there is less evidence on undergraduate loans than other forms of 
financial aid (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). Field (2009) randomly assigned law school 
students to receive a tuition waiver that would turn into a loan if the student did not enter 
public interest law, in which case the student would have to repay the tuition amount. 
Students not assigned to this condition would receive a loan for the amount of tuition, 
which would be forgiven if the student entered public interest law; the student would not 
have to repay the tuition amount only if the student entered a public interest occupation. 
Field (2009) found that students in the tuition waiver condition were 19–20 percentage 
points more likely to choose an occupation in public interest law. In analyzing the causal 
effects of loans on postbaccalaureate decision-making, Rothstein and Rouse (2011) found 
that, for a single highly selective institution, a $10,000 increase in the cumulative amount of 
undergraduate loans decreased the likelihood of working in a low-salary occupation by 5–6 
percentage points; increased annual salary by $2,000; and decreased the likelihood of an 
annual salary below the 25th percentile by 6 percentage points. 
Taken together, the research on financial aid suggests that grants, tax credits, and 
information on access to financial aid increase the likelihood of students enrolling in higher 
education. A small body of research on undergraduate loans finds that increasing 
cumulative amounts of debt decreases the likelihood of entering low-salary occupations. 
The amount of aid given as federal loans exceeds all other forms of aid (College Board, 
2014), but the majority of research on financial aid focuses on grants (Dynarski & Scott-
Clayton, 2013). This limited evidence likely reduces policymakers’ ability to make decisions 
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based on research or students’ and their families’ ability to make informed decisions about 
financing higher education.  
One of the potential consequences of undergraduate borrowing is students 
defaulting on their loans and not being able to meet loan repayment requirements. 
Students default on their education loans when they miss payments for more than 270 
days (Looney & Yannelis, 2015). Looney and Yannelis (2015) analyzed data representing a 
random sample of all federal student borrowers in the National Student Loan Data System 
(approximately 4%) from 1970 to 2014; they merged these data with earnings and income 
data from tax information from 1999 to 2014. The authors found that nontraditional 
students (i.e., those attending for-profit or two-year institutions) defaulted at higher rates 
than their traditional peers who attended not-for-profit four-year institutions and graduate 
schools. The general national trends in higher default rates in recent decades appeared to 
be driven by the larger numbers of nontraditional students entering higher education, who 
are more vulnerable to default. The authors also found that labor market characteristics, 
earnings, and income significantly contribute to the rise in student default from 2000 to 
2011. This would mean that while defaulting on educational debt has primarily been on the 
rise for nontraditional students, the occupational earnings of students influenced the 
likelihood of students defaulting. This is one reason it is important to understand if and 
how undergraduate debt affects postbaccalaureate decision-making. 
Undergraduate Debt and Postbaccalaureate Decision-Making 
There is a substantial, if contradictory, body of research on the relationship between 
debt levels and graduate school aspirations, application, and enrollment. Researchers 
report a variety of findings, ranging from negative effects of debt (Baum & Saunders, 1998; 
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Baum & Schwartz, 1988; Choy & Gies, 1997; Fox, 1992; Heller, 2001; Malcom & Dowd, 
2012; Millett, 2003; Weiler, 1994; Zhang, 2013) to insignificant/positive effects, which 
suggest that debt is not inhibiting students (Baird, 1973; Carter, 1999; Choy, 2000; COFHE, 
1983; Ekstrom et al., 1991; Kim & Eyermann, 2006; Murphy, 1994; Perna, 2004; Rothstein 
& Rouse, 2011; Sanford, 1980; Schapiro, O’Malley & Litten, 1991; Weiler, 1991).1 This is in 
contrast to research on early-career occupation, which, while smaller, reflects a primarily 
negative effect of debt (Baum & Saunders, 1998; Baum & Schwartz, 1988; Field, 2009; 
Heller, 2001; Minicozzi, 2005; Rothstein & Rouse, 2011; Sanford, 1980; Zhang, 2013). As 
students increase their undergraduate debt, they are less likely to select careers in the 
public sector or in so-called low-salary industries.  
In all the research on debt’s influence on postbaccalaureate decision-making, the 
issue of endogeneity is fundamental (Cellini, 2008). For example, using postbaccalaureate 
aspirations, the amount of debt students borrow could be (and most likely is) a function of 
the students’ postbaccalaureate plans (e.g., students planning to earn a JD may be more 
willing to borrow in comparison with students planning to be primary school teachers). If 
this is the case, then changes in debt cannot be said to cause changes in graduate school 
aspirations; changes in graduate school aspirations could cause changes in debt. Therefore, 
debt would be an endogenous predictor. Few studies focused on undergraduate debt: 
Malcom and Dowd (2012), Rothstein and Rouse (2011), and Zhang (2013) deal with the 
potential endogeneity in their debt measures. These often study a single highly selective 
institution, use older data, focus on specialized majors, or provide weak evidence that the 
analytical approach met the assumptions necessary to provide credible causal estimates. 
                                                          
1 Previous literature groups the studies with positive and insignificant effects together. This also does not 
imply that the negative estimates are practically significant. 
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Also, these studies generally do not measure whether any of these college graduates 
aspired to enter graduate school. Therefore, I endeavor to use a new instrumental 
variable—change in cost of attendance—to investigate undergraduate debt’s effects while 
filling in these gaps in the literature using newer, nationally representative data rich with 
financial aid and indebtedness measures.  
Conceptual Framework 
Human capital theory aids in understanding how students make decisions (Becker, 
1964; Bound et al., 2010). According to Becker (1964), students must evaluate the costs of 
enrolling in college, both the direct costs of attendance and foregone earnings, and the 
potential economic returns to the increase in their human capital by acquiring new skills 
and knowledge (often signaled by the earning of a degree). This would apply when 
students are considering whether to aspire to and enroll in postbaccalaureate study. 
Students might evaluate the amount of their undergraduate loan debt and decide that the 
only way to pay the debt back is to attend graduate school in order to obtain higher lifetime 
earnings. This is a particularly popular decision during recessions and times when 
unemployment is high (Bedard & Herman, 2008; Fry, 2010; Murphy, 1994). Alternately, 
students who directly enter the labor market would be more likely to choose occupations 
that maximize their lifetime earnings (Blaug, 1976; Boskin, 1974). This would allow 
students to select early-career occupations with higher salaries, nonpecuniary benefits, or 
a combination of the two. Thus, students with additional undergraduate debt would be 
more likely to pursue a high-salary occupation.  
Scholars also posit that students will make decisions based on their risk aversion 
with regard to debt (Burdman, 2005; Field, 2009). Risk aversion would align with human 
 10 
capital theory on predicting early-career occupation. Students who are averse to risk 
around debt would be more likely to pursue a high-salary occupation. However, risk 
aversion diverges from the traditional interpretation of behavior by human capital theory 
for postbaccalaureate educational enrollment. Students would react to increased 
undergraduate debt load by lowering their aspirations for or choosing not to enroll in 
postbaccalaureate study, instead entering the labor force more quickly in order to begin 
repayment of loans. In terms of differential effects, numerous scholars have found that 
different student populations (e.g., racial ethnic/minorities, students from low-income 
backgrounds) can often be risk averse when confronted with undergraduate student loans 
(Burdman, 2005; Callender & Jackson, 2005; Cunningham & Santiago, 2008; Perna, 2000). 
This is often posited as owing to structural income and wealth inequalities (Oliver & 
Shapiro, 1997), cultural aversion to debt, or familial lack of or negative experience with 
borrowing more generally (Burdman, 2005, Cunningham & Santiago, 2008). Therefore, 
students from groups that are underrepresented in higher education could react more 
strongly to the increasing reliance on student debt for college funding.  
Methods 
I employed a mixed-methods approach in my dissertation. I investigated research 
question 1 (To what extent does undergraduate student loan debt affect postbaccalaureate 
educational aspirations, educational enrollment, and early-career occupational choice?) 
using instrumental variables estimation on two different samples: a national sample of 
first-time postsecondary students and a national sample of bachelor’s degree recipients. 
Due to the previously discussed complex, and potentially endogenous, relationship 
between debt and postbaccalaureate decision-making, I used changes in tuition and fees 
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over a student’s undergraduate career as an excluded instrument (interacted with parental 
education) to estimate undergraduate debt’s causal effect. I investigated research question 
2 (How do underrepresented students conceptualize undergraduate debt and their 
repayment options? How does this change closer to time of repayment?) using semi-
structured interviews with six recent graduates of a historically Black college or university 
(HBCU)who borrowed at some point in their undergraduate career and were required to 
complete federal exit counseling. 
Results 
The quantitative results align with findings from prior causal research on 
undergraduate debt’s effects (Malcom & Dowd, 2012; Rothstein & Rouse, 2011; Zhang, 
2013). Larger changes in tuition and fees are associated with larger amounts of 
undergraduate debt. Larger amounts of undergraduate debt lead to changes in 
postbaccalaureate decision-making. This supports the conceptual framework as a theory of 
behavior for students’ postbaccalaureate decision-making. I find that a $10,000 increase in 
total undergraduate debt does not appear to induce a change in students’ aspirations, 
decreases the likelihood of students enrolling in graduate school by 3–4%, and increases 
the average annual salary of students by $1,550 in 2009 and $3,410 in 2012. A $10,000 
increase in federal undergraduate debt does not appear to induce a change in students’ 
aspirations, decreases the likelihood of students enrolling in graduate school by 5%, and 
increases the average annual salary of students by $2,100 in 2009 and $4,620 in 2012. 
For the qualitative results, I find that, for the six students with whom I spoke, the 
relationship between undergraduate debt and postbaccalaureate decision-making might be 
partially explained by the themes of timing and structure of information, family as a source 
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of knowledge, comfort with the amount borrowed, and the realities of postbaccalaureate 
decision-making. These results align with the few prior qualitative research studies on this 
topic. The six students in the sample reported not allowing undergraduate debt to affect 
their postbaccalaureate plans, similar to Murphy’s (1994) work. However, four of the six 
students reported changing either their immediate plans after graduating or their long-
term career plans in some part because of the amount they borrowed. These students also 
borrowed the highest amounts of cumulative debt of all the study participants. Students 
expressed more confidence in their ability to repay their undergraduate debt during their 
phase one interviews. This mirrors the high levels of confidence reported by the students 
in Fernandez and colleagues’ (2015) research on federal exit counseling. However, as I 
hypothesize based on my conceptual framework, by the phase two interviews conducted 
approximately six months after graduation, students who had begun repayment reported 
more unease with their ability to repay their undergraduate debt. The results, while 
preliminary in nature because of the small sample size, suggest that following students past 
graduation is critical because the students' reported confidence or emotional state can 
change as repayment draws closer. 
Contributions to Theory and Practice 
The barrier of undergraduate debt could exacerbate the relatively stable trend of 
disproportionate graduate school attendance depending on students’ race and income level 
(Carter, 1999; Malcom & Dowd, 2012; Mullen, Goyette & Soares, 2003; Sibulkin & Butler, 
2011). And even though public-sector and so-called low-salary industries have been seen 
as havens for females and African Americans entering the labor market (Cooper, Gable & 
Austin, 2012), there is growing evidence that increased debt makes students less likely to 
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work in low-salary industries (Rothstein & Rouse, 2011). This is not necessarily a negative. 
Students responding to increased undergraduate debt by seeking an early-career 
occupation with a higher salary has likely positive effects both on the students’ ability to 
repay and on their future utility. The concern about this is twofold. First, debt could induce 
students to select postbaccalaureate educational or occupational opportunities that run 
counter to their underlying preferences and abilities. If there is a distribution of underlying 
preferences and abilities for different majors, careers, and educational attainment, it could 
be a problem that undergraduate debt decreases students' ability to pursue their preferred 
postbaccalaureate life. Second, borrowing to finance undergraduate education is not 
randomly distributed among the population. Certain types of students (i.e., low-income, 
African American) borrow at higher rates and higher amounts than their peers do. 
Therefore, even if it is a rational choice to change postbaccalaureate behaviors based on the 
amount of undergraduate debt amassed, only certain students must face this particular 
reassessment.  
The methodological contribution to the field is twofold. First, I add a new way to 
identify causal estimates from undergraduate debt by using changes in cost of attendance 
as an excluded instrument. This technique could be used in multiple scenarios beyond 
investigating the specific dependent variables I have chosen, as long as the change in 
tuition has no outside effect on the outcome variable. The technique could be more widely 
applicable than the previous methods when investigating debt’s impact. Second, I employ a 
mixed-methods analytical approach, allowing me to investigate not only the causal effect of 
undergraduate debt but the ways in which students conceptualize their debt and the 
underlying reasoning behind their postbaccalaureate decision-making. 
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Structure of the Dissertation 
 
 The structure of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter II is the review of the 
literature. In Chapter III, I outline the conceptual framework. Chapter IV presents the 
research methods and results for the quantitative research question. Chapter V covers the 
research methods and results for the qualitative research question. I end with Chapter VI, 
the conclusions and policy recommendations.
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Prior research on the relationship between undergraduate loans and students' 
postbaccalaureate decision-making mainly focuses on educational and early-career 
occupation choices. I begin the review of the literature with a discussion of how college 
graduates choose to attend graduate school and to pursue certain early-career occupations. 
Next, I review the drivers and motivations for undergraduate debt. I follow with an 
overview of the research on the relationship between borrowing and graduate school 
aspirations, applications, and enrollment. Then, I examine research on the relationship 
between borrowing and early-career occupation choice. Next is a synopsis of how the 
relationship between undergraduate debt and these prior decisions differs for 
underrepresented students, specifically African American students and those attending 
HBCUs. I conclude the literature review with an overview of the qualitative research on 
undergraduate debt’s influence on postbaccalaureate decision-making. 
In quantitative research involving debt’s causal effect, there is a fundamental issue 
of endogeneity (Cellini, 2008; Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). Using early-career 
occupation as an example, students could evaluate the amount of undergraduate debt they 
borrowed and then decide they will need to choose a higher-paying occupation after 
graduation in order to finance the debt. However, students could also go to college with a 
plan of entering a high-paying career field that will easily allow them to meet their loan 
payments each month. In this case, the choice of career would dictate how much a student 
is willing to borrow. Or, even worse from a statistical modeling perspective, the decision to 
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borrow undergraduate loans could be made near-simultaneously with the decision to 
pursue certain postbaccalaureate education or occupation decisions. With this possibility, 
debt would likely be an endogenous predictor. Prior causal research on undergraduate 
debt has either used pre-2000 data, which could be impractical for the current policy 
context post-Great Recession, or has studied a single institution/single area of study. I will 
fill this gap in the literature by estimating the causal effect of undergraduate debt on 
education and early-career occupational choice using a nationally representative sample of 
students from the past decade. 
Qualitative research on undergraduate debt’s influence on postbaccalaureate 
decision-making is scarce. A gap exists in the understanding of how students process their 
undergraduate debt, make meaning of debt burden, select repayment plans, and decide on 
postbaccalaureate education or occupation based on cumulative debt. I seek to fill this gap 
in our understanding of how students, particularly underrepresented students, 
conceptualize undergraduate debt and their repayment options. 
Postbaccalaureate Decision-Making 
To explain the relationship between undergraduate debt and postbaccalaureate 
education and early-career occupation decisions, I begin with a review of the literature on 
how college graduates make decisions for their postbaccalaureate life. Research on 
graduate school choice has found a mixture of individual and institutional characteristics 
associated with postbaccalaureate aspirations, application, and enrollment (e.g., English & 
Umbach, 2016; Heller, 2001; Millett, 2003; Mullen et al., 2003; Perna, 2004). For example, 
Mullen, Goyette, and Soares (2003) employed multinomial logistic regression to investigate 
the relationship between parental education attainment levels and enrollment in different 
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types of graduate degree programs: no enrollment, doctoral, professional, MBA, and 
master’s. Using Baccalaureate and Beyond (B&B): 93/97, the authors found that gender, 
college admission test scores, selectivity of undergraduate institution, undergraduate GPA, 
college major, and, logically, students’ graduate school aspirations all had a significant 
influence on the odds of a student enrolling in some type of postbaccalaureate education 
program as compared to their peers who did not enroll. The authors found limited 
evidence of the direct influence of parental education but strong support for the theory that 
parental education indirectly influences postbaccalaureate education decision-making. In 
the full regression models, the authors found evidence that an increase in parental 
education was associated with a 3.6% increase in the odds of students enrolling in master’s 
programs. There was no evidence that parental education directly influenced enrollment in 
any of the other postbaccalaureate education degree programs. The authors argued that 
“the more socially prestigious the graduate occupation and the greater the amount of 
academic capital required for it, the more influence parental education has on 
matriculation into that program” (Mullen et al., 2003, p. 160–161). Following that logic, 
Mullen and colleagues posit that parental education actually had the largest influence on 
more “socially prestigious” program enrollment (doctoral and first professional) compared 
to less prestigious program enrollment (master’s) due to the larger estimates for doctoral 
and first professional degree enrollment as compared to no enrollment (6.3% and 4.7% 
increase in the odds respectively). However, once the authors included measures of 
educational aspirations and career value (e.g., focus on financial gain) in that final model, 
those doctoral and first professional estimates lost statistical significance. The authors 
conclude that a particularly strong relationship between parental education and the 
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educational aspirations of students must exist in order to account for their results. 
Therefore, while there does not appear to be enough evidence to support the authors’ 
supposition that “parental education has the strongest effect on enrollment in doctoral 
programs and the weakest on enrollment in master’s programs” (p. 161), clear evidence 
exists that the relationship between individual and institutional characteristics and the 
decision to enroll in postbaccalaureate education changes depending on the type of 
program.  
 Most recently, English and Umbach (2016) added to this body of literature by 
creating a conceptual model of graduate school choice by analyzing the graduate school 
aspirations, applications, and enrollment of a nationally representative dataset of 
baccalaureate degree holders (B&B: 2000/2001). The authors based their model on 
Perna’s (2006) model of how students choose to attend an undergraduate institution. This 
new model of graduate student choice melds the sociological theoretical concepts of social 
and cultural capital with economic concepts, such as human capital theory. The model has 
four layers that influence student decision-making: habitus, institutional context, graduate 
school context, and the macro social, economic, and policy context. This research 
contributes significantly by accounting for the clustered nature of the data (i.e., students 
nested within institutions) by using generalized hierarchical linear modeling and analyzing 
newer data as compared to other graduate school choice researchers (who generally used 
data from the early 1990s). English and Umbach (2016) found that a 1-point increase in 
undergraduate GPA was associated with .4%, .5%, and .7% increase in the odds of graduate 
school aspiration, application, and enrollment, respectively. Majoring in the humanities and 
social/behavioral sciences or math and life/physical sciences, as compared to business and 
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management, increased the odds of students aspiring to, applying to, and enrolling in 
graduate school. With all else being equal, African American students had 267%, 112%, and 
53% higher odds of aspiring to, applying to, and enrolling in graduate school compared to 
their White peers. Parents’ highest education primarily influenced applying to graduate 
school; students of parents with a bachelor’s or master’s degree had 32% or 47%, 
respectively, higher odds than peers whose parents held a high school diploma or less. 
Students attending Carnegie Classification other institutions had nearly 50% lower odds of 
aspiring to, applying to, and enrolling in graduate school compared to students attending 
Carnegie Classification doctoral institutions. Taken together, the results suggest that 
students with higher undergraduate GPAs, in certain majors, with parents with additional 
cultural or social capital (as evidenced by education level), and attending more research-
intensive institutions were more likely to aspire to, apply to, and enroll in graduate school. 
 To be clear, aspiration to, application to, and enrollment in graduate school vary in 
terms of student effort. Scholars investigating the relationship between aspirations and 
behaviors, in this case application and enrollment, found mixed evidence (Glasman & 
Albarracin, 2006; Kraus, 1995). Aspirations or attitudes toward certain objects or 
behaviors do not consistently predict behaviors (Regan & Fazio, 1977). With that in mind, a 
large body of research, primarily conducted by psychologists, has investigated the 
situations in which attitudes do predict subsequent behaviors. Of primary interest to this 
work, scholars have found evidence that confidence in attitudes (Glasman & Albarracin, 
2006) and direct experience with the object or behavior (Kraus, 1995) increased the 
predictive abilities of attitudes. Two students could express an interest in attaining a 
postbaccalaureate degree, but one student could have stronger confidence in her ability to 
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complete the degree and stronger direct experience with graduate school (e.g., if the 
student has a parent with a postbaccalaureate degree). Based on prior research, that 
student would be more likely to exhibit the behavior of interest (applying or enrolling in 
graduate school) even though the two students hold the same aspirations.  
These types of moderators to the relationship between aspirations and behaviors 
complicate research with aspirations as an outcome. Aspirations may not vary greatly or 
may predict future behaviors weakly. This is particularly true when there is public 
pressure to report certain aspirations, such as obtaining a postbaccalaureate degree. This 
does not mean that researching aspirations is not practical or a contribution to the 
scholarly community. Throughout the world, a number of education policy interventions 
focus on changing aspirations of students (Chiapa, Garrido, & Prina, 2012; Dyce, Albold, & 
Long, 2013) in order to change the students’ future behaviors. Research investigating how 
aspirations or attitudes change can be critical for developing education policy, particularly 
if one also studies behaviors. For example, if evidence suggests that an institutional 
experience does not change students’ aspiration but does change behavior, policymakers 
might wish to focus on interventions that affect behavior, not aspiration. Research on 
aspirations or attitudes is meaningful; it is simply important to contextualize the results 
within the understanding of differences between self-reported aspirations and actual 
behaviors. 
For postbaccalaureate early-career occupation selection, education scholars 
generally conduct research through the lens of Holland’s theory of vocational personalities 
and work environments (Holland, 1985, 1997; Pike, 2006; Smart, Feldman, & Ethington, 
2000). Holland’s theory focuses on individuals, their environments, and how those 
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individuals interact with said environments (Holland, 1985). This allows researchers to 
assess the person-environment fit of the students. According to the theory, students select 
a major based on their interests and personality type, and that major socializes the 
students by rewarding certain behaviors and censuring others, which leads students to 
flourish if there is congruence between their personalities and their major environment 
(Pike, 2006; Smart et al., 2000). The six personality types are realistic, investigative, 
artistic, social, enterprising, and conventional (Holland, 1985). Applying theory to major 
selection, students would select majors that most align with their interests. If the major 
does not meet the students’ expectations, the socialization process that occurs in the major 
will motivate students to select a different major. Once students have found a major 
(environment) that matches or closely aligns with their individual personalities (person), 
the students will have congruence and be more likely to report satisfaction and stronger 
learning outcomes in the classroom (four separate measures constructed from items on the 
National Survey of Student Engagement, based on four of the personality types: 
investigative, artistic, social, and enterprising; Pike, Smart, & Ethington, 2011). This process 
would take place again once a student selects an occupation after graduating from college. 
Holland’s (1985) theory is a simplistic version of the way students make decisions about 
early-career occupation choices. Scholars have found evidence for differential occupation 
selection barriers, whether perceived or real, faced by certain student groups, such as 
women and racial/ethnic minorities (McWhirter, 1997). However, research focused on 
cross-group validation of Holland’s theory in primary and secondary schools and higher 
education institutions reveals support for the theory’s applicability in modeling vocational 
interests of different racial/ethnic groups and socioeconomic backgrounds (Fouad, 2007; 
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Nauta, 2010). Scholars have found suggestive evidence that this is the same for male and 
female students, though a minority of scholars found significant difference in vocational 
interest structures across gender (Fouad, 2007; Nauta, 2010). A significant body of 
research demonstrates that Holland’s theory may not be applicable among individuals with 
non-American nationalities (Nauta, 2010). Thus, it is helpful to use Holland’s (1985) theory 
to posit how students will approach early-career occupation choice, but there are student 
populations to whom this theory may not apply. 
While there is generally consistent evidence of a link between college major and 
early-career occupation choice, this link strengthens as the occupation requires more 
major-specific skills or knowledge (Altonji, Arcidiacono, & Maurel, 2015). If students wish 
to maximize their postbaccalaureate earnings, there is evidence for a causal link between 
major choice and subsequent earnings, mediated by occupation selection. Evidence 
suggests that students working in occupations outside their undergraduate major field of 
study earn less than their peers whose occupations are more closely aligned with their 
major (Robst, 2007). Therefore, if maximizing salary is a primary anxiety, students are 
likely to focus on selecting majors that lead to certain early-career occupations. It is 
important to note that, while baccalaureate degree holders assess the salary a particular 
occupation could give them, they also focus on the occupation's nonpecuniary benefits. 
Additionally, there is likely heterogeneous prioritization of different pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary benefits, depending on demographics and cultural upbringing (Paulsen, 
2001). 
Typically, students attending highly selective or “prestigious” institutions report 
seeking high-salary and prestigious early-career occupations (e.g., finance, consulting, 
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technology-focused; Binder, Davis, & Bloom, 2016). In a sample of Harvard University and 
Stanford University undergraduates or recent graduates (less than three years from 
graduation), Binder et al. (2016) found that students wished to find occupations worthy of 
the institution they attended and the peers they attended with, while gaining financial 
stability and security for themselves. In interviews these students did allow that, once they 
are better established and have more financial security, they would like to switch 
occupations and focus more on work in the nonprofit and education sector.  
Postbaccalaureate decision-making is driven by a combination of pre-college 
individual characteristics and in-college characteristics/experiences (which can be driven 
by the pre-college individual characteristics). Even after taking into consideration 
academic factors like college GPA and the research focus of the undergraduate institution, 
familial cultural and social capital still influence the education decision-making of recent 
graduates. Based on the most recent research on postbaccalaureate education choice, the 
critical point for graduates whose families have low cultural and social capital is likely at 
application time, though there is suggestive evidence that this also influences students 
when deciding to enroll. For early-career choice, there is a stronger emphasis in the 
literature on the personality of students and how students seek congruence between their 
personality and their environment (whether it is the environment while enrolled in college 
or once they have graduated). However, research shows that environmental barriers can 
potentially constrain students’ ability to pursue a major or occupation that aligns with their 
personality. A potential barrier could be high amounts of undergraduate debt. Students 
could select occupations that will help them repay their debt, but the occupation would not 
align with their personality, which would lead to dissatisfaction and decreases in 
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productivity. Understanding the motivations and incentives for borrowing to finance 
undergraduate education helps us understand how additional debt affects 
postbaccalaureate decision-making. I fill this gap in the literature through my quantitative 
and qualitative research. Quantitatively, I examine the association between individual 
characteristics of students and their graduate school aspirations, enrollment, and early-
career occupation salary. Qualitatively, I investigate the process by which students 
determine their postbaccalaureate plans and how this process changes over time. 
Drivers and Motivations for Undergraduate Debt 
 Undergraduate debt is an area of higher education policy that has drawn intensive 
scholarly and practical interest. Since late 2011, American student loan debt has officially 
exceeded one trillion dollars, which has led to headlines such as CNN’s “40 Million 
Americans Now Have Student Loan Debt,” Forbes’ “How the $1.2 Trillion College Debt Crisis 
Is Crippling Students, Parents and the Economy,” and Huffington Post’s “College Debt Is 
Crippling Black Graduates’ Ability to Gain Wealth” (Berman, 2015; CNN, 2014; Denhart, 
2013). It can be difficult to understand why, with the overwhelmingly negative press on 
undergraduate borrowing and its effects, students still choose to borrow in order to finance 
their undergraduate education rather than seeking out other methods of payment or 
choosing not to enroll in higher education. Yet students do continue to borrow. Avery and 
Turner (2012) found that, in recent decades, the number of students using federal loans to 
finance their undergraduate careers has increased, though the average amount of debt per 
student has been relatively stable in constant dollars. This increase arises from both the 
larger number of students who are now enrolling in higher education and the higher 
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percentage of students pursuing an undergraduate education who rely on loans (Avery & 
Turner, 2012).  
 Reviewing the latest Trends in Student Aid from the College Board (2015) reveals a 
persistent relationship between the individual characteristics of students and borrowing 
rates. In 2011–2012, older students had the largest percentage of bachelor’s recipients 
with $40,000 or more in cumulative undergraduate debt: 33% of those age 30–39 and 29% 
of those over the age of 40. This contrasted with students age 23 or younger. Only 11% of 
the younger students had $40,000 or more in undergraduate debt. Students who filed as 
dependents had the highest percentage of graduates with no debt upon graduation (34%), 
while independents with and without dependents had the highest percentage of graduates 
with $40,000 or more in debt (25% and 29%, respectively). There also appeared to be a 
positive relationship between time to degree and borrowing. Of students who reported 
earning a bachelor’s degree within four years, 36% had no debt and 10% had $40,000 or 
more. Of students who took 10 years or longer, 24% have no debt and 31% have $40,000 
or more. A pattern emerged: as students took longer to earn a bachelor’s degree, they also 
were more likely to borrow more. Further, students who self-identified as African 
American had the highest percentage of reporting $40,000 or more in debt (32%) and the 
lowest percentage of reporting no debt (14%). Thus, relying on simple descriptives, older, 
independent students who took longer than four years to complete a bachelor’s degree and 
self-identified as African American were more likely to carry high debt burdens. This is 
consistent with Houle’s (2013) multivariate analysis of individual predictors of borrowing 
using the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1997. Ordinary least squares estimates 
showed parental socioeconomic status and race had a strong relationship with logged 
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student-reported undergraduate debt. Students from middle-income backgrounds who 
self-identified as African American were more likely to incur larger amounts of 
undergraduate debt. Students with at least one parent with a bachelor’s degree or higher or 
who came from high-income backgrounds were more likely to borrow smaller amounts of 
undergraduate debt.  
 Evidence on institutional characteristics’ relationship with undergraduate debt is 
mixed. Houle (2013) also found that private institutions and institutions with higher-than-
average sticker price appeared to exacerbate the relationship between parental 
socioeconomic status and borrowing. Avery and Turner (2012) found that private not-for-
profit four-year institutions had the highest percentage of undergraduate borrowing (as 
compared to public four- and two-year institutions; using Beginning Postsecondary Survey: 
04/09). Recent trends support this conclusion: 20% of students attending private not-for-
profit institutions had $40,000 or more in cumulative undergraduate debt while only 12% 
of students attending public institutions carried the same debt load. Baum and O’Malley 
(2003) conducted a multivariate analysis of the trends in undergraduate debt levels and 
borrower attitudes over a 15-year period for borrowers in repayment on at least one 
federal student loan with Nellie Mae in 2002. They found that students who attended four-
year private institutions borrowed larger amounts (only studying not-for-profit 
institutions). However, Monks’ (2014) updated scholarship on not-for-profit four-year 
institutions found no relationship between control of an institution and average student 
debt. He analyzed the College Board’s 2011 Annual Survey of Colleges and merged that data 
with financial aid figures from the National Association of State Student Grant Aid 
Programs. This difference could arise from a number of factors: Monks (2014) included 
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state grant aid measures; Baum and O’Malley’s (2003) sample did not include any 
borrowers who defaulted on their student loans and was not nationally representative 
(while Monks’ (2014) sample includes approximately 85% of all four-year degree-granting 
institutions); and Monks (2014) focused on the institution as the unit of analysis while 
Baum and O’Malley (2003) focused on the individual. It could be that, at the individual 
level, students attending private institutions borrowed higher amounts than their peers at 
public institutions but, on average, the amount of undergraduate debt was statistically 
indistinguishable between private and public not-for-profit institutions. It is difficult to 
form a clear picture, particularly as the Baum and O’Malley (2003) work was not nationally 
representative and the other cited research did not use a multivariate methodological 
approach.  
Although he did not find a difference between public and private institutions in 
average student debt, Monks (2014) found evidence that the drivers of undergraduate debt 
do differ by control. All else being equal, borrowing at public institutions was driven by the 
amount of state grant aid, whether the institution was need-blind, the percentage of 
students with aid, limited-loan financial aid policy, four-year graduation rate, and 
selectivity (as measured by SAT median). Borrowing at private institutions was driven by 
cost of attendance, whether the institution meets the full need of a student, percentage of 
students with aid, no-loan financial aid policy, percentage of graduates in high-salary 
majors, and selectivity. Monks (2014) posits that more-selective institutions had lower 
average student debt because of the relationship between SAT scores and the income of 
students’ families. There appeared to be a difference in the value of state grant aid and the 
sticker price of attending an institution for the different sectors. This makes sense, because 
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public institutions rely more on state grant aid to support undergraduate education and 
private institutions have higher cost of attendance on average. He also found that 
institutions that reported being need-blind in the admissions process had higher average 
debt loads. This is likely because these institutions attract more students from low-income 
backgrounds to apply and are better able to meet the students’ financial need, which 
induces the students to attend that institution. 
Combining the individual and institutional characteristics that are linked to an 
increase in undergraduate debt, it becomes clear that regression results without context 
are not enough. For example, in the prior section I discussed how, with all else equal, 
African American students are more likely than their White peers to aspire to, apply to, and 
enroll in graduate school. However, the reality is that all else is not equal. African American 
students are disproportionately older, more likely to be independent, more likely to have 
their own dependents, and on average take longer to complete a bachelor’s (College Board, 
2015). A sizable amount of research also demonstrates that African American students are 
less likely to attend selective institutions (e.g., Melguizo, 2008). Further differential effects 
of debt are discussed in the following section on Borrowing and Graduate School 
Aspirations, Applications, and Enrollment. 
Students’ age, dependency status, income background, parental education, ability to 
complete a degree in a shorter time (not intellectual ability), race/ethnicity, undergraduate 
institution selectivity and (potentially) institutional control all have an influence on how 
much they will borrow. Additional social and political structures within institutions and 
states can and do influence the debt burden experienced at different institutions. However, 
not enough research has examined the causal impact of these individual and institutional 
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characteristics on how much students will actually borrow. Prior research has focused on 
generally older data, with little ability to infer causality from the results. Therefore, 
scholars have a general understanding of the characteristics that influence borrowing 
amounts but less of causal mechanisms. Understanding the context of who borrows in the 
United States is a critical step in creating better comprehension of how debt affects 
students’ actions. Borrowing is not a negligible activity. Borrowing to finance an 
undergraduate education has real potential consequences, including default and delaying 
certain life goals, such as graduate school, marriage, or buying a house. High payments and 
default on undergraduate debt have consequences and are of national interest if aversion 
to them deters students from making optimal postbaccalaureate decisions about 
postbaccalaureate education aspiration and enrollment and early-career occupation. The 
typical profile of a borrower shapes the discussion of how borrowing affects those 
students’ lives. Little recent research exists on the effects of undergraduate debt on 
postbaccalaureate decision-making. I am focused on investigating how undergraduate debt 
affects postbaccalaureate education (graduate school aspirations, applications, and 
enrollment) and early-career occupation choice, though there are other postbaccalaureate 
decisions of equal interest both to the individual and the country. 
Borrowing and Graduate School Aspirations, Applications, and Enrollment 
Although not as widely researched as some areas of higher education, a substantial, 
if contradictory, body of research concerns the relationship between debt levels and 
graduate school aspirations, application, and enrollment. Researchers have reported a 
variety of findings, which range from negative effects of debt (Baum & Saunders, 1998; 
Baum & Schwartz, 1988; Choy & Gies, 1997; Fox, 1992; Heller, 2001; Malcom & Dowd, 
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2012; Millett, 2003; Weiler, 1994; Zhang, 2013) to neutral or insignificant/positive effects, 
grouped together because these effects would suggest that debt is not inhibiting students 
(Baird, 1973; Carter, 1999; Choy, 2000; COFHE, 1983; Ekstrom et al., 1991; English & 
Umbach, 2016; Kim & Eyermann, 2006; Murphy, 1994; Perna, 2004; Rothstein & Rouse, 
2011; Sanford, 1980; Schapiro, O’Malley, & Litten, 1991; Weiler, 1991).  
Scholars have posited that the reason undergraduate debt level has mixed findings 
of influence on graduate school enrollment in the extant literature is that debt levels could 
have an indirect effect on graduate school enrollment (Kim & Eyermann, 2006; Weiler, 
1994). Graduate school aspirations would mediate this indirect effect. Educational 
aspirations influence academic achievement and graduate/first-time professional school 
enrollment (Allen, 1992; Astin, 1977; Epps, 1995; Hearn, 1987; Pascarella, 1984).2 
Aspirations can differ by the sector of higher education students attend (Brint & Karabel, 
1989; Carter, 1999; Clark, 1960), students’ race (Carter, 1999; Ekstrom et al., 1991), and 
students’ socioeconomic status (Wapole, 2003). Prior aspirations, often operationalized as 
students’ aspirations when entering college, are also the best predictor of later aspirations 
(Carter, 1999; Hearn, 1987; Heller, 2001; Millett, 2003; Pascarella, 1984). Therefore, debt 
level would influence graduate school aspirations, which influence enrollment behaviors 
(e.g., application, enrollment). Even with this potential mediating role, researchers who 
focused on debt’s relationship with educational aspirations found mixed results (Carter, 
1999; COFHE, 1983; Ekstrom et al., 1991; English & Umbach, 2016; Kim & Eyermann, 2006; 
Murphy, 1994; Rothstein & Rouse, 2011; Schapiro, O’Malley, & Litten, 1991).  
                                                          
2 Due to the varying naming conventions of the extant literature, I will refer to graduate and first-time 
professional school interchangeably with graduate school or postbaccalaureate education. 
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It is important to note that, for all the research on debt’s influence on graduate 
school aspirations and enrollment, there is a fundamental issue of endogeneity (Cellini, 
2008). The amount of debt students borrow could be, and most likely is, a function of the 
students’ postbaccalaureate plans (e.g., students planning to earn a JD may be more willing 
to borrow in comparison with students planning to be primary school teachers). If this is 
the case, then changes in debt do not cause changes in graduate school 
aspirations/enrollment; changes in graduate school aspirations/enrollment would cause 
the changes in debt. Or, as previously mentioned, these two decisions could happen near 
simultaneously or jointly along with students’ college major selection (Altonji, Blom, & 
Meghir, 2012). It becomes difficult to disentangle the direct effect of undergraduate debt on 
postbaccalaureate decisions. Therefore, debt would be an endogenous predictor.  
Few researchers deal with the potential endogeneity in their debt measures 
(Malcom & Dowd, 2012; Rothstein & Rouse, 2011; Zhang, 2013). Rothstein and Rouse 
(2011) used administrative data from 1999–2006 from one institution that implemented a 
no-loan policy for all students receiving financial aid in 2001. Students attending after the 
policy changed were treated as if they would receive no loans as part of their 
undergraduate financial aid package. These students could be compared to students who 
never would have received need-based financial aid after 2001 in order to control for any 
temporal trends in the behaviors measured as outcome variables. Those students could 
also be compared to students who would have qualified for the no-loan program prior to 
2001 because they should be similar to the treated students except that they were not 
given the opportunity to participate in the program because it had not been implemented 
yet. The authors created an analytical sample of cohorts of students who matriculated 
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before the no-loan policy was announced in order to ensure that students did not select to 
attend the anonymous institution specifically for the additional need-based financial aid. 
The researchers created a simulated loan offer on each student by using 
administrative data. Using this simulated loan offer as an instrument for undergraduate 
debt, the authors employed instrumental variables estimation to investigate the causal 
effect of undergraduate debt on planning to attend graduate school (aspirations), planning 
to work directly after graduation, having a job, whether that job is in a high- or low-salary 
industry, and the salary of the early-career occupation (both in continuous dollar amount 
and an indicator of a salary above or below the 25th percentile). These models all included 
cohort-fixed effects in order to control for any cohort/temporal effects that were not 
controlled for by including the students who were not eligible for need-based financial aid. 
The authors also employed a difference-in-differences strategy, but I will discuss only the 
instrumental variables estimates because they are the most robust estimates. Rothstein 
and Rouse (2011) found that undergraduate debt had a nonstatistically significant, small, 
negative effect on graduate school aspirations. The authors did not find sufficient evidence 
that debt had an inhibiting impact on graduate school aspirations. I discuss the results of 
the occupation/work outcomes in the next section. While the estimation strategy was 
strong, it lacks generalizability because the authors studied just one institution, which is 
extremely selective and has a large endowment and a more privileged student body than 
the majority of other American institutions of higher learning.  
Zhang (2013) used the B&B: 93/97 study to investigate the causal effect of 
undergraduate debt on a number of outcomes: graduate school attendance, graduate 
school program selection, early-career choice, and marriage and homeownership. Zhang 
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reduced the analytical sample to students who earned a baccalaureate degree from the 50 
states and the District of Columbia. Like Rothstein and Rouse (2011), the author employed 
instrumental variables estimation to mitigate the potential endogeneity of undergraduate 
debt. His instruments were the percentage of gift aid relative to loans from the student’s 
undergraduate institution and the percentage of students at said institution who received 
any form of financial aid. In order to make causal inferences, Zhang’s (2013) instruments 
had to be relevant (able to predict the endogenous measure, in this case undergraduate 
debt) and exogenous (only influencing the outcome measure indirectly through the 
endogenous predictor). If there is a direct relationship between either of these instruments 
and the outcome variable, it would be difficult to make causal inferences based on Zhang’s 
(2013) estimates. For example, if the amount of gift aid an institution can give a student, 
relative to the amount of loans, directly influences whether the student attends graduate 
school, this would violate the exogeneity assumption. This could occur if institutions with 
more robust opportunities for preparing students to attend graduate school are also more 
likely to have high gift-aid-to-loan ratios. Due to this likelihood, as well as the weak 
evidence that the instruments did not suffer from finite sample bias for private institutions, 
it is difficult to consider the relationships Zhang (2013) found to be causal. 
With these caveats in mind, Zhang (2013) found that, for students attending public 
institutions, a $1,000 increase in debt reduced the likelihood of attending graduate school 
by 2.7 percentage points (there was no consistent effect for students attending private 
institutions). This effect was concentrated in students attending doctoral, MBA, or first 
professional degree (e.g., medical or law school) programs. The early-career choice results 
are discussed in the next section. Zhang (2013) used older data (B&B: 93/97) and there are 
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serious threats to the exogeneity of his instruments. Also, there was no measure of whether 
any of these college graduates ever actually aspired to enter graduate school. If students 
who attended public institutions for their baccalaureate degrees were not as likely to 
aspire to graduate school, this finding would not be as critical a warning about the effects of 
undergraduate debt. 
Malcom and Dowd (2012) investigated the effect of relative debt burden of STEM 
baccalaureate degree holders on graduate and professional school enrollment and whether 
that effect varied by students' race/ethnicity. The authors created a measure of each 
student's relative debt using the National Survey of Recent College Graduates (2003), a 
biennial nationally representative survey of individuals holding either a bachelor’s or 
master’s degree in a science, engineering, or health field from a United States institution 
(conducted by the National Science Foundation), Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS), and the Institute for College Access and Success student debt database. To 
create this measure, they divided the cumulative amount of debt a participant borrowed by 
the average amount of debt for that students’ degree-granting institution. This allowed the 
authors to separate the analytical sample into three groups: heavy borrowers, typical 
borrowers, and individuals who never borrowed. If a student had attended a community 
college at some point in their educational career, this was taken into consideration for 
his/her placement into one of the three categories. While a useful measure, this calculation 
of debt burden is a noncontinuous measure of undergraduate debt. It assumes that there 
are three categories of debt use and that the delineations the authors make to separate the 
three groups are appropriate. The authors do not give a reason for choosing this 
operationalization of their debt measure. It was likely due to the conventional method of 
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estimating propensity scores, which necessitates a categorical measure of the endogenous 
predictor. It is generally accepted that undergraduate debt’s effect is nonlinear (Dwyer et 
al., 2012; Hillman, 2015). Scholars generally agree that undergraduate debt has a likely 
positive effect on outcomes such as persistence or completion up to a certain amount of 
cumulative debt. Then, debt’s positive effect likely decays as the negative effects of high 
debt loads manifest. Therefore, while I acknowledge the need for researchers to model 
undergraduate debt’s relationship with outcomes in some nonlinear method, there is no 
evidence that it should be operationalized in this manner in order to create a proper model 
specification.  
Malcom and Dowd (2012) matched individuals within their self-identified 
racial/ethnic group on their propensity to (a) borrow heavily compared to never 
borrowing and (b) be a typical borrower compared to a non-borrower using students' 
individual characteristics:  gender, national origin, parental education, nontraditional 
student status, community college attendance, AA attainment, college GPA, and STEM 
major field (narrow kernel matching with a greater than 99% common support region). 
The authors then estimated the effect of relative borrowing on students’ likelihood of 
enrolling in a master’s, doctoral, or professional program within two years of earning a 
bachelor’s degree. To make causal inferences using propensity score matching, some set of 
variables ( ) must be found so that the assumption of ignorability can be upheld. 
Therefore, estimating causal effects relies heavily on the set of variables chosen for ( ) 
and how the outcomes for the treated and comparison groups react when conditioned on 
( ). Without this assumption, selection bias could mean that one group (heavy, typical, or 
never borrow) could be more likely to systematically enroll in some type of 
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postbaccalaureate education degree program. The authors do include a useful set of 
covariates to predict borrowing behavior. It would have been useful to include measures of 
graduate school aspirations, control of undergraduate institution, selectivity/research 
focus of undergraduate institution, or the student's income background. It is the most 
robust set the authors could have used based on their data, but it does create potential 
difficulties in estimating causal effects. For example, if students attending research-
intensive universities are more likely to be typical or heavy borrowers, and the authors 
find evidence of a positive relationship between enrollment and borrowing, this could 
actually be the relationship between attending a research-intensive institution and 
enrolling in graduate school (which is known to be positive; English & Umbach, 2016). 
As noted previously, African American students were most likely to be heavy 
borrowers (along with White students). Latino students were most likely to be typical 
borrowers, and Asian students were most likely not to borrow at all. The authors estimated 
that typical borrowing had a negative effect on the likelihood of a student enrolling in 
graduate school compared to peers who did not borrow. Heavy borrowing had a negative 
effect on the same likelihood for White and Latino students compared to those who did not 
borrow. For African American and Asian students, there was no statistically significant 
effect of heavy borrowing on the likelihood of a student enrolling in graduate school. 
Although the authors used more recent data and estimate causal effects from propensity 
score matching, this research applied only to students earning STEM degrees, which is a 
minority of the overall college-going population (National Science Board, 2014). 
Overall, there is weak evidence for increased undergraduate debt causing the 
average student to not apply to or enroll in postbaccalaureate education. There is stronger 
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evidence that increased undergraduate debt discourages STEM majors from enrolling in 
graduate programs. Previous research on debt’s causal effect on postbaccalaureate 
education decision-making either used older, nationally representative data or newer, 
single-institution/single-major data, which may not be as relevant. New research is needed 
which analyzes the causal effects of debt for a representative sample of recent students 
eligible for federal financial aid. I endeavor to fill this gap. Even with this dearth of causal 
research, the literature base focused on postbaccalaureate education decision-making and 
debt is stronger than the literature focused on early-career choice.  
Borrowing and Early-Career Occupation 
Early-career occupations in low-salary or nonprofit industries can often lead to 
positive social externalities (Preston, 1989) and higher personal job satisfaction and 
nonpecuniary benefits even when controlling for salary (Benz, 2005). As previously 
mentioned, the public has expressed worry that, with more undergraduate debt, people 
will be less likely to make decisions that give them the most happiness/satisfaction or 
benefit society. A varied body of research on postbaccalaureate educational behavior exists 
(see above), but not enough research has investigated how undergraduate loans shape 
early-career occupational choice. The majority of research on educational debt and career 
choice has focused on graduate or first-professional-school debt. A large body of research 
has analyzed medical school students’ career and specialty choices based on the amount of 
debt borrowed to finance their entire postsecondary education (Colquitt, Zeh, Killian, & 
Cultice, 1996; Grayson, Newton & Thompson, 2012; Kassebaum, Szenas, & Schuchert, 1996; 
Rosenblatt & Andrilla, 2005; Rosenthal, Marquette, & Diamond, 1996; Rosenthal et al., 
1994; Spar, Pryor & Simon, 1993; Teitelbaum, Ehrlich, & Travis, 2009; Woodworth, Chang, 
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& Helmer, 2000). The results were mixed. Some researchers found that increased amounts 
of debt were associated with lowered likelihood of a student choosing a lower-paying 
specialty (e.g., primary care) and others found no statistically significant evidence of a 
relationship.  
Scholars have conducted less research on law school debt and early-career 
occupational choice, but they have the advantage of causal results. Field (2009) analyzed a 
randomized control trial at New York University Law School, which randomly assigned 
some incoming students to receive a waiver for two thirds of the tuition that would become 
a loan if the student did not choose a public interest type of law; others received loans with 
income-contingent forgiveness based on the students’ occupations after graduation (the 
loan would be forgiven if the student selected a public interest type position). The data 
came from administrative data, first-year entry surveys, third-year exit surveys, and work 
experience surveys completed biennially for up to six years after graduation. The results 
suggest that students assigned to the tuition waiver condition were induced to choose 
public interest law occupations at statistically significantly higher rates than the other 
students were. The regression results—controlling for individual characteristics, year of 
graduation, and lottery type—found a treatment effect of 19–20 percentage points. The 
author suggests that there could be a psychological or social cost for some students when 
they analyze their debt, which could influence the students to choose a higher-paying 
occupation after graduation. This is especially important because there was no guarantee 
that the loan forgiveness program would exist throughout the entire 10-year period the 
students would need in order to have their loans forgiven. 
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The little research done for undergraduate debt generally supports what Field 
(2009) found in law schools: an increase in debt correlates with a higher likelihood of 
selecting a higher-paying occupation (Baum & Saunders, 1998; Baum & Schwartz, 1988; 
Heller, 2001; Minicozzi, 2005; Rothstein & Rouse, 2011; Sanford, 1980; Zhang, 2013). The 
two causal studies find opposing results. Rothstein and Rouse (2011), discussed earlier, 
found that more undergraduate debt caused students to choose higher-paying early career 
occupations. As the simulated loan offer/undergraduate debt increased, students were less 
likely to hold a nonprofit/government/education job or any low-salary industry job. 
Students were also predicted to have higher observed salaries and less likely to have a 
salary below the 25th percentile. An increase of $10,000 in undergraduate debt reduced 
the likelihood of a nonprofit/government/education job by 5–6 percentage points, 
increased the annual salary by $2,000 on average, and reduced the likelihood of a salary 
below the 25th percentile by approximately 6 percentage points. The sample provided rich 
administrative data, but the results lack generalizability because the authors studied only 
one highly selective institution, with large endowments and a more privileged student 
body than the majority of other American institutions of higher learning institution (as 
mentioned previously). However, the authors posit that, because the sample students had 
families with higher incomes and higher early-career occupation salaries than national 
averages, undergraduate debt was less likely to have a strong effect on these students' 
postbaccalaureate decision-making (because of intra-family wealth sharing and higher 
utility from higher salaries). Based on those conjectures, Rothstein and Rouse (2011) 
believe that “debt effects should be larger for typical students than for [sample students]” 
(p. 161).  
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Zhang (2013), as discussed previously, conducted research on a nationally 
representative sample of baccalaureate degree holders. Using his instrumental variables of 
the percentage of gift aid relative to loans given by the student’s undergraduate institution 
and the percentage of students at said institution who received any form of financial aid, he 
found no causal effect of debt on early-career choice both 1–2 years after graduation and 
4–5 years after. This is contrary to what Rothstein and Rouse found. However, as discussed 
previously, his data were older (students earned their baccalaureate degree in 1993 and 
were followed until 1997), and there was not strong enough evidence that his instruments 
were exogenous. 
Overall, there is strong evidence that an increase in debt causes students to choose 
higher-salary early-career occupations. While only one of the two causal studies 
investigating undergraduate debt find evidence supporting that supposition, the other 
simply finds statistically insignificant estimates (and there are methodological concerns 
about its ability to make causal claims). Couple that with the robust evidence from the 
professional school debt research, both causal and correlational, and there is clear evidence 
that an increase in undergraduate debt would likely inhibit students from pursuing low-
salary early-career occupations. Previous research on undergraduate debt’s causal effect 
on postbaccalaureate early-career occupation decision-making either used older, nationally 
representative data or newer, single-institution data, which may not be as relevant in the 
post–Great Recession context. New research is needed to analyze the causal effects of debt 
for a representative sample of recent students eligible for federal financial aid. I focus on 
filling this gap in the literature by estimating the effect of undergraduate debt on early-
career occupation salary. 
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The majority of causal research on postbaccalaureate decision-making has focused 
on the average student, which can often obscure the experiences of different student 
groups. The differential effects of debt are an important part of understanding how debt 
could cause certain students—in this research, African American students—to react in 
different ways than their peers. 
Differential Effects of Debt 
Understanding the history of institutions critical to the education of African 
Americans in the United States, both historically and currently, creates an appropriate 
background for conceptualizing the differential effect of debt for African American 
students. A change ushered in with the Higher Education Act (HEA; 1965) was the creation 
of a new type of designation for postsecondary institutions. Title III of the HEA (1965) 
defines historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs) as institutions founded before 
1964 whose primary purpose was educating African Americans (Department of Education, 
2015). Secretary of Education Arne Duncan once remarked, “We have over 7,000 
institutions of higher education across the country, 106 of which are HBCUs. But in 2010, 
HBCUs still awarded a sixth of all bachelor degrees and professional degrees earned by 
African Americans in the U.S.” (Duncan, 2013). HBCUs enrolled 11% of African American 
students in higher education in 2012 although they make up only 3% of all U.S. institutions 
(Center for MSIs, 2014).  
With the likely differential effects of undergraduate loans discussed in detail below 
(Baum & O’Malley, 2003; Burdman, 2005; Callender & Jackson, 2005; Cunningham & 
Santiago, 2008; Perna, 2000), I wish to further our understanding of the experiences of 
underrepresented students. Prior research has found that African American students were 
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more likely to aspire to graduate study if they attended an undergraduate institution with 
higher percentages of African American students (Carter, 1999). HBCUs are more likely to 
graduate African American students who go on to earn a doctorate, even after accounting 
for the number of African American students they enroll (Sibulkin & Butler, 2011). 
Understanding the experiences of students attending these institutions is especially critical 
because research suggests that shifting higher education funding to loans instead of grants 
may disproportionately disadvantage underrepresented students, racial/ethnic minorities, 
and/or students from low-income backgrounds (Long & Riley, 2007). For example, of 
students who earned a bachelor’s degree in 2011–2012, 30% had no debt and only 18% 
had $40,000 or more in debt (College Board, 2015). However, African American students 
were under a larger undergraduate debt burden than the average bachelor’s degree 
recipient. Of African American students, 14% had no debt and 32% had $40,000 or more in 
debt (College Board, 2015). Solely focusing on the overall average would obscure the 
additional debt burden faced by African American students. 
Recent research documents a student loan disadvantage for students attending 
HBCUs, regardless of race. Research from Texas and North Carolina found that students 
attending HBCUs had significantly higher delinquency and default rates than students 
attending Hispanic-serving institutions (HSIs) or predominantly White institutions (PWIs; 
Fletcher & Webster, 2010; Rust, 2009). Recent changes to Parent PLUS loan eligibility have 
also added to the unease surrounding differential influences of undergraduate loans. In 
2011, President Obama and the Department of Education added additional criteria, such as 
unpaid debts in collection within the past five years, that could disqualify a family from 
receiving PLUS loans (Doubleday, 2013). This is generally seen as a response to fiscally 
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inappropriate access to debt after the Great Recession. Two recent empirical papers 
(Britton, 2015; Johnson, Bruch, & Gill, 2015), suggested that HBCUs were differentially 
affected by the change in PLUS loan eligibility compared to all non-HBCUs and 
predominantly Black institutions (those whose enrollment is at least 40% African 
American and 50% low-income or first-generation degree-seeking; Higher Education Act, 
20 U.S.C. §§ 1059e). Their conclusions add credence to the idea that a general investigation 
into how students perceive undergraduate debt may not yield useful information because 
attending an HBCU might have a moderating influence on students’ borrowing and 
decision-making behaviors.  
Furthermore, African American students were more likely to borrow heavily to 
finance their baccalaureate degree (Heller, 2001; Houle, 2013; Malcom & Dowd, 2012) and 
more likely to aspire to enroll in postbaccalaureate education (Ekstrom et al., 1991). For 
example, debt burden—the ratio of monthly income to monthly repayment amount—is one 
measure of a student’s ability to meet repayment requirements. In 1997, African American 
college graduates had 1.5 times greater risk of having a debt burden over 8%, declared the 
excessive cutoff by the federal government, than their White peers (Price, 2004). While 
approximately 24% of African American graduates held debt burden greater than 8%, only 
21% of White graduates held an excessive debt burden.  
Unfortunately, even African American students who aspired to a postbaccalaureate 
education when they entered college were less likely than their White peers to enroll in 
graduate school (Weiler, 1994). A combination of factors is thought to be the cause. Oliver 
and Shapiro’s (1997) seminal work on the differences in wealth accumulation between 
African American and White families found severe structural inequalities. A large body of 
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research has focused on the persistent achievement gap between African American and 
White students in primary and secondary education (e.g., Jencks & Phillips, 2011). 
Researchers can generally agree that differences in class also create differences in the pre-
collegiate achievement gap, but some also argue that “the black-white gap is partly the 
difference between the achievement of all lower-class and middle-class students, but there 
is an additional gap between black and white students even when the blacks and whites 
come from families with similar incomes” (Rothstein, 2004, p. 1). Using the National 
Assessment of Education Progress, researchers have been able to track a narrowing of the 
racial achievement gap until the late 1980s and 1990s, when the test score convergence 
stalled (Jencks & Phillips, 2011; Magnuson et al., 2008). From there, African American and 
White children improved at roughly the same rate in math but were mostly stagnant in 
reading achievement (Magnuson et al., 2008).  
The previously discussed wealth disparities, in addition to disparities in adequate 
prenatal health and access to housing that is not located in areas with higher incidences of 
lead exposure, asthma rates, and the like, partially drove this gap in achievement 
(Rothstein, 2004). Even at similar levels of income, different racial/ethnic groups have 
different levels of achievement. Rothstein (2004) posits that this is because African 
American families are often poor longer, and they are more likely to give money to their 
family members who are also poor. This would result in even fewer material resources for 
poor African American families, which displays the complexities in understanding how 
students’ characteristics influence their likely level of academic achievement. Primary and 
secondary schooling itself reinforces these disparities, which drive differential 
performance of African American students. Minority and low-income students were less 
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likely to have high-quality teachers, in part because of teacher self-sorting (Clotfelter, Ladd, 
& Vigdor, 2010; Corcoran & Evans, 2008; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Lankford, Loeb, 
& Wyckoff, 2002). Less-advantaged students faced disproportionate exposure to low-
quality teachers, and the gap in exposure between African American and White students 
has been growing over time (Corcoran & Evans, 2008). African American students 
encountered differential rates of discipline (e.g., suspension, expulsion; Gregory et al., 
2010), and assignment to gifted programs, particularly when the assigning teacher was 
White (Grissom & Redding, 2016). Some evidence suggested that even African American 
students with high aspirations disproportionately chose not to enroll in postbaccalaureate 
education (although English & Umbach [2016] found increased odds of African American 
students applying and enrolling in graduate school, this did not translate to an actual 
increase in the number of students in programs).  
This evidence contrasts with research on early-career occupation, which, while 
smaller, reflected a primarily negative effect of debt (Baum & Saunders, 1998; Baum & 
Schwartz, 1988; Field, 2009; Heller, 2001; Minicozzi, 2005; Rothstein & Rouse, 2011; 
Sanford, 1980; Zhang, 2013). As students increased their undergraduate debt, they were 
less likely to select careers in the public sector or in so-called low-salary industries. In 
particular, African American students were more likely to report that they changed their 
postbaccalaureate career plans due to their undergraduate debt (Baum & Saunders, 1998). 
As outlined before, African American students have faced additional challenges both 
in financing higher education and in postbaccalaureate decision-making, particularly in 
education. These students were more likely than their peers were, particularly their White 
peers, to borrow, to borrow at higher rates, to have higher monthly debt burdens, and to 
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default on repayment. Evidence generally pointed to these students being less likely to 
enroll in postbaccalaureate education unless they were being compared to their peers, 
generally White students, who had the same amount of undergraduate debt, self-reported 
the same demographics, and attended similar institutions. The unfortunate reality is that 
African American students disproportionately come from low-income backgrounds, take 
longer to graduate, borrow more, and are less likely to come from families with abundant 
social and cultural capital. This means that, when equal conditions were not artificially 
created statistically, these students have faced larger hurdles to their postbaccalaureate 
decision-making. This could and likely does create a differential effect of undergraduate 
debt for African American students on their postbaccalaureate decision-making. My work 
fills a gap in the extant literature in two ways. First, I increase our understanding of the 
extent to which undergraduate debt affects the postbaccalaureate decision-making of 
African American students (through subpopulation analyses in the quantitative research). 
Second, by interviewing African American students attending an HBCU, I seek to 
understand how these students perceive their undergraduate debt and how they decide on 
postbaccalaureate education and occupation options. It is critical to understand how these 
students in particular make meaning around undergraduate debt due to the consistent 
evidence of their higher borrowing rates and amounts. 
Qualitative Research on Undergraduate Debt 
The majority of prior research on undergraduate debt and postbaccalaureate 
decision-making is quantitative. Although this can produce useful evidence of the effect of 
undergraduate loans, it does not help us understand how students make meaning of their 
undergraduate debt and how they perceive their postbaccalaureate options. There are 
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large gaps in our understanding of how students’ perceptions of undergraduate student 
loans influence their behavior (Burdman, 2005; Cunningham & Santiago, 2008). Qualitative 
research on undergraduate debt and postbaccalaureate decision-making has primarily 
been published as doctoral dissertations. For example, Murphy (1994) conducted a mixed-
methods dissertation. It incorporated focus groups, during the fall of 1991 and 1992 and 
the spring of 1992 and 1993 at a single private research university, with quantitative 
analyses using the sample of students who completed the 1986 third follow-up to High 
School and Beyond (HS&B). The focus groups included undergraduate students in their 
final year of study and first- or second-year graduate students. The main findings about 
graduate school aspirations from the focus groups were parental influence; importance of 
outside-school activities, from primary through higher education; primary and secondary 
school role models; the students’ prior aspirations before entering their undergraduate 
program; collegiate academic success; and a labor market with few open positions.  
In regard to undergraduate debt's influence, Murphy (1994) found a wide variety of 
responses. Some students needed to find employment immediately that would pay enough 
for the students to repay their loans. Others believed that the benefits of earning a 
postbaccalaureate degree outweighed the additional trepidation associated with more 
debt. However, the majority of students reported that they did not allow debt to “dictate 
what they chose to pursue after college” (Murphy, 1994, p. 97). These findings suggest that 
debt was not a large factor in forming graduate school aspirations, which supports the 
previous quantitative work. Although the qualitative portion of this study offers insight 
previously unseen in the undergraduate debt and graduate school aspirations literature, 
the student participants were wealthier, on average, than other students in the United 
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States and they attended a highly selective and prestigious institution. The nature of the 
sample makes it difficult to generalize the findings. Additionally, Murphy (1994) conducted 
this study more than 20 years ago. A more recent investigation of undergraduate debt’s 
influence on postbaccalaureate decision-making is essential for creating policies more 
responsive to current students’ needs. 
The most updated qualitative research on undergraduate debt and 
postbaccalaureate decision-making or repayment comes from Fernandez and colleagues 
(2015). The authors conducted interviews with 38 students graduating from six 
institutions from different regions of the United States (three in Texas, two in the 
southeast, one in the Midwest) and sectors (three public 2-year, two private 4-year, one 
public 4-year) as they completed federally mandated exit counseling for the students’ 
federal student loans. The authors found that students often reported high levels of 
confidence in themselves to repay their debt or in the system to help them find alternative 
means of repayment if necessary. This finding does not support the popular-press idea that 
students who have borrowed feel inhibited by their debt. While the study was timely and 
relevant, the researchers only spoke with students once. Thus, the study does not provide 
information on whether students’ confidence in “the system” and their ability to repay their 
loans changes over time. Additionally, since the focus of the work was on evaluating exit 
counseling, in-depth questions about students’ beliefs about their debt or 
postbaccalaureate futures were limited.  
Overall, there is a dearth of qualitative research on undergraduate debt and 
postbaccalaureate decision-making. The research conducted so far generally suggests that 
students are confident that debt will not discourage them from reaching their preferred 
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postbaccalaureate goals and that they will be able to meet repayment conditions. There is 
still a gap in understanding how students conceptualize their undergraduate debt, make 
meaning of debt burden, select repayment plans, and whether and how cumulative debt 
influences postbaccalaureate education or occupational decisions. There is also a lack of 
understanding around how students’ conceptions of undergraduate debt and repayment 
change over time, particularly in the time leading up to when students traditionally begin 
repayment. I seek to fill this gap in our understanding of how students, particularly 
underrepresented students, conceptualize undergraduate debt and their repayment 
options. 
Conclusion 
Prior research on the effects of undergraduate debt, both quantitative and 
qualitative, created the foundation for this work. Unfortunately, the causal research on 
undergraduate debt has either used pre-2000 data, which could be impractical for the 
current post–Great Recession policy context, or has focused on a single institution/single 
area of study. The qualitative work rarely investigated the specific influence of 
undergraduate debt on postbaccalaureate decision-making or the temporal nature of 
conceptions of debt and repayment. I fill this gap in the literature by estimating the causal 
effect of undergraduate debt on postbaccalaureate decision-making while expanding our 
understanding of how students, particularly underrepresented students, conceptualize 
undergraduate debt and their repayment options. In the next chapter, I outline the 
conceptual framework, which primarily relies on human capital theory from the discipline 
of economics. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
I combine human capital theory and debt aversion to construct a conceptual model 
for how students respond to undergraduate debt. While prior research often views these 
theoretical perspectives in opposition, I explore how human capital theory and debt 
aversion can be viewed as complementary. To explain the conceptual framework, I first 
outline these two theoretical perspectives. Then I discuss caveats to their interpretation 
when applied to the relationship between undergraduate debt and postbaccalaureate 
decision-making. Next, I share the conceptual model and hypotheses for the effect of 
undergraduate debt. Finally, I give practical examples of the theories applied to 
undergraduate debt and postbaccalaureate decision-making. 
Human Capital Theory 
Human capital is the knowledge and skills that an individual or society hold that 
could be used to increase productivity (Paulsen, 2001). Scholars typically conceive 
investments in human capital as expenditures on health, formal or informal education, or 
activities that increase the capacity for productivity (Schultz, 1961). Human capital theory, 
the idea that both individuals and society benefit economically from investments in people, 
is often applied to research on education within economics (Sweetland, 1996).  
In Becker’s (1964) seminal work on internal rates of return on human capital 
investment, he outlined the implicit decision-making process for students when 
considering enrolling in higher education. Students must evaluate the costs of enrolling in 
college and the potential economic returns to the increase in their human capital by 
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acquiring new skills and knowledge (I discuss only economic returns in this section 
because these are the overwhelming majority of benefits discussed in relation to human 
capital theory). The costs are both direct (e.g., tuition and fees) and indirect (the foregone 
earnings the student could have earned with a high school diploma or GED alone). These 
costs might be offset if the student receives subsidies to attend higher education or works 
while enrolled. If a student receives a subsidy for higher education, such as a grant, the 
direct costs of enrolling decrease. Decreasing the net direct costs of higher education 
through subsidies is the primary focus of the United States’ federal financial aid system. If a 
student works while enrolled in higher education, the amount of foregone earnings for the 
student decreases. With regard to benefits, investing in human capital leads to economic 
returns both to the individual, with increased lifetime earnings, and to society, with 
increased income at the local, state, regional, and national levels (Paulsen, 2001). 
Individual economic returns are often operationalized as the individual earnings 
differential between having a high school diploma and a baccalaureate degree (Paulsen, 
2001; Sweetland, 1996).3  
These benefits and costs should be evaluated at the present discounted value if 
possible (Paulsen, 2001). Earning $1,000 today is not equal to earning $1,000 dollars 5 
years from now. Each person values future flows of cash, incoming and outgoing, 
differently. One person could be relatively forward-thinking and willing to forego present 
benefits for potentially larger ones in the future, which would indicate a lower discount 
rate. Another person could be present-focused and not willing to risk the essentially 
                                                          
3 This is for internal rate of return. The two other popular methods of measuring the private rate of return are 
either the average education differential (differential between the average person with a high school diploma 
and the average person with a baccalaureate degree) or the Mincerian earnings functions (Paulsen, 2001; 
Sweetland, 1996). 
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guaranteed benefit in the present for potential returns in the future, which would indicate a 
higher discount rate. If the forward-thinking person had a discount rate of 3%, she would 
value $1,000 given to her in 5 years as approximately $863 in the present day.4 If the 
present-focused person had a discount rate of 10%, she would value $1,000 given to her in 
5 years as approximately $621 in the present day. This is why it is critical to factor in the 
present-value of future benefits and costs. Offering to give the first person $1,000 in 5 years 
might induce different behavior than the same offer to the second. Once the present-value 
of future cash flows are taken into consideration, if the marginal benefit (additional benefit 
from a single-unit increase in education, normally operationalized as a year in college) is 
greater than the marginal cost (additional cost from a single-unit increase in education), 
human capital theory predicts that the student would choose to enroll in that additional 
year of higher education. The internal rate of return for a student is predicted to be higher 
if the earnings differential is larger, direct costs are lower, subsidies are higher, foregone 
earnings are lower, or the discount rate of the student is lower. 
Human capital theory allows for adjustments for students who do not face the same 
challenges that the so-called traditional college student faces. The heterogeneous 
preferences and ability of each student affects both the supply and demand of higher 
education available to that student (Altonji, Blom, & Meghir, 2012). Demand for higher 
education can differ for students depending on their personal backgrounds and 
experiences (Paulsen, 2001). Students vary in the amount of ability they have, 
discrimination they face, quality of primary and secondary opportunities, and more. These 
differences can affect students’ perceptions of how beneficial higher education would be 
                                                          
4 The equation for the calculation of present value of an amount of money is found in many economic texts, 
such as Paulsen (2001).   
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for them. Even when, on average, there is a high earnings differential between a high school 
graduate and a college graduate, certain groups of students may, correctly or incorrectly, 
assume that those benefits will not accrue to them (Paulsen, 2001). The supply of money to 
cover the direct costs of higher education also varies depending on the student. Credit 
markets do not treat all students or families the same, and often students from low-income 
backgrounds or those who are racial minorities have less access to financing options 
(Becker, 1975, 1993; Paulsen, 2001; Rothstein & Rouse, 2011). Need-based financial aid 
fills a critical gap in the supply for higher education because, without it, the costs would be 
so high that students could view their optimal amount of investment in higher education as 
less than is beneficial both to other types of students and to society (Paulsen, 2001).  
Some scholars posit that the critical gap in the supply for higher education should 
not be filled by financial aid. Heckman and Carneiro (2003) argue that subsidies focused on 
early childhood education would reduce the gap in supply as the improvements in learning 
outcomes would exponentially improve the lives of younger students. In fact, they posit 
that, without drastic changes in early childhood education funding, “traditional policies” 
like tuition subsidies can do little to close gaps in the supply of higher education (in the 
paper specifically referring to college attendance). While focusing on early childhood 
education does have fiscal merit, it is difficult to see computationally that the investments 
in early childhood education would be the most efficient method of closing gaps in supply. 
For example, Dynarski and colleagues (2013) examined the effect of smaller class size in 
the first years of formal schooling on postsecondary outcomes. The authors found that 
being randomly assigned to a smaller class size in Tennessee increased the probability of 
attending college by 2.7 percentage points and of graduating by 1.6 percentage points, but 
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they also estimated that it would cost $171,000 to induce a single student in the poorest 
third of schools to enroll in college. The authors calculated similar costs for other early 
childhood education programs: $133,333 for Head Start, $410,000 for the Abecedarian 
preschool experiment. However, when the authors calculated the costs of later-in-life 
interventions, they found smaller amounts: $1,100 for the previously mentioned H&R 
Block FAFSA experiment (Bettinger et al., 2009), $21,000 for the Social Security Student 
Benefit Program (grant to students whose parents died), and $93,667 for Upward Bound. It 
is clear that, while investments in early childhood education are certainly useful, subsidies 
for higher education may be an effective and efficient way to close gaps in access to an 
undergraduate education.  
Human capital theory has implications for postbaccalaureate decision-making. This 
theory is overwhelmingly used when discussing the choice to enroll in another year of 
primary and secondary schooling or an undergraduate degree program (Perna, 2000), but 
it logically applies to the choice to enroll in postbaccalaureate programs as well (Perna, 
2004). As students near completion of their baccalaureate degree, they must decide 
whether they will try to enter the labor market or pursue further education. It follows that 
these students have many of the same anxieties that prospective undergraduate students 
do: Will attending graduate school pay me enough in the future to make up for the lost 
income? Will I not be able to get the type of job I want unless I attend graduate school? 
Students deciding whether to apply to graduate school must weigh these options and 
choose the individually optimal decision for them. Traditional interpretations of human 
capital theory predict that students would evaluate the amount of undergraduate loan debt 
they have borrowed and decide that the most rational way to repay the debt is to attend 
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graduate school to obtain a higher-earning occupation. This, however, depends on the 
anticipated rate of return the students have for their investment in graduate school. 
Additionally, undergraduate enrollment often increases during recessions and times when 
unemployment is high as students attempt to postpone labor market entry (Bedard & 
Herman, 2008; Fry, 2010; Murphy, 1994). If that assumption holds for enrollments to 
graduate school, the students might seek to attend graduate/professional school in order to 
wait out poor work opportunities (analysis sample for the quantitative portion of this 
study includes students who graduated during the beginning of the Great Recession).  
With regard to early-career occupational choice, students implicitly weigh the 
benefits and costs of certain occupations in order to decide which occupation is the most 
optimal for them. The benefits in the case of occupational choice are generally expected 
lifetime earnings and nonpecuniary benefits (Boskin, 1974). The costs are the training 
required for the new occupation and the foregone potential lifetime earnings in other 
occupations. Under human capital theory, students are predicted to choose occupations 
that maximize the present value of potential lifetime earnings (Blaug, 1976; Boskin, 1974). 
Thus, students would select early-career occupations with higher salaries, better 
nonpecuniary benefits, or a combination of the two. Thus, students with additional 
undergraduate debt would be more likely to pursue a high-salary occupation.  
Debt Aversion 
Scholars posit that students make decisions based on their risk aversion with regard 
to debt (Burdman, 2005; Field, 2009). Debt aversion theory predicts that a student would 
either make decisions that do not require borrowing (not enrolling in higher education or 
transferring when more borrowing is required) or that lead to an extreme focus on 
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repayment of debt. Following this theory, students would react to increased undergraduate 
debt load by choosing to work in an occupation that returns a higher salary in order to 
repay loans quicker. Or students would react to increased debt load by lowering their 
aspirations for postbaccalaureate study and instead deciding to enter the labor force more 
quickly in order to begin repayment of loans. This theory does not have to be in 
competition with human capital theory. As noted previously, recent scholarship on the 
unstable nature of costs and benefits for students allows for debt aversion to predict 
students viewing education as less of a benefit or viewing the cost of additional education 
as exceptionally high (Altonji, Blom, & Meghir, 2012; Paulsen, 2001). In terms of 
differential effects, numerous scholars have found suggestive, though not conclusive, 
evidence that some student populations (e.g., racial ethnic/minorities, students from low-
income backgrounds) can be risk-averse when confronted with undergraduate student 
loans (Burdman, 2005; Callender & Jackson, 2005; Cunningham & Santiago, 2008; Field, 
2009; Perna, 2000). This is often posited as the result of structural income and wealth 
inequalities (Oliver & Shapiro, 1997), cultural aversion to debt, or familial lack of or 
negative experience with borrowing more generally (Burdman, 2005, Cunningham & 
Santiago, 2008). Based on prior research, students underrepresented in higher education 
could react more strongly to the increasing reliance on student debt for college funding. 
This would support Rothstein and Rouse’s (2011) supposition that, potentially, all “college 
graduates are averse to holding debt or that they face constraints on their ability to borrow 
against future earnings” (p. 162). This aversion could push these students to search for 
higher-paying employment when previously the students had wished to enroll in 
postbaccalaureate education or choose an occupation with a smaller salary.  
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Caveats 
Two types of repayment policies complicate these theories. Income-Based 
Repayment (IBR) plans allow students to pay a set portion of their income toward their 
federal loans instead of a flat payment based on the amount borrowed (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2014b). Still, approximately 14% of students in repayment on their Direct Loans 
in 2014 used IBR (College Board, 2014), which is a marginal portion of the population. 
Federal and state policies that allow for loan forgiveness generally rely on some low-
salary/public service occupation requirement. For example, the federal Public Service Loan 
Forgiveness Program allows students who work full-time in public service occupations to 
forego repaying the remaining balance on any Direct Loans after making 120 payments on 
the debt. Like IBR, this policy could make it easier for students to manage high amounts of 
cumulative debt without needing a high-salary occupation. Based on prior research and the 
conceptual frameworks I apply, even with these types of repayment programs, students 
made postbaccalaureate decisions by responding to the cumulative amount of debt they 
borrowed. 
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses 
A simpler way to think through the choices a student makes for additional schooling 
and then early-career occupation or graduate school is to focus on the sequential decisions 
each student makes (Altonji et al., 2012). Before enrolling in an undergraduate institution, 
a student chooses a major, an occupation, or enrolling in graduate school directly after 
graduating (initial decision). She decides on these alternatives nearly simultaneously and 
bases the decision on her underlying preferences and her abilities, as well as her 
uncertainty about those two factors (no student can truly know the extent of her ability or 
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preference for a certain occupation or postbaccalaureate degree; Altonji et al., 2012). While 
she is enrolled, tuition increases at that undergraduate institution. The student chooses to 
borrow or not to borrow in order to continue attending that institution. If the student does 
choose to borrow more, she must evaluate and reassess her prior decision about an 
occupation or attending graduate school. This reassessment can happen many times during 
a student’s undergraduate career. My dissertation focuses on this reassessment decision: 
the choice of occupation or graduate school after a student has responded to tuition 
increases by borrowing an additional amount. The quantitative analyses focus on the local 
average treatment effect (LATE) of undergraduate debt: testing the extent to which 
undergraduate debt affects students’ postbaccalaureate decision-making solely for 
students induced to borrow more because of tuition and fee changes. I study this 
reassessment at three time points: while students were in college, one year after 
graduation, and four years after graduation. The qualitative analyses focus on the process 
of reassessment students with undergraduate debt experience while making 
postbaccalaureate education and occupation decisions. See Figure for a visual explanation 
of these decision points.  
I investigate how variation caused by exogenous shocks to the change in the price of 
attending different institutions induced certain students to borrow more to finance their 
undergraduate education. By doing this, I am able to analyze part of the causal effect of 
undergraduate debt on postbaccalaureate decision-making. In the models, I focus on the 
coefficients for the undergraduate debt measures. For the postbaccalaureate education 
models, if the coefficient on undergraduate debt is statistically significant and negative, 
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Figure. Conceptual Model. 
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debt had a negative effect on students’ graduate school aspirations or enrollment behavior. 
If the coefficient on undergraduate debt is statistically significant and positive or 
statistically insignificant, but there is enough power to detect an effect, debt did not have an 
inhibiting effect on students’ graduate aspirations or enrollment. For the postbaccalaureate 
early-career occupation models, if the coefficient on undergraduate debt is statistically 
significant and positive, debt had a positive effect on the early-career salary. If the 
coefficient on undergraduate debt is statistically significant and negative or statistically 
insignificant, and there is enough power to detect an effect, debt did not have an inhibiting 
effect on students’ selecting occupations with lower salaries.  
I have three hypotheses about debt’s relationship with postbaccalaureate decision-
making (for the quantitative work). First, I hypothesize that debt will have either a positive 
or statistically insignificant effect on graduate aspirations. Prior research has rarely found 
that debt could induce change in students aspiring to postbaccalaureate education 
(Rothstein & Rouse, 2011). Second, I hypothesize that debt will have a negative effect on 
graduate enrollment. As outlined in the literature review, educational aspirations and 
behaviors are not the same construct. Aspirations or attitudes toward certain objects or 
behaviors do not consistently predict behavior (Regan & Fazio, 1977). Moderators of the 
relationship between aspirations and debt, such as direct experience with the object or 
behavior (Kraus, 1995), can explain why aspirations may not vary greatly within the 
population or predict future behaviors weakly. Prior research, particularly Malcom and 
Dowd (2012), found suggestive evidence that increasing undergraduate debt would lead to 
students choosing not to enroll in postbaccalaureate education. This evidence differs from 
the research on aspirations, likely due to the weak predictive abilities of aspirations for 
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future behaviors. Malcom and Dowd’s (2012) enrollment findings run counter to a 
traditional human capital theory prediction; however, I argue that students' risk aversion 
will make not enrolling in graduate school the most optimal decision from students’ 
perspectives. Third, I hypothesize that debt will have a positive effect on early-career 
occupation salary. Extant literature and human capital theory predict that students will 
seek a higher salary when undergraduate debt increases in order to increase their utility.  
To be clear, reassessment of prior postbaccalaureate decision-making is not 
inherently a negative behavior. For example, in examining the relationship between debt 
and early-career occupation salary, students' response to increased undergraduate debt by 
seeking an early-career occupation with a higher salary has likely positive effects both on 
the students’ ability to repay and on their future utility. The potential apprehension about 
this reassessment is twofold. First, debt could induce students to select postbaccalaureate 
educational or occupational opportunities that are at odds with their underlying 
preferences and abilities. There is an unobserved distribution of underlying preferences 
and abilities for majors, careers, and educational attainment. Undergraduate debt may 
decrease students' ability to pursue their preferred postbaccalaureate life if they choose 
educational attainment levels or early-career occupations contrary to their underlying 
preferences and abilities. Second, borrowing to finance undergraduate education is not 
randomly distributed throughout the population. As outlined previously, certain types of 
students (i.e. low-income, African American) borrow at higher rates and higher amounts 
than do their peers. Therefore, even if it is a rational choice to change postbaccalaureate 
behaviors based on the amount of undergraduate debt amassed, only certain students must 
face this particular reassessment of prior postbaccalaureate decision-making.  
 62 
Practical Examples 
Here I provide examples of these theories applied to undergraduate debt and 
postbaccalaureate decision-making. First is an example for postbaccalaureate education. 
Two students enroll at Public State University (PSU). These students are both full-time, live 
on campus, have a mixture of grants and loans in their financial aid awards, and wish to 
attend a master’s program after graduation. The COA at PSU is $25,000 each year. After two 
years, PSU raises COA to $32,000. Because of this $7,000 increase, the students both 
borrow the additional amount in federal loans. Both students graduate after four years at 
PSU with $15,000 in cumulative debt (average for bachelor’s degree recipients; College 
Board, 2014). Student A is debt-averse/has a higher discount rate and, after graduation, 
chooses to forego graduate school and enter the labor market in order to begin repayment 
on the unanticipated amount of debt accumulated during her collegiate career. Student B 
realizes that, though she holds more debt than she had planned, the lifelong differential 
between holding a baccalaureate degree and a postbaccalaureate degree is large enough 
that she will easily be able to repay her undergraduate debt and still benefit from further 
education.  
The second example concerns postbaccalaureate early-career occupational choice 
and uses the same two students without reference to their master’s degree aspirations. 
Student A is debt averse/has a higher discount rate and chooses a high-salary occupation 
after graduation in order to begin repayment on the unanticipated amount of debt 
accumulated during her collegiate career. This is also a rational decision based on the 
student wishing to maximize her lifetime earnings. Student B realizes that, though she 
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holds more debt than she had planned, her underlying preferences and abilities make a 
low-salary occupation after graduation an attractive choice.  
These examples show how the conceptual framework works in real-world 
scenarios. In the next chapter, I apply this conceptual framework to the quantitative 
analysis of research question 1: To what extent does undergraduate student loan debt 
affect postbaccalaureate educational aspirations, enrollment, and early-career occupational 
salary?
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
INVESTIGATION 1: UNDERGRADUATE DEBT’S EFFECT ON POSTBACCALAUREATE 
EDUCATION AND EARLY-CAREER OCCUPATION CHOICE 
 
My contribution to this body of research is to estimate the causal relationship 
between undergraduate debt and postbaccalaureate decision-making. Previous research on 
debt’s relationship with postbaccalaureate decision-making either uses older, nationally 
representative data or newer, single-institution/single-field-of-study data. I use a new 
instrument—change in average tuition and fees—in order to investigate undergraduate 
debt’s effects while filling in these gaps in the literature using newer, nationally 
representative data rich with financial aid and indebtedness measures. This instrument 
intuitively makes sense because changes in the cost of attending college should predict a 
change in the amount of undergraduate debt students borrow without directly affecting 
students’ graduate school aspirations, enrollment behaviors, or early-career occupation 
salary. I focus on research question 1 for the quantitative analysis. For ease of 
interpretation, I separate that research question into three subquestions based on the 
outcome variable. The subquestions are: To what extent does undergraduate student loan 
debt affect postbaccalaureate 
(A) educational aspirations? 
(B) educational enrollment?  
(C) early-career occupational salary? 
In this chapter I outline the research methods first. I discuss the data, the variables, 
and how the variables are operationalized, and I end with model specifications. Then I 
report the results of the quantitative analyses. This includes summary statistics, 
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relationships among the key variables, the main regression analyses, subpopulation 
analyses, and robustness checks. 
Research Methods 
Data 
I analyze two datasets from the U.S. Department of Education National Center for 
Education Statistics. I use the Beginning Postsecondary Students (BPS): 04/09 dataset for 
the analysis of the dependent variable postbaccalaureate education aspirations (research 
question 1.A) and the B&B 2007–2008 graduating cohort for the analysis of the dependent 
variables, postbaccalaureate education enrollment and early-career occupation choice 
(research questions 1.B and 1.C).  
The BPS: 04/09 is a subsample of the base-year study of the National Postsecondary 
Student Aid Study (NPSAS: 04), a nationally representative survey of first-time 
postsecondary students conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics. NPSAS: 
04 uses a two-stage design: Researchers select eligible institutions from the institutional 
sampling frame (constructed from IPEDS 2000–2001 to 2002–2003 data) and then choose 
students from those institutions. Selection requires eligible institutions to meet all criteria 
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act (20 U.S.C. §§ 1070–1099) for disbursing federal 
financial aid; eligible students must attend those institutions, be enrolled in the requisite 
academic program or course, and not be concurrently enrolled in high school or a GED 
program. A direct, unclustered sample of institutions is selected and, in order to analyze 
state policy measures, 12 states were oversampled from three higher education sectors 
(public 2-year, public 4-year, private not-for-profit 4-year). NPSAS: 04 samples 109,210 
first-time beginning students via fixed-type sampling rates in order to maintain equal 
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probability of selection across institution type, but only 101,010 students are eligible once 
institutional records are verified. While NPSAS examines how students pay for college, BPS 
is a longitudinal dataset composed of information on students’ background characteristics, 
persistence in and completion of postsecondary education programs, financing of college, 
transition to labor force, and changes over time in their aspirations, income, and other 
factors. For BPS: 04/09, students are initially surveyed at the end of their first academic 
year (2003–2004, first wave) and then invited to participate in follow-up surveys 2 years 
(2006, second wave) and 4 years later (2009, third wave). The final BPS: 04/09 dataset has 
16,680 participants: any sample member eligible at the beginning of the study, alive during 
data collection, who has valid data to allow construction of his/her enrollment history. 
Response rate is 90% among sample members who are initially located in the batch-
locating activities that create the base group from the NPSAS: 04. There are weights for 
three groups: study respondents at any point in data collection, panel respondents who 
completed all three phases, and sample members with transcript data (adjusted for 
nonresponse). I use the first and third waves of BPS: 04/09 to investigate graduate 
aspirations and debt.  
The B&B: 08/12 is a subsample of NPSAS: 08. NPSAS: 08 samples students in a way 
similar to the methods described for NPSAS: 04. B&B: 08/12 focuses on a nationally 
representative sample of postsecondary students who earned a baccalaureate degree from 
a Title IV eligible institution between July 1, 2007 and June 30, 2008. The first follow-up 
occurred 1 year after earning the degree (2009) and the second follow-up occurred 3 years 
after that (2012). The surveys focus on postbaccalaureate education, debt and finances, and 
employment. The final B&B: 08/12 dataset has approximately 17,160 participants, which 
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include any sample member who participated in B&B: 08 and is still deemed eligible based 
on the B&B: 08/09 transcripts or interviews. The Department of Education obtained an 
85% response rate. There are weights for three groups: panel weight to analyze NPSAS 
items with B&B: 08/12 items, panel weight to for all three waves, and panel weight for all 
three interviews and transcript data. I use all three waves to investigate the relationship of 
graduate school enrollment and early-career occupation salary with undergraduate debt. 
I supplement each dataset with tuition and fee figures for the first postsecondary 
institution attended from IPEDS (surveys completed by all Title IV eligible postsecondary 
institutions in the United States) and selectivity measures for the first postsecondary 
institution from the 2004 Barron’s Admissions Competitiveness Index (year chosen 
because of proximity to when students started postsecondary education). For the 
aspirations dataset, I use figures from AY 2003–2004 to 2005–2006 (answering research 
question 1.A). For the enrollment and early-career choice dataset, I use figures from the 
entire approximate undergraduate enrollment for each student (answering research 
questions 1.B and 1.C).5 I further restrict the sample to U.S. citizens and resident aliens, 
since they are the only students eligible for federal financial aid, who attend not-for-profit 
institutions for which IPEDS codes could be located. This results in a sample size of 
approximately 9,000 for aspirations and 10,000 for enrollment and salary.  
To measure the number of students who enroll in graduate school at some point, it 
would be useful to follow them for as long as possible after they earn their baccalaureate 
degree.  That is not possible with the existing data constraints. Therefore, some students in 
                                                          
5 I created a variable for when students started postsecondary education based on the age the students 
reported they started postsecondary education. For any person whose starting year was before AY 1999–
2000, I assigned them a starting year of AY 1999–2000. The earliest starting year was in the 1950s, but the 
25th percentile was 2003. Additionally, the measure of tuition and fees is not recorded in IPEDS before 1999.  
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the sample count as not enrolling in graduate school during the time covered by the dataset 
but would eventually choose to enroll. Using the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study 
of 2007–2008, Choy and Cataldi (2011) found that, of students currently in graduate 
school, approximately 70% enrolled within 3–6 years of earning their baccalaureate degree 
in a master’s or doctoral program.6 Of students in first-professional degree programs, 
approximately 90% enrolled within 3–6 years of college graduation. Therefore, although 
B&B is not perfect, it allows me to observe students who enrolled in graduate school up to 
4 years after earning their baccalaureate degree. This is likely to capture a substantial 
portion of students who enroll in graduate school. 
Variables 
There are three outcome variables of interest. The first outcome variable is graduate 
aspirations, which is operationalized as the highest degree ever expected three years after 
entering postsecondary education. This variable takes on a value of 1 if a student reports 
that his/her highest degree ever expected is any degree beyond a bachelor’s degree. It 
measures the attitudes of students and, as such, is not the same as actual behaviors 
students exhibited. As mentioned in the literature review, it is critical to differentiate the 
effects on aspirations and enrollment. The second outcome variable is graduate enrollment, 
which is operationalized as whether a student has enrolled in any type of 
postbaccalaureate education (measured at two time points: one year and four years after 
earning a baccalaureate degree). It measures actual student behavior. The third outcome 
variable is early-career occupation choice, which is operationalized as the annualized 
                                                          
6 This excludes students enrolled in doctoral programs in education. The authors removed those students 
from the overall averages as they are atypical and only 30% enroll in their program within 3–6 years of 
earning a baccalaureate degree. 
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salary of the student’s primary occupation (measured at 1 year and 4 years after earning a 
baccalaureate degree). I log salary measures after adding 1 to them (to preserve the 0s, as 
the natural log of 1 is 0) in order to account for the multiplicative nature of salary 
increases. 
Undergraduate debt is the endogenous variable of interest. I include both 
cumulative educational debt and cumulative federal educational debt as measures of total 
undergraduate debt for all models. The change in the average tuition and fees for each 
institution is the primary instrumental variable.7 I log these variables after adding 1 to 
them (again to preserve the 0s) in order to account for the likely multiplicative relationship 
between debt and change in average tuition and fees. This means that, for the salary 
outcome models (research question 1.C), I estimate the elasticity between early-career 
choice outcome and undergraduate debt. I include a measure of parents’ education and an 
interaction between change in the average tuition and fees and parents’ education in order 
to create an overidentified model (which allows me to test one of the primary assumptions 
of instrumental variables, discussed below). Parents’ education in the aspirations models 
(research question 1.A) is mother’s highest education (binary for education level of high 
school or higher) and in the enrollment and salary models (research questions 1.B and 1.C) 
is father’s highest education (binary for education level of high school or higher). I made 
this choice because the respective measures of education provide the best identification for 
the sample. 
                                                          
7 In IPEDS, these variables for in-state students are tuition2 and fee2 (in-state average tuition for full-time 
undergraduates and in-state required fees for full-time undergraduates, respectively). For out-of-state 
students these are tuition3 and fee3 (out-of-state average tuition for full-time undergraduates and out-of-
state required fees for full-time undergraduates, respectively). 
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Previous research emphasized the relationship between students’ precollege 
characteristics (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, high school 
performance) and their graduate school aspirations/enrollment. I operationalize 
precollege characteristics as age when starting postsecondary education, race/ethnicity 
(White, African American, Latino, Asian, other race),8 binary for gender, prior income 
(parents’ income for dependent students or students’ income for independent students), 
and college entrance examination score (SAT/ACT score). Many scholars found that the 
type of institutions students attend can influence students’ graduate aspirations (e.g., 
Bowen & Bok, 1998). In contrast, Pascarella (1984) posited that institutional 
characteristics indirectly influenced graduate school aspirations because of their smaller 
effect estimates in the majority of models investigating the factors influencing graduate 
aspirations. I operationalize institutions’ characteristics as binary for institutional control, 
binary for institutional level, initial average tuition and fees at first postsecondary 
institution, and institutional selectivity (most selective, selective, less selective, 
nonselective). Except for initial average tuition and fees and institutional selectivity, all 
these variables are measured in BPS: 04 or B&B: 08. Finally, I include measures of the 
individual after enrollment in postsecondary education: college GPA, marriage status, and 
whether the student has children. These variables are all measured as early as possible in 
students’ careers: in BPS: 04 (except college GPA, which was measured in BPS: 06) or B&B: 
08. 
 
 
                                                          
8 Other race is a combination of American Indian/Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander, 
other race, and more than one race due to small sample size. 
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Model Specification 
Because of the potentially endogenous relationship between debt and 
postbaccalaureate decision-making, I implement instrumental variables (IV) estimation as 
an identification strategy to estimate causal effects. I use the changes in average tuition and 
fees at the institution the student attended their first year of postsecondary education 
interacted with parental education as an instrument for the change in student debt. Change 
in average tuition and fees could force students to borrow more because higher average 
tuition and fees would presumably lead students to rely on loans in order to finance their 
educations. However, change in average tuition and fees should not influence 
postbaccalaureate decision-making, except through the channel of undergraduate debt.  
Students would be less likely to rely on loans to finance these changes if the increase 
in average tuition and fees was coupled with an increase in the amount of other types of aid 
available (e.g., grant aid). This did not appear to be the case, given that the maximum Pell 
grant was generally steady over the majority of students’ undergraduate education in the 
sample: $4,050 from AY 2003–2004 to AY 2006–2007, with a minor increase to $4,310 in 
AY 2007–2008, the final year of undergraduate education for the second analysis of 
graduate school enrollment (U.S. Department of Education, 2015c). Although it is a cruder 
indicator, the amount of state need-based grant aid and institutional grants meeting need 
were also generally steady during the undergraduate education of the sample (Figures 26A, 
31A, 31B of College Board, 2014). Therefore, it is likely that if the institution a student 
attends raises the average tuition and fees and the student chooses to continue attending 
that institution, the student will rely in some part on loans to cover the additional cost.  
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Students are not required to continue attending their first postsecondary institution. 
They could, in reaction to an increase in average tuition and fees, choose to transfer to a 
different institution or leave higher education altogether. Transferring is not necessarily a 
negative: Transfer students might be able to find a better fit at another institution and 
graduate with what they view as an appropriate amount of undergraduate debt. This 
scenario would mean that the coefficient of interest I estimate could be the lower bound 
because larger changes in average tuition and fees could be linked to a smaller amount of 
debt with transfer to a less expensive institution. Neither institutions, states, nor the 
federal government want the second option, leaving higher education with no degree or 
credential (Fain, 2014). In the model, these students would not have an increasing amount 
of undergraduate debt while the average tuition and fees were changing. Students in the 
sample choosing to leave college altogether could falsely result in estimates indicating that 
increases in average tuition and fees are not inhibiting students when in reality the 
increases caused the students to drop out of higher education. This is a concern only with 
research question 1.A, aspirations (questions 1.B and 1.C, enrollment and early-career 
choice, include only students who have earned a baccalaureate degree).  
It would have been preferable to create an experimental design to test the research 
questions. However, it is both ethically and feasibly challenging to randomly assign 
students to different amounts of undergraduate debt in order to investigate how borrowing 
changes postbaccalaureate decision-making. Instead, I use the unsystematic assignment of 
tuition and fees changes throughout the United States, which are outside the control of 
students, to predict the portion of the causal relationship between undergraduate debt and 
 73 
postbaccalaureate decision-making that is driven by students induced to borrow more by 
changes in tuition and fees (discussed below).  
There are four assumptions of IV estimation that, once satisfied, allow the 
quantitative results of this work to be interpreted as credible estimates for the causal effect 
of undergraduate debt on graduate school aspirations, enrollment, and early-career 
occupation salary for students whose amount of undergraduate debt is influenced by the 
instruments, change in tuition and fees, parental education, and their interaction. This type 
of estimate is called a local average treatment effect (LATE; Imbens & Angrist, 1994). The 
four assumptions are independence, exclusion, relevance, and monotonicity (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009; Imbens, 2014).  
The independence assumption means the instruments must be distributed among 
the population of interest in a manner not related to the endogenous predictor (debt) or 
the potential outcomes (graduate school aspirations, enrollment, and early-career 
occupation salary). That the instrument can be considered good as randomly assigned 
makes it a strong assumption. Although it is easier to satisfy when estimating intent-to-
treat effects from randomly assigned experiments, it is conventional to relax this 
assumption when using observational data (Imbens, 2014). The assumption can be relaxed 
to require that the instrument could be unconfounded assignment, conditioned on the 
other covariates. The instrument of changes in average tuition and fees satisfies this 
relaxed assumption because, conditioned on individual and institutional characteristics, 
changes in average tuition and fees at the first postsecondary institution attended 
conceivably occur in a quasi-random manner. It is plausible that this assumption is upheld.  
 74 
The second assumption, the exclusion restriction, means the instruments can only 
affect the outcomes through the endogenous predictor; there is no plausible way for the 
instrument to influence the outcome directly. A potential threat is that graduate school 
admissions committees could view the increase in average tuition and fees as an increase 
in the quality of education students receive. If this were the case, an increase in average 
tuition and fees would directly influence the likelihood of students being admitted and 
ultimately enrolling in graduate school. This is not a plausible scenario, though, as graduate 
admissions committees normally view the rigor of coursework or opportunities for 
research at an undergraduate institution to be indicators of quality rather than the sticker 
price for attending. However, to control for this potential threat, I include a measure of 
selectivity of the undergraduate institution. High-salary occupation employers could view 
the increase in COA as an increase in the quality of education the students receive. If this 
were true, an increase in COA would directly influence the likelihood of students being 
offered high-salary occupations. This is not a plausible scenario, however, because 
potential employers normally view the general prestige at an undergraduate institution to 
be indicators of quality rather than the changes in the sticker price for attending. It also 
would not explain why a student chose to take the offered position. Still, the previously 
discussed measure of selectivity should control for this potential threat.  
In addition, as students select which postsecondary institution they will attend, 
those who are more likely to aspire to or enroll in graduate school or select a low-salary 
occupation (e.g., highly motivated students) might enroll at institutions with higher 
changes in average tuition and fees. This would allow changes in average tuition and fees to 
have another pathway to affect the outcome variables. One would have to assume that 
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students can predict the amount of change in average tuition and fees that an institution 
will have over their undergraduate education. Students are generally not good predictors 
of how much undergraduate debt they will accumulate (Akers & Chingos, 2014; Andruska 
et al., 2014), which gives evidence that they are also not likely to be able to forecast the 
changes in average tuition and fees at their institution.  
In states where tuition increased rapidly, there are two potential concerns: poor 
labor markets and apprehension about graduate school cost. Potentially poor labor 
markets lead to lower tax revenues, which reduces funding for higher education and 
increases college tuition. This is unlikely to be the case, however, as there is no discernible 
pattern between changes in tuition and fees and the state indicators of labor market health, 
such as unemployment rate. The direction of the relationship between undergraduate debt 
and the postbaccalaureate outcomes of interest can also provide evidence for this potential 
additional pathway between the endogenous predictor and the outcome. If the effects I find 
are reactions to poor labor markets, an increase in undergraduate debt should predict an 
increase in graduate school enrollment and a decrease in the early-career occupation 
salary. If the effects are the opposite of these directions, it is likely the exclusion restriction 
is upheld. I address this with the robustness checks outlined below.  
For apprehension about graduate school cost, students might surmise that graduate 
school tuition will be very expensive based on the rapid increase in undergraduate tuition 
in their state. I would first have to assume that apprehension of rising costs of graduate 
education vary throughout the population of recent baccalaureate degree earners in 
relation to the changes in tuition at the students’ institutions. Unless a student is borrowing 
more and analyzing the amount of money necessary to finance her college education, it is 
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unlikely that she would focus attention on the exact amount of increase in tuition and fees 
at her institution. There would be a general sense that tuition and fees have been 
increasing at colleges and universities, but students attending institutions with larger 
increases would not notice a distinct difference. This is tested further in the qualitative 
portion of this dissertation (Chapter V) and in the robustness checks below.  
The third assumption, relevance, means the instruments must be predictive in the 
first stage models (when the endogenous predictor is regressed on the instruments and 
other covariates). If the instruments do not have significant predictive power, it is difficult 
to obtain unbiased and precise second stage estimates. This is testable and is shared in the 
results section of this chapter. 
The final assumption, monotonicity, means the instruments' effect on the population 
of interest must be the same for all, though it allows that some may not be affected. For this 
work, I argue that large changes in average tuition and fees increase the amount of 
undergraduate debt students hold. If large changes in average tuition and fees caused 
students to decrease their amount of undergraduate debt, this work would violate this 
assumption. Due to this assumption, I focused only on the amount of undergraduate debt 
students borrowed, not the amount the students owed at any given time (because that 
would include the amount of undergraduate debt remaining after in-college payments). 
Students transferring to another institution and borrowing less or not borrowing at all 
would not decrease the amount of undergraduate debt borrowed. This is also true if 
students drop out of college in reaction to a change in average tuition and fees: the students 
still do not decrease the actual amount of undergraduate debt borrowed. For these reasons, 
violations of monotonicity are not possible.  
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In model 1, I investigate research question 1.A, debt’s effect on postbaccalaureate 
education aspirations. Model 1 is as follows:  
First stage 
 
Second stage 
 
where  is the amount of undergraduate loans borrowed by 2008–2009 for student i; 
 represents a vector of the excluded instruments' change in average tuition and fees from 
2003–2004 to 2008–2009, mother’s education, and an interaction between the two for 
student i; represents a vector of individual and institutional covariates for student i 
including gender, race/ethnicity, prior income (quadratic), college entrance examination 
score, institutional selectivity, institutional control, institutional level, college GPA, 
marriage status, and the number of dependents a student has; and 
 is the highest degree expected to be earned in 2008–
2009 (or the second wave) for each student i. I estimate this model with two measures of 
undergraduate debt, total and federal. For the second stage, I run a linear probability model 
(because the outcome variable is dichotomous). 
 For model 2, I investigate research question 1.B, debt’s effect on postbaccalaureate 
education enrollment. Model 2 is as follows:  
First stage 
 
Second stage 
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where  is the amount of undergraduate loans borrowed for the undergraduate 
career for student i;  represents a vector of the excluded instruments' change in average 
tuition and fees over the undergraduate career, father’s education, and an interaction 
between the two for student i; represents a vector of individual and institutional 
covariates for student i including age at start of postsecondary education, gender, 
race/ethnicity, prior income (quadratic), college entrance examination score, 
undergraduate grade point average, marriage status, the number of dependents a student 
has, first institution selectivity, first institution control, and first institution level; and 
 is an indicator for graduate school enrollment for 
each student i (= 1 if student chose to enroll in graduate school). I estimate this model with 
two measures of undergraduate debt, total and federal, and at two time points for the 
outcome variable, enrollment in 2009 and 2012. For the second stage, I run a linear 
probability model (because the outcome variable is dichotomous). 
 For model 3, I investigate research question 1.C, debt’s effect on postbaccalaureate 
early-career occupation salary. Model 3 is as follows:  
First stage 
 
Second stage 
 
where  is the amount of undergraduate loans borrowed for the undergraduate 
career for student i;  represents a vector of the excluded instruments' change in average 
tuition and fees over the undergraduate career, father’s education, and an interaction 
between the two for student i; represents a vector of individual and institutional 
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covariates for student i including age at start of postsecondary education, gender, 
race/ethnicity, prior income (quadratic), college entrance examination score, 
undergraduate grade point average, marriage status, the number of dependents a student 
has, first institution selectivity, first institution control, and first institution level; and 
 is the primary early-career occupation salary. I estimate 
model 3 with two measures of undergraduate debt, total and federal, and at two time 
points for the outcome variable, enrollment in 2009 and 2012.  
To evaluate the hypotheses mentioned in the conceptual framework section, if  is 
statistically significant and negative, debt would have a negative effect on the students’ 
graduate aspirations or enrollment behavior. However, if  is statistically significant and 
positive or statistically insignificant, but there is enough power to detect an effect, debt 
would not have an inhibiting effect on students’ graduate aspirations or enrollment. For the 
early-career occupation choice model, if is statistically significant and positive, increases 
in undergraduate debt induce students to select early-career occupations with higher 
salaries.  being statistically significant and negative or statistically insignificant would 
mean that increases in undergraduate debt do not inhibit students from selecting early-
career occupations with lower salaries. 
I model these relationships for subpopulations of student’s race and prior income 
quartile. It would have been useful to include state-level characteristics in the primary 
model specifications to control for a variety of factors, such as the supply of graduate 
programs available to the student or the economic context for the labor market. Multiple 
factors complicate this. First, students can reside in one state but pursue postsecondary 
education in another, and little research has been done on which state influences a student 
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more for postbaccalaureate decision-making. It could be that one state influences a student 
more than another for all postbaccalaureate decision-making, or the state of legal residence 
influences graduate school decision-making while the post-college–enrollment state 
influences early-career occupation, or some other combination. Therefore, it is difficult 
even to select which state to assign to each student. Additionally, with regard to graduate 
school decision-making, there is a dearth of research on how distance influences the 
decisions to aspire to, apply to, or enroll in postbaccalaureate education. Even the latest 
research on graduate school choice (i.e., English & Umbach, 2016) includes state context 
only by controlling for whether students attended college in the same state as their legal 
residence. This was used as a proxy for social capital, following Perna (2004), and not to 
control for the state context of educational opportunities. The authors found no evidence 
supporting the notion that out-of-state students had larger or smaller odds of aspiring to, 
applying to, or enrolling in graduate school. Thus, prior research gives little guidance on 
which state’s context provides the most appropriate control for understanding students’ 
postbaccalaureate decision-making. For these reasons, I do not include state-level 
characteristics in the main specifications.  
I conduct a robustness check using the main models, including state fixed effects for 
the two primary options of state contexts: state of legal residence (home state) and state 
post-college enrollment (post-college state). In the aspirations sample, home state is 
measured in the student’s first year of postsecondary education and post-college state is 
the location of the first institution attended when the student enrolled (both measured in 
2003–2004). In the enrollment and salary sample, home state is measured in the fall of the 
year the student earned a bachelor’s degree (2007–2008). It would have been preferable to 
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have a measure of the state of legal residence from the first-year of postsecondary 
education for this sample, but the data do not include that information. The post-college 
state is measured as the state the student lived in during the first follow-up in 2009, one 
year after earning a bachelor’s degree. Therefore, the post-college state measures are 
slightly different for the two samples, primarily due to the likelihood that the students in 
the enrollment and salary sample could have changed their residence during their 
baccalaureate career (though there is no way to know that using the data). These 
robustness checks give further evidence to the two state-related concerns with the 
exclusion restriction: poor labor markets and selective apprehension about graduate 
school costs. 
In the results section of this chapter, I report several empirical tests of the excluded 
instruments. The first test is the Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity. The null hypothesis of 
this test is that ordinary least squares (OLS) and IV models produce statistically similar 
estimates. A p-value less than .05 allows the researcher to reject the null hypothesis; 
suggestive evidence that the predictor of interest (in my work, undergraduate debt) is 
statistically endogenous. This test is less reliable the smaller the sample size. As smaller 
sample size increases standard errors (because the formula for standard errors is heavily 
dependent on sample size), it is more difficult to detect a statistically significant difference 
between the OLS and IV models. 
The next is the test of instrument relevance. Following Stock and Yogo (2005), there 
are two primary threats to instrument relevance. One is the amount of inflation in the 
conventional significance-level test of coefficient estimates (size). For example, I could 
calculate that a coefficient estimate is statistically significantly different from 0 if the p-
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value for that estimates is .045 (conventional Wald test). With a weak instrument, the 
precision of the coefficient estimates and standard errors would be weak. Therefore, when 
I thought that coefficient had a p-value below .05, the conventional standard for statistical 
significance, it actually had a p-value below .10. To reach the conventionally optimal 
amount of inflation in size, the overidentified models must have a minimum eigenvalue F 
statistic (Shea’s partial r^2) of at least 22.3 (Table 5.2, Stock & Yogo, 2005). I would then 
have confidence that, when I labeled an estimate as statistically significant at the .05 
significance level, at most the inflation would be to the .10 significance level.  
The other threat to instrument relevance is the amount of bias that is present in the 
OLS model and reduced by IV, or, put another way, the amount of bias present in the IV 
models relative to the amount of bias relative to OLS models. To reach the conventionally 
optimal 5% or less bias, the overidentified models must have a minimum eigenvalue F 
statistic (Shea’s partial r^2) of at least 13.91 (Table 5.1, Stock & Yogo, 2005). In both cases, 
the null hypothesis of these tests is that the instruments are weak. Reaching those critical 
F-values allows the researcher to reject the null hypothesis, which is evidence that the 
instruments are strong. Minimum eigenvalue F statistics below either of these cutoffs do 
not automatically nullify the potential positives of IV estimation. It would solely increase 
concerns about the instrument relevance and decrease confidence in the reliability of the 
coefficient estimates and standard errors. These two tests give additional evidence for the 
relevance assumption: that the instruments have a sufficiently predictive relationship with 
the endogenous predictor. 
The final test is the test of overidentifying restrictions (testing the previously 
discussed exclusion restriction). The null hypothesis for this test is that the instruments are 
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exogenous. At conventional levels, a Sargan statistic greater than .05 suggests that the 
instruments are not systematically related to the error term of the second stage model. 
That would be suggestive evidence that the instruments satisfy the exclusion assumption is 
upheld and there is no third channel between the instruments and the outcome variables. 
Results 
Summary Statistics 
 As previously summarized, postbaccalaureate decision-making varies by a number 
of individual and institutional characteristics. Tables 1, 2, and 3 show how students’ 
individual and institutional characteristics vary according to students’ postbaccalaureate 
educational aspirations, enrollment, and early-career occupation salary, respectively. 
 Using two-sample t-tests to detect differences, I find that students who aspired to a 
bachelor’s degree or below do not statistically significantly differ from those who aspire to 
graduate degrees only when those students self-identify as African American, Latino, or 
other race (American Indian, Alaskan Native, more than one race, and other race). All other 
individual and institutional characteristics differ by aspirations. Students who self-identify 
as female, Asian, attending selective or most-selective institutions, or private institutions, 
or who aspire to graduate degrees when they entered postsecondary education, report 
graduate degree aspirations at higher rates. Students reporting higher proportions of 
graduate education aspirations also have higher prior incomes, SAT/ACT scores, and 
undergraduate GPAs, as well as fewer children. Notably, these students have, on average, 
approximately $16,000 of undergraduate debt, $10,000 of which is federal debt, whereas 
students with bachelor’s or below aspirations have, on average, approximately $12,000 of 
undergraduate debt, $7,000 of which is federal debt. The students aspiring to attend  
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Table 1 
 
T-Tests on Graduate School Aspirations 
 Bachelor’s or Below Postbaccalaureate 
 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Continuous Variables     
Cumulative Loans 11,862.44 16,921.10 16,134.27*** 19,979.74 
Cumulative Federal Loans 7,219.08 9,031.04 9,945.52*** 10,564.86 
Prior Income 65,378.72 52,103.81 78,252.96*** 57,110.42 
Entrance Examination (in SAT) 969.62 189.02 1,076.44*** 196.90 
College GPA 2.99 0.62 3.18*** 0.53 
Entering Tuition & Fees 7,058.22 6,952.81 11,095.48*** 8,923.36 
Dependents 0.05 0.28 0.02*** 0.20 
     
Indicator Variables     
Female 0.52 0.50 0.60** 0.49 
Mother’s Education 0.94 0.24 0.96*** 0.20 
Race     
White 0.74 0.44 0.72* 0.45 
African American 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.29 
Latino 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 
Asian 0.03 0.18 0.06*** 0.24 
Other Race 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 
Selectivity     
Nonselective 0.46 0.50 0.20*** 0.40 
Less Selective 0.06 0.25 0.05* 0.23 
Selective 0.41 0.49 0.55*** 0.50 
Most Selective 0.07 0.25 0.20*** 0.40 
Private Control 0.23 0.42 0.39*** 0.49 
2-Yr or Less Institution 0.43 0.49 0.17*** 0.38 
Married 0.01 0.12 0.01*** 0.08 
Entering Graduate School 
Aspirations 0.52 0.50 0.81*** 0.39 
Note: Bachelor’s or Below columns are means/proportions for students aspiring to a 
bachelor’s degree. Postbaccalaureate columns are means/proportions for students aspiring 
to a postbaccalaureate degree. Two sample t-tests were run; significance of difference 
recorded in the Postbaccalaureate Mean column. * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
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Table 2 
 
T-Tests on Graduate School Enrollment 
 No Enrollment Enrollment 
 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Continuous Variables     
Cumulative Loans 18,605.96 18,952.77 17,295.30** 18,792.37 
Cumulative Federal Loans 12,528.36 10,948.70 11,627.61*** 10,774.47 
Age 18.12 0.75 18.04*** 0.70 
Prior Income 66,973.15 62,438.42 69,832.28* 63,556.70 
Entrance Examination (in SAT) 1,079.07 174.46 1,119.34*** 183.69 
College GPA 3.26 0.47 3.41*** 0.41 
Entering Tuition & Fees 10,245.32 8,697.69 11,783.08*** 9,479.97 
Dependents 0.07 0.35 0.07 0.33 
     
Indicator Variables     
Female 0.56 0.50 0.62*** 0.49 
Father’s Education 0.95 0.21 0.95 0.23 
Race     
White 0.80 0.40 0.75*** 0.43 
African American 0.05 0.22 0.08*** 0.27 
Latino 0.06 0.25 0.07 0.26 
Asian 0.05 0.22 0.06* 0.24 
Other Race 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 
Selectivity     
Nonselective 0.20 0.40 0.16*** 0.37 
Less Selective 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.23 
Selective 0.60 0.49 0.59 0.49 
Most Selective 0.14 0.34 0.19*** 0.39 
Private Control 0.32 0.47 0.39*** 0.49 
2-Yr or Less Institution 0.16 0.37 0.13*** 0.34 
Married 0.10 0.30 0.08** 0.27 
Entering Graduate School 
Aspirations 0.68 0.47 0.93*** 0.26 
Note: No Enrollment columns are means/proportions for students who did not enroll in 
graduate school in 2012. Enrollment columns are means/proportions for students who did 
enroll in graduate school in 2012. Two sample t-tests were run; significance of difference 
recorded in the Enrollment Mean column. * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
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Table 3 
 
T-Tests on Salary 
 Low Salary High Salary 
 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Continuous Variables     
Cumulative Loans 17,845.79 18,143.92 18,281.20 19,627.46 
Cumulative Federal Loans 12,358.32 10,958.93 11,948.90+ 10,807.51 
Age 18.07 0.69 18.10* 0.77 
Prior Income 66,780.20 60,658.99 69,553.23* 65,097.35 
Entrance Examination (in SAT) 1,082.10 182.69 1,109.60*** 175.02 
College GPA 3.32 0.46 3.33 0.45 
Entering Tuition & Fees 10,745.58 8,912.27 11,022.29 9,209.06 
Dependents 0.06 0.31 0.08 0.37 
     
Indicator Variables     
Female 0.67 0.47 0.50*** 0.50 
Father’s Education 0.95 0.21 0.95 0.22 
Race     
White 0.78 0.41 0.78 0.41 
African American 0.08 0.26 0.05*** 0.22 
Latino 0.06 0.24 0.07+ 0.26 
Asian 0.05 0.21 0.06*** 0.25 
Other Race 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 
Selectivity     
Nonselective 0.19 0.39 0.18+ 0.38 
Less Selective 0.06 0.25 0.05* 0.22 
Selective 0.61 0.49 0.58* 0.49 
Most Selective 0.13 0.34 0.19*** 0.39 
Private Control 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.47 
2-Yr or Less Institution 0.16 0.36 0.14+ 0.35 
Married 0.08 0.28 0.09 0.29 
Note: Low Salary columns are means/proportions for students with a salary at or below the 
50th percentile of salaries in 2012 ($39,000). High Salary columns are means/proportions 
for students with a salary above the 50th percentile of salaries in 2012. Two sample t-tests 
were run; significance of difference recorded in the High Salary Mean column. + = p < 0.10; * 
= p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
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postbaccalaureate education owe more, which is consistent with the idea that students 
with more undergraduate debt are not automatically deciding that some type of graduate 
education is not a viable option. Students who aspire to attain a postbaccalaureate degree 
might be borrowing more in order to achieve that goal (see Table A1 for the unconditioned 
sample means).  
Students reporting enrollment in graduate school in 2012 at higher rates are those 
who self-identify as female, African American, or Asian and attend most-selective or private 
institutions. Similar to graduate aspirations, these students also have higher prior incomes, 
SAT/ACT scores, and undergraduate GPAs. They are also younger on average when they 
started postsecondary education (though only by .08 of a year). However, the relationship 
between debt and postbaccalaureate education decision-making has now switched. 
Students who enroll in graduate school by 2012 have only $17,000 in undergraduate debt, 
$12,000 of which is federal, while students who do not enroll borrow $19,000, $13,000 of 
which is federal. Students who enroll in graduate school do not hold as much debt as their 
peers who do not enroll (see Table A2 for the unconditioned sample means). This could 
mean that the relationship between undergraduate debt and aspirations differs from the 
relationship with enrollment. This could be partly due to the previously discussed 
differences between attitudes and behaviors. 
Students who report a high-salary (split at the 50th percentile, approximately 
$39,000) in 2012 are less likely to be female or African American and more likely to attend 
most selective institutions. These students are slightly older and have higher prior incomes 
when they started college and higher SAT/ACT scores. Interestingly, these students do not 
differ from their peers in borrowing behaviors at conventionally significant levels (see 
 88 
Table A2 for the unconditioned sample means). Taking these summary statistics together, 
students who aspire to graduate school, enroll in graduate school, and earn higher salaries 
are generally more privileged, especially with higher prior incomes, SAT/ACT scores, and 
attending most-selective institutions. Female and African American students are both more 
likely to enroll in graduate school and less likely to have high salaries after graduating from 
college. The relationship with undergraduate debt is less clear across the three outcome 
measures. To investigate the relationship between debt and the three outcomes, I first 
explore how borrowing varies by individual and institutional characteristics. 
Murphy (1994) found that students with greater academic ability who attended 
more-selective institutions borrowed at higher rates. The raw averages in my two samples 
tell a more complex story. For the aspirations sample, if greater academic ability is 
measured by SAT/ACT score, students with the greatest academic ability (score greater 
than the 75th percentile) borrow the second-least in cumulative loans and the least in 
federal loans. Students above the 75th percentile of SAT/ACT score and above (greater 
than 1180) borrow $14,000, $9,000 of which is federal. Students between the 50th and 
75th (greater than 1040 and up to and including 1180) borrow $15,000, $9,000 of which is 
federal, and those between the 25th and 50th (greater than 910 and up to and including 
1040) borrow $16,000, $10,000 federal. For the enrollment and salary sample, students 
with the highest SAT/ACT scores borrow the least, both in cumulative loans and federal 
loans. Students above the 75th percentile (greater than 1220) borrow $16,000, $10,000 of 
which is federal. Students in the lowest quartile (25th percentile, below and including 970) 
borrow the most, approximately $20,000, $12,000 of which is federal.  
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For the aspirations sample, students who attend most-selective institutions borrow 
an average of $15,000 in cumulative loans ($8,000 federal), and students attending 
selective and less-selective institutions actually borrow the most: $17,000 ($10,000 
federal) and $17,000 ($12,000 federal), respectively. This might be linked to the abundant 
financial aid available at the most-selective institutions, which allows students from low-
income backgrounds to rely less on loans to finance their educations (Rothstein & Rouse, 
2011). Students who attended nonselective institutions borrow an average of $10,000 
($7,000 federal). Similar to SAT/ACT scores, for the enrollment and salary sample, students 
who attend the most-selective institutions borrow the least ($16,000, $10,000 federal). 
Students who attend nonselective and selective institutions borrow approximately $18,000 
($12,000–$13,000 federal), while those attending less-selective institutions borrow the 
most ($20,000, $14,000 federal). 
For the aspirations sample, students with a prior income less than or equal to the 
25th percentile (less than $35,000) borrow approximately $15,000 ($10,000 federal), 
while students with prior incomes greater than the 75th percentile (greater than $98,000) 
borrow approximately $11,400 ($6,000). For the enrollment and salary sample, students 
with a prior income of less than or equal to $22,000 (25th percentile) borrow $19,000 
($15,000 federal), whereas students with the highest prior incomes (greater than $99,000) 
borrow only $15,000 ($8,000 federal). It makes sense that the students with higher prior 
income amounts would have had more disposable resources—particularly given that 
federal loans are means-tested—but these summary statistics reinforce the finding that 
students with lower prior income are borrowing more, in raw averages, rather than paying 
for their education strictly through grants.  
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Following Malcom and Dowd (2012) and others, I find that African American 
students borrow the most, regardless of whether the sample is first-time attendees in 
postsecondary education (aspirations sample) or bachelor’s degree earners (enrollment 
and salary sample). These students borrow $17,000 ($13,000 federal) in the aspirations 
sample and $23,000 ($18,000 federal) in the enrollment and salary sample.  
It is important to note the taste for borrowing within the analytical sample. Before 
the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008, dependent students could 
borrow up to $23,000 during their undergraduate career in federal subsidized and 
unsubsidized loans (FinAid, 2016). Independent students were allowed an aggregate 
borrowing limit of $46,000. Within the aspirations sample, students borrow, on average, 
39% of the aggregate borrowing maximum. Students who report graduate school 
aspirations borrow a statistically significantly larger percentage of the maximum (43% 
versus 31%). Within the enrollment and salary sample, students borrow, on average, 45% 
of the aggregate borrowing maximum. In contrast to graduate school aspirations, students 
who report enrolling in graduate school in 2009 and 2012 borrow a smaller percentage of 
the maximum than their contemporary peers who did not enroll, though not at 
conventionally statistically significant levels (43–44% versus 45%). Students who report a 
high salary in both 2009 and 2012 borrow a statistically significantly smaller percentage of 
the maximum than their contemporary peers who report a low salary (43% versus 46%). 
Therefore, on average, students borrow less than half the maximum aggregate amount 
allowed for federal borrowing. There is suggestive evidence that students who aspire to 
graduate school or who report a low salary borrow a larger percentage of the maximum 
amount. With these borrowing relationships in mind, I turn to analyzing the relationships 
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among the measures: debt, change in tuition and fees, and postbaccalaureate decision-
making. 
Relationships among Key Variables 
A critical prerequisite for the use of IV is strong relationships between debt, the 
instruments (change in tuition and fees, interacting with parent’s education), and the 
outcomes (graduate school aspirations, graduate school enrollment, and early-career 
occupation salary). Table 4 shows the proportion of students who aspire to graduate school 
by percentiles of undergraduate debt. A clear pattern holds for both cumulative total and 
federal loans. Students with larger amounts of debt are also more likely to aspire to 
graduate school. This relationship reflects the simple means discussed in the prior section 
and suggests a relationship between undergraduate debt and the outcomes of interest. 
Table 5 shows the proportion of students who aspire to graduate school by percentiles of 
the change in tuition and fees and the interaction between that change and parental 
education. A similar pattern is found: Students with larger changes in tuition and fees are 
students who aspire to graduate school at higher rates (there is less variation in graduate 
school aspirations for the children of parents with less than a high school diploma). Tables 
6 and 7 show the average amount of cumulative debt—total loans and federal loans, 
respectively—over percentiles of the instruments. Again, students with larger changes in 
tuition and fees borrow higher amounts of debt. This suggests a relationship between the 
instruments and the endogenous predictor, debt, which is critical because the strength of 
the relationship between the instruments and the endogenous predictor dictates both the 
reliability of the later significance tests and the amount of bias I can account for by 
modeling with IV. Table 8 shows correlations between total cumulative loans, total federal  
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Table 4 
 
Mean of Graduate School Aspirations by Debt Percentiles, Conditioned on Having Debt  
Percentile of Debt Loan 
Federal 
Loan 
 Mean SD Mean SD 
No Debt 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.48 
Less Than and 
including 25th 0.61 0.49 0.61 0.49 
Between 25th 
and 50th 
(including 50th)  0.67 0.47 0.66 0.48 
Between 50th 
and 75th 
(including 75th)  0.73 0.44 0.77 0.42 
Greater than 75th  0.77 0.42 0.76 0.43 
Note: Each cell shows the likelihood of aspiring to earn a postbaccalaureate degree in 2009 
for that subset of borrowers. 
 
 
Table 5  
 
Mean of Graduate School Aspirations by Instruments’ Percentiles 
Percentile of 
Instrument 
Change in 
Tuition & 
Fees 
Interaction with 
HS and Above 
Interaction with 
below HS 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Less than and 
including 25th 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.67 0.47 
Between 25th 
and 50th 
(including 50th)  0.64 0.48 0.65 0.48 0.47 0.50 
Between 50th 
and 75th 
(including 75th)  0.72 0.45 0.73 0.45 0.66 0.47 
Greater than 75th  0.80 0.40 0.81 0.39 0.66 0.48 
Note: Interaction between Change in Tuition & Fees and mother’s education level (HS = 
high school). Each cell shows the likelihood of aspiring to earn a postbaccalaureate degree 
in 2009 for students whose tuition and fees increased by the stated percentile.
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Table 6 
 
Mean of Undergraduate Debt (Loan) by Instruments’ Percentiles 
Percentile of 
Instrument Change in Tuition & Fees 
Interaction with HS and 
Higher 
Interaction with HS or 
Below 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Less than and 
including 25th 9,873.47 14,898.00 10,618.96 15,413.00 14,672.74 19,180.91 
Between 25th 
and 50th 
(including 
50th) 12,644.16 15,960.10 12,562.25 15,794.49 9,641.324 13,199.19 
Between 50th 
and 75th 
(including 
75th) 15,980.49 18,298.02 16,385.65 18,946.61 16,948.52 17,676.78 
Greater than 
75th 20,335.18 24,295.46 20,202.53 24,291.51 20,353.50 18,800.95 
Note: Interaction is change in tuition and fees with mother’s education (HS = high school). Each cell is the average amount of 
debt for students whose tuition and fees changed by the stated percentile. 
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Table 7 
 
Mean of Federal Undergraduate Debt (Federal Loan) by Instruments’ Percentiles 
Percentile of 
Instrument Change in Tuition & Fees 
Interaction with HS and 
Higher 
Interaction with HS or 
Below 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Less than and 
including 25th 6,457.258 8,868.406 7,007.503 9,369.989 8,974.502 10,114.1 
Between 25th 
and 50th 
(including 
50th) 8,566.762 10,086.55 8,479.243 9,952.385 6,896.448 9,482.979 
Between 50th 
and 75th 
(including 
75th) 10,437.96 10,595.61 10,464.06 10,493.4 12,388.2 11,677.69 
Greater than 
75th 10,677.68 10,431.19 10,630.99 10,465.3 12,815.66 11,537.66 
Note: Interaction is change in tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education (HS = high school). Each cell shows the 
average amount of debt for students whose tuition and fees changed by the stated percentile. 
 
 95 
Table 8 
 
Correlations among Key Variables for Aspirations Sample 
 
Loan 
Federal 
Loan 
Graduate 
School 
Aspirations 
Change in 
Tuition and Fees 
Parent’s 
Education 
Loan 1     
Federal Loan 0.68 1    
Graduate School 
Aspirations 0.11 0.13 1   
Change in Tuition 
and Fees 0.20 0.14 0.22 1  
Parent’s Education 0.02 0.001 0.05 0.09 1 
Note: Pearson’s correlations.
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loans, graduate school aspirations, change in tuition and fees, and parent’s education. 
These relationships are generally replicated.  
Focusing on graduate school enrollment, Table 9 shows the proportion of students 
who enroll in graduate school by percentiles of undergraduate debt. Graduate school 
enrollment appears to have the opposite relationship with debt. Students with higher 
amounts of undergraduate debt enroll in graduate school at slightly lower rates, which 
supports the earlier summary statistics. Table 10 shows the proportion of students who 
enroll in graduate school in 2009 by percentiles of the instruments. Table 11 shows the 
same relationship for enrollment in 2012. The relationship generally follows the same 
pattern as the one between enrollment and debt, though students with changes in tuition 
and fees above the 75th percentile consistently enroll at high rates. This indicates a 
nonlinear relationship between changes in tuition and fees and graduate school 
enrollment. Tables 12 and 13 show the average amount of cumulative debt—total loans 
and federal loans, respectively—over percentiles of the instruments. Students with larger 
changes in tuition and fees borrow more to finance their undergraduate education. Table 
14 shows correlations between total cumulative loans, total federal loans, graduate school 
enrollment in 2009 and 2012, early-career occupation salary in 2009 and 2012, change in 
tuition and fees, and parental education. These relationships are generally replicated. 
Table 15 reflects the relationship between early-career occupation salary and 
undergraduate debt. There is not as clear a linear pattern between salary and debt; for this 
and other previously stated reasons, I log salary and debt. Once I transform these variables, 
students with higher amounts of debt also have higher salaries. Tables 16 and 17 show that  
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Table 9 
 
Mean of Graduate School Enrollment by Debt Percentiles, Conditioned on Having Debt  
Percentile of Debt Loan, 2009 Loan, 2012 
Federal Loan, 
2009 
Federal Loan, 
2012 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
No debt 0.31 0.46 0.44 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.44 0.50 
Less than and 
including 25th 0.30 0.46 0.43 0.50 0.30 0.46 0.43 0.50 
Between 25th 
and 50th 
(including 50th)  0.29 0.46 0.41 0.49 0.28 0.45 0.42 0.49 
Between 50th 
and 75th 
(including 75th)  0.23 0.42 0.40 0.49 0.25 0.43 0.40 0.49 
Greater than 75th  0.27 0.44 0.38 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.38 0.49 
Note: Each cell shows the likelihood of enrolling in graduate school for that subset of 
borrowers (measured in the year included in column title). 
 
Table 10  
 
Mean of Graduate School Enrollment by Instruments’ Percentiles for 2009 
Percentile of 
Instrument 
Change in 
Tuition & 
Fees 
Interaction with 
HS and Above 
Interaction 
with below 
HS 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Less than and 
including 25th 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 
Between 25th 
and 50th 
(including 50th)  0.26 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.29 0.45 
Between 50th 
and 75th 
(including 75th)  0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.22 0.42 
Greater than 75th  0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.32 0.47 
Note: Interaction is change in tuition and fees with father’s education (HS = high school). 
Each cell shows the likelihood of enrolling in graduate school for students whose tuition 
and fees changed by the stated percentile (enrollment measured in 2009). 
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Table 11  
 
Mean of Graduate School Enrollment by Instruments’ Percentiles for 2012 
Percentile of 
Instrument 
Change in 
Tuition & Fees 
Interaction with 
HS and Above 
Interaction 
with below 
HS 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Less than and 
including 25th 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.49 
Between 25th 
and 50th 
(including 50th)  0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.46 0.50 
Between 50th 
and 75th 
(including 75th)  0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49 
Greater than 75th  0.44 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.44 0.50 
Note: Interaction is change in tuition and fees interacted with father’s education (HS = high 
school). Each cell shows the likelihood of enrolling in graduate school for students whose 
tuition and fees changed by the stated percentile (enrollment measured in 2012). 
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Table 12 
 
Mean of Undergraduate Debt (Loan) by Instruments’ Percentiles 
Percentile of 
Instrument 
Change in Tuition & 
Fees 
Interaction with HS 
and Higher 
Interaction with HS 
or Below 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Less than and 
including 25th 14,411.41 15,968.97 15,331.11 16,516.74 17,915.24 18,923.51 
Between 25th and 
50th (including 50th)  14,805.29 15,924.62 14,829.8 15,964.91 16,519.6 14,346.66 
Between 50th and 
75th (including 75th)  20,046.19 18,475.41 19,807.1 18,365.37 22,720.92 18,069.78 
Greater than 75th  22,987.12 22,950.08 22,938.59 23,200.11 26,264.74 19,441.54 
Note: Interaction is change in tuition and fees with father’s education. Each cell shows the average amount of debt for students 
whose tuition and fees changed by the stated percentile. 
 
 
Table 13 
 
Mean of Federal Undergraduate Debt (Federal Loan) by Instruments’ Percentiles 
Percentile of 
Instrument 
Change in Tuition & 
Fees 
Interaction with HS 
and Higher 
Interaction with HS 
or Below 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Less than and 
including 25th 10,247.81 10,069.45 10,836.34 10,441.1 12,022.61 10,825.22 
Between 25th and 
50th (including 50th)  10,859.25 10,615.75 10,850.41 10,626.14 12,854.34 10,731.19 
Between 50th and 
75th (including 75th)  13,639.08 11,174.00 13,484.16 11,073.03 16,471.13 12,491.95 
Greater than 75th  13,874.00 11,167.66 13,761.1 11,120.3 17,260 11,881.59 
Note: Interaction is change in tuition and fees with father’s education. Each cell shows the average amount of debt for students 
whose tuition and fees changed by the stated percentile. 
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Table 14 
 
Correlations among Key Variables for Graduate School Enrollment and Salary Sample 
 
Loan 
Federal 
Loan 
Enroll 
2009 
Enroll 
2012 
Salary 
2009 
Salary 
2012 
Change in 
Tuition 
and Fees 
Parent’s 
Education 
Loan 1        
Federal Loan 0.70 1       
Enroll 2009 -0.03 -0.03 1      
Enroll 2012 -0.03 -0.04 0.63 1     
Salary 2009 0.01 -0.01 -0.25 -0.20 1    
Salary 2012 -0.003 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 0.51 1   
Change in Tuition 
and Fees 0.19 0.15 -0.02 0.005 0.06 0.04 1  
Parent’s 
Education -0.02 -0.04 0.004 -001 -0.005 -0.004 0.03 1 
Note: Pearson’s correlations. 
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Table 15 
 
Mean of Early-Career Occupation Salary by Debt Percentiles, Conditioned on Having Debt  
Percentile of Debt Loan, 2009 Loan, 2012 Federal Loan, 2009 Federal Loan, 2012 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
No debt 31,321.46 19,096.57 42,945.49 29,330.38 31,564.86 19,142.45 43,024.15 29,909.10 
Less than and 
including 25th 31,322.62 18,512.86 42,942.31 29,501.05 31,368.11 18,364.90 42,864.25 29,101.75 
Between 25th and 
50th (including 
50th)  29,291.45 16,273.89 40,368.45 24,109.38 29,915.76 17,221.46 40,781.72 23,789.59 
Between 50th and 
75th (including 
75th)  31,404.39 17,507.01 40,084.18 22,841.35 29,899.15 16,150.62 39,863.14 23,444.16 
Greater than 75th  31,305.35 16,664.53 41,853.77 24,727.62 31,897.20 17,017.14 41,315.59 24,712.35 
Note: Each cell is the average salary of that subset of borrowers (measured in the year included in column title). 
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Table 16 
 
Mean of Early-Career Occupation Salary by Instruments’ Percentiles in 2009 
Percentile of 
Instrument 
Change in Tuition & 
Fees 
Interaction with HS 
and Above 
Interaction with below 
HS 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Less than and 
including 25th 29,831.08 17,104.85 30,043.25 17,323.74 30,918.68 17,615.87 
Between 25th and 
50th (including 
50th)  31,214.39 18,497.32 31,367.75 18,412.83 31,323.84 19,072.16 
Between 50th and 
75th (including 
75th)  30,902.01 16,785.96 30,836.56 16,749.07 32,020.21 16,832.29 
Greater than 75th  31,876.13 17,964.82 31,801.88 17,960.3 32,321.9 16,775.41 
Note: Interaction is change in tuition and fees interacted with father’s education (HS = high school). Each cell shows the 
average salary for students whose tuition and fees changed by the stated percentile (enrollment measured in 2009)
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Table 17 
 
Mean of Early-Career Occupation Salary by Instruments’ Percentiles in 2012 
Percentile of 
Instrument 
Change in Tuition & 
Fees 
Interaction with HS 
and Above 
Interaction with below 
HS 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Less than and 
including 25th 40,931.3 26,611.69 41,027.86 26,457.74 41,670.11 26,578.95 
Between 25th and 
50th (including 
50th)  41,743.47 24,897.74 41,998.21 24,943.50 44,453.86 27,210.94 
Between 50th and 
75th (including 
75th)  41,079.47 26,959.27 40,984.42 27,141.32 42,204.18 26,221.07 
Greater than 75th  43,203.08 27,724.98 43,129.66 27,679.76 43,854.85 26,520.29 
Note: Interaction is change in tuition and fees with father’s education (HS = high school). Each cell shows the average salary for 
students whose tuition and fees changed by the stated percentile (enrollment measured in 2012).
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students with larger changes in tuition and fees also generally have higher salaries (refer to 
Tables 12 and 13 for the relationship between the debt and the instruments).  
Overall, these estimates reveal that all the debt measures are related to the outcome 
measures and instruments. The naïve relationships reflect that debt has a positive 
relationship with aspirations and salary but a negative relationship with enrollment. The 
previously discussed potential endogeneity in measures of debt make it difficult to draw 
causal inferences from these results. For causal estimates, I turn to the main analyses. 
Main Analyses 
 All the estimates from the IV models are LATE (as previously discussed). This means 
that the estimates apply only to students for whom changes in the instruments (i.e., 
changes in tuition and fees interacted with parental education) induce them to borrow 
more. For the tests of the assumptions of IV, I model the two-stage least squares models 
without robust standard errors and then conduct the tests. Then I estimate the IV models 
with robust standard errors, and those are the standard errors reported in all tables. 
Research question 1.A is, To what extent does undergraduate student loan debt 
affect postbaccalaureate educational aspirations? Table 18 shows the OLS models for 
graduate school aspirations (full model in Table A3). The measures for cumulative loans 
and federal loans both have an extremely small, statistically significant association with 
graduate school aspirations. Holding individual and institutional characteristics constant, a 
1% increase in undergraduate loans predicts a 0.4% increase in graduate school 
aspirations. A 1% increase in undergraduate federal loans predicts a 0.5% increase in 
graduate school aspirations. A $10,000 increase from the average amount of total loans 
predicts a 0.2% increase in graduate school aspirations. The same increase in the average  
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Table 18 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
 Loan Federal 
Loan  
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
   
Covariates Included X X 
Observations 8880 8880 
Note: Covariates included in the models: gender, race/ethnicity, family or student income 
prior to postsecondary education, college entrance examination score, institutional 
selectivity, institutional control, institutional level, college GPA, marriage status, and the 
number of dependents a student has. The primary covariate of interest in the models is 
cumulative loans borrowed from 2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and cumulative federal 
loans borrowed over the same period (federal loan). Standard errors in parentheses.  *** = p 
< .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines.
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amount of federal loans would predict a 0.4% increase. This means that, practically, 
undergraduate debt has little influence on graduate school aspirations, once individual and 
institutional characteristics were controlled. However, due to debt’s potential endogeneity, 
it would be more appropriate to estimate debt’s relationship with graduate school 
aspirations by exploiting the exogenous variation in change in tuition and fees. 
 Table 19 shows the results from the IV models (full reduced form, first stage, and 
second stage models in Tables A4–A6). In both models, debt has a small, negative, 
statistically insignificant relationship with graduate school aspirations. There is not 
sufficient evidence to conclude that this finding is more than a spurious result of this 
particular sample. In addition, the Wu-Hausman statistic is not statistically significant (p-
values of 0.165 and 0.176 for loans and federal loans, respectively). I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the OLS and the IV models produce statistically similar estimates.  
The minimum eigenvalue is not large enough to allay concerns about the strength of 
the instruments either in size or bias (9.53 and 9.49 for loans and federal loans, 
respectively). I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak at the 
optimal level (at most 5% relative bias and size inflation to 0.10 significance level). 
However, I could reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak at the next 
critical value level (at most 10% relative bias [critical F-value 9.08] and size inflation to 
0.15 significance level). Therefore, while not optimally strong, there is evidence of 
marginally strong instruments. This would create doubt about the point estimates for 
coefficients and their statistical significance (though the coefficient on debt, primary 
coefficient of interest, is statistically insignificant). The Sargan statistic’s p-values are above 
conventional levels (0.697 and 0.659, respectively), so I failing to reject the null hypothesis  
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Table 19 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
 Loan Federal Loan 
First Stage   
   
  Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
0.88*** 0.83*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
  Mother’s Education 4.71*** 4.36*** 
 (1.19) (1.16) 
  Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.64*** -0.58*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Second Stage   
   
  Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   
Covariates Included X X 
Observations 8880 8880 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.93 (0.165) 1.83 (0.176) 
Minimum eigenvalue 9.53 9.49 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.72 (0.697) 0.83 (0.659) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Covariates included 
in the models: gender, race/ethnicity, family or student income prior to postsecondary 
education, college entrance examination score, institutional selectivity, institutional 
control, institutional level, college GPA, marriage status, and the number of dependents a 
student has. The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed 
from 2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the 
same period (federal loan). Standard errors in parentheses.  *** = p < .001. Observations are 
rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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that the instruments are exogenous and not systematically related to the second stage 
error term. In general, this leads me to prefer the OLS estimates, which still estimate a 
practically small influence of debt on graduate school aspirations. Therefore, in answer to 
research question 1.A, I find no evidence that larger amounts of debt inhibit students from 
aspiring to attend graduate school. 
 Research question 1.B is, To what extent does undergraduate student loan debt 
affect postbaccalaureate educational enrollment? Similar to graduate school aspirations, 
the OLS models for graduate school enrollment reveal a small influence of undergraduate 
debt on graduate school enrollment (Table 20, full model in Table A7). In 2009, increasing 
either loans or federal loans by 1% predicts a 0.4% decrease in graduate school enrollment. 
By 2012, this relationship attenuates but only to 0.3%. All the models show a small, 
negative, statistically insignificant relationship between undergraduate debt and graduate 
school enrollment. The IV models give a clearer picture (Table 21, full reduced form, first 
stage, and second stage models in Tables A8–A10). A 1% increase in cumulative loans 
causes a 7% decrease in the likelihood of a student enrolling in graduate school in 2009 
and an 8% decrease for all other models, holding individual and institutional 
characteristics constant.  
Wu-Hausman statistics all reject the null hypothesis that OLS and IV models 
produce statistically similar estimates, while the smallest minimum eigenvalue F is 33.91, 
which rejects the null hypothesis of weak instruments. At most, there is 5% inflation in the 
relative bias and increase in size of the Wald statistic significance level to .10. Also, the 
models’ Sargan statistics are all statistically insignificant, therefore failing to reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous. Based on these tests, the results are  
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Table 20 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.004*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Covariates Included X X X X 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Note: Covariates included in the models: age at start of postsecondary education, gender, 
race/ethnicity, family or student income prior to graduation, college entrance examination 
score, undergraduate grade point average, marriage status, the number of dependents a 
student has, first institution selectivity, first institution control, and first institution level. 
The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed during the 
postsecondary career (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same period 
(federal loan). Standard errors in parentheses. ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are 
rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table 21 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
First Stage     
     
  Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.84*** 0.84*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
  Father’s Education 2.55** 2.55** 2.19* 2.19* 
 (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) 
  Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees * 
Father’s Education 
-0.38** -0.38** -0.33* -0.33* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Second Stage     
     
  Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
     
Covariates Included X X X X 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 43.31 (0.000) 47.99 (0.000) 44.68 (0.000)  48.56 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 37.18 37.182 33.91 33.91 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 3.90 (0.142) 2.23 (0.329) 3.19 (0.203) 1.75 (0.416) 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Covariates included 
in the models: age at start of postsecondary education, gender, race/ethnicity, family or 
student income prior to graduation, college entrance examination score, undergraduate 
grade point average, marriage status, the number of dependents a student has, first 
institution selectivity, first institution control, and first institution level. The primary 
covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed during the postsecondary 
career (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same period (federal loan). 
Standard errors in parentheses. * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are 
rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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consistent with the assumption that undergraduate debt is endogenous, the instruments 
are sufficiently strong and relevant, and the instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction. 
Therefore, the estimate for undergraduate debt satisfies the assumptions of LATE.  
The average amount of debt is $18,000 in loans and $12,000 in federal loans, which 
means a 1% increase would be $180 and $120, respectively. Twenty-eighty percent of 
students enroll in graduate school by 2009 and the standard deviation is 45%. The number 
of students enrolling increases to 42% by 2012, with a standard deviation of 49%. That 
means an increase of $180 in cumulative loans and $120 in federal loans cause a decrease 
in enrollment of approximately 0.002 of a standard deviation in both 2009 and 2012. 
Imagining these effects for a more standard change in debt is illuminating. A $10,000 
increase in total loans would cause a 3% and 4% decrease in graduate school enrollment in 
2009 and 2012, respectively. A $10,000 increase in federal loans would cause a 5% 
decrease in graduate school enrollment in both years. Therefore, in answer to research 
question 1.B, I find evidence that increased undergraduate debt decreases the likelihood of 
recent bachelor’s degree earners enrolling in graduate school. 
 Research question 1.C is, To what extent does undergraduate student loan debt 
affect postbaccalaureate early-career occupation salary? The OLS models for early-career 
occupation salary result in small, statistically insignificant estimates (Table 22, full model 
in Table A11). The IV models give stronger evidence on the relationship between debt and 
early-career salary (Table 23, full reduced form, first stage, and second stage models in 
Tables A12–A14). In 2009, a 1% increase in total loans or federal loans causes a 0.1% and 
0.11% increase in salary, respectively. In 2012, this relationship strengthens and a 1% 
increase causes a 0.18% increase in salary for both types of loans.  
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Table 22 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.003 0.010+ 0.001 0.009+ 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
     
Covariates Included X X X X 
Observations 8030  8030   8030   8030 
Note: Covariates included in the models: age at start of postsecondary education, gender, 
race/ethnicity, family or student income prior to graduation, college entrance examination 
score, undergraduate grade point average, marriage status, the number of dependents a 
student has, first institution selectivity, first institution control, and first institution level. 
The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed during the 
postsecondary career (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same period 
(federal loan). Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10. Observations are rounded due 
to NCES guidelines. 
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Table 23 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
First Stage     
     
  Change in Average Tuition 
and Fees 
0.83*** 0.83*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
  Father’s Education 2.70* 2.70* 2.39* 2.39* 
 (1.19) (1.19) (1.19) (1.19) 
  Change in Average Tuition 
and Fees * Father’s 
Education 
-0.40* -0.40* -0.35* -0.35* 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Second Stage     
     
  Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.10*** 0.18* 0.11*** 0.18* 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) 
     
Covariates Included X X X X 
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 28.96 (0.000) 9.220 (0.002) 30.60 (0.000) 9.13 (0.003) 
Minimum eigenvalue 26.27 26.27 24.07 24.07 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 3.04 (0.219) 1.01 (0.604) 2.44 (0.295) 1.16 (0.561) 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Covariates included 
in the models: age at start of postsecondary education, gender, race/ethnicity, family or 
student income prior to graduation, college entrance examination score, undergraduate 
grade point average, marriage status, the number of dependents a student has, first 
institution selectivity, first institution control, and first institution level. The primary 
covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed during the postsecondary 
career (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same period (federal loan). 
Standard errors in parentheses. * = p < 0.05; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to 
NCES guidelines. 
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Wu-Hausman statistics are all statistically significant, thus rejecting the null 
hypothesis that OLS and IV models produce statistically similar estimates. The smallest 
minimum eigenvalue is 24.07, and with the previously mentioned critical values, I reject 
the null hypothesis of weak instruments. The Sargan statistics are all statistically 
insignificant, which again fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are 
exogenous. Based on these tests, the results are consistent with the assumption that 
undergraduate debt is endogenous, the instruments are sufficiently strong and relevant, 
and the instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction. Therefore, the estimate for 
undergraduate debt satisfies the assumptions of LATE.  
The average amount of salary in 2009 is $31,000 and in 2012 is $42,000, which 
means the increases of approximately 0.1% and 0.18% for the average student are $30 and 
$80. Therefore, an increase of $180 in cumulative loans or $120 in federal loans (1% 
increase) causes an increase in salary of $30 in 2009 and $80 in 2012. These are relatively 
small amounts, but for students who have larger changes in the amount of debt, they could 
be practically significant. A $10,000 increase in total loans causes an increase in salary of 
$1,550 (5% increase) in 2009 and of $3,410 (11% increase) in 2012. A $10,000 increase in 
federal loans causes an increase in salary of $2,100 (5% increase) in 2009 and of $4,620 
(11% increase) in 2012. These figures could both be practically significant for students. For 
total loans, these changes correspond to 0.09 and 0.13 of a standard deviation change in 
2009 and 2012, respectively. For federal loans, these changes correspond to 0.12 and 0.17 
of a standard deviation change in 2009 and 2012, respectively. Therefore, in answer to 
research question 1.C, I find evidence that increased undergraduate debt increases recent 
bachelor’s degree earners' early-career occupation salaries. 
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 The prior estimates from the IV models are applicable to only a certain type of 
student. The interaction between change in tuition and fees with parental education (which 
is particularly critical to test that the instruments do not have a direct effect on the 
outcomes of interest) complicates the interpretation. To investigate how robust the 
estimates are without the additional treatment effect restrictions, I also model the 
relationship between debt and postbaccalaureate decision-making using just identified 
models with change in tuition and fees as the sole instrument (full reduced form, first stage, 
and second stage models in Tables A15–23). The estimates are qualitatively similar to the 
overidentified models in estimate size, direction, and significance. Similar to the 
overidentified models, the aspirations model is not as efficient as an OLS model would have 
been, and the enrollment and salary models uphold the assumptions of instrument 
relevance and exclusion.  
Subpopulation Analyses 
 I conduct the same analyses for race/ethnicity and income subpopulations. The 
primary racial comparison of interest for this work is between White and African American 
students because both the prior research and the summary statistics previously outlined 
show that African American students generally hold higher amounts of undergraduate 
debt. I present estimates for models run for students who self-identified as White, African 
American, Latino, Asian, and other race in Tables A24–A83 (these include full OLS, reduced 
form, first stage, and second stage models for all race/ethnicity subpopulation analyses).  
For graduate school aspirations, African American students have marginally 
statistically significant estimates. There is suggestive evidence that a 1% increase in total 
or federal loans caused a 5% decrease in graduate school aspirations. Unlike the full 
 116 
sample, Wu-Hausman statistics for the African American students’ models are all 
statistically significant, therefore rejecting the null hypothesis that OLS and IV models 
would produce statistically similar estimates. The minimum eigenvalues are not large 
enough to allay worries about the strength of the instruments either in size or in bias 
(10.21 and 9.19 for loans and federal loans, respectively). I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are weak at the optimal level (at most 5% relative bias and 
size inflation to 0.10 significance level). However, I could reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are weak at the next critical value level (at most 10% relative bias [critical F-
value 9.08] and size inflation to 0.15 significance level). Therefore, there is evidence of 
marginally strong instruments, though it is not optimally strong. This creates doubt about 
the point estimate bias of the coefficient estimates and their statistical significance. The 
Sargan statistic’s p-values are above conventional levels, which fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous and the instruments are not systematically 
related to the second stage error term. The full sample estimates for graduate school 
aspirations are generally positive in OLS models with a small, statistically insignificant, and 
negative IV second stage estimate for debt’s effect. That negative IV second stage estimate 
appears to be driven primarily by African American students and partially by Asian and 
other race students. The estimates from the Asian and other race subpopulation models are 
statistically insignificant, with weak instrument relevance (potentially due to the smaller 
sample size).  
 For both graduate school enrollment and early-career occupation salary, the models 
for White students show generally relevant instruments that uphold the exclusion 
restriction. I predict that a 1% increase in total loans would cause an 11% decrease in 
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graduate school enrollment. For federal loans, it would cause a 12% decrease. I predict that 
a 1% increase in either total or federal loans would cause a 0.12–0.14% increase in salary 
in 2009, climbing to 0.22–0.24% in 2012. The models for African American students have 
generally weak instruments (small minimum eigenvalues), likely due, in part, to the smaller 
sample size. Therefore, while the estimates are similar in sign (negative with enrollment 
and positive with salary), none of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant. With 
the instrument relevance issues, the African American models do not yield credible causal 
estimates. 
Focusing on prior income, I present the estimates for students from low-income to 
high-income backgrounds in Tables A84–A131 (includes full OLS, reduced form, first stage, 
and second stage models for all income subpopulation analyses). The instrument relevance 
for both low- and high-income students is weak for graduate school aspirations models. 
The estimates are all small, statistically insignificant, and negative. Due to the instrument 
relevance issues, these are not credible causal estimates. For graduate school enrollment 
and salary, low-income student models show strong evidence for causal estimates (Wu-
Hausman statistics statistically significant; smallest minimum eigenvalue of approximately 
21 or 14; Sargan statistically insignificant). A 1% increase in either total or federal 
undergraduate debt caused a 5% decrease in graduate school enrollment in 2009 and a 4% 
decrease in 2012. There is marginal evidence as well that a 1% increase in either measure 
of debt caused a 0.05% increase in salary in 2009 (at the 0.10 significance level). 
Prior research and summary statistics from this work suggest that the students in 
the middle of the prior income distribution might be the most affected by undergraduate 
debt. The aspirations models have weak instrument relevance. Except for graduate school 
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enrollment for mid- to low-income students, instrument relevance and exogeneity is 
inconsistent, which leads me to question the credibility of the estimates from those models. 
For mid- to low-income students, a 1% increase in undergraduate debt caused an 8–9% 
decrease in graduate school enrollment. 
These subpopulation analyses point to low-income and mid- to low-income students 
as the primary drivers of the full sample relationships. However, due to sample size 
limitations for the race/ethnicity subpopulation analyses, it is difficult to exclude the 
possibility that race/ethnicity also moderates the relationship between undergraduate 
debt and postbaccalaureate decision-making. 
Robustness Check 
 As discussed in the methods section, the capacity of different states to provide 
graduate school education or early-career occupation opportunities or differential rates of 
changes in tuition and fees based on revenues could influence the estimates.  
I present the graduate school aspirations state specification results in Tables A132–
A135. The first two columns present estimates with home state fixed effects and the second 
two columns present estimates with post-college enrollment state fixed effects. All primary 
estimates are qualitatively similar (in direction and magnitude), but the IV models now 
produce statistically different estimates from OLS (Wu-Hausman statistic is statistically 
significant) and continue to provide evidence that the instruments are exogenous and not 
systematically related to the second stage error term (Sargan statistics’ p-values remain 
above conventional levels of .05).  
Tables A136–A143 show the graduate school enrollment state specification results. 
For both the home state and post-college state specifications, the estimates are all 
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qualitatively similar. The IV models produce statistically different estimates from OLS (Wu-
Hausman statistic is statistically significant), sufficiently strong instruments (minimum 
eigenvalues greater than 22.3), and support instrument exogeneity (Sargan statistics’ p-
values above .05). 
Tables A144–A151 show the early-career occupation state specification results. For 
both the home state and post-college state specifications, the estimates are all qualitatively 
similar. The IV models produce similarly credible causal estimates, except for the relative 
size critical value (lowest minimum eigenvalue obtained is 19.66). 
Overall, regardless of controlling for home or post-college enrollment state 
characteristics, the main analysis relationships hold: Increasing undergraduate debt 
decreases graduate school enrollment and increases early-career occupation salary. 
Conclusion 
I find no evidence that larger amounts of debt inhibit students from aspiring to 
attend graduate school, but I do find evidence that increased undergraduate debt decreases 
the likelihood of recent bachelor’s degree earners enrolling in graduate school and 
increases their early-career occupation salaries. Due to the generalizability restrictions of 
the methods, these findings apply solely to recent bachelor’s degree earners for whom 
changes in tuition and fees induce changes in borrowing behaviors. This generalizability 
restriction contextualizes the policy and practice relevance of these findings (discussed in 
the final chapter). In the next chapter, I apply the previously outlined conceptual 
framework to the qualitative analysis of research question 2: How do underrepresented 
students conceptualize undergraduate debt and their repayment options, and how does 
this change closer to time of repayment? 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
INVESTIGATION 2: A CASE STUDY OF UNDERGRADUATE DEBT, REPAYMENT PLANS, 
AND POSTBACCALAUREATE DECISION-MAKING 
 
The Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965 originally targeted the neediest students 
for student financial aid (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). Over time, with new laws such 
as the Middle Income Assistance Act (1978) and the reauthorization of the HEA in 1992, 
which created non–means-tested loans (Stafford unsubsidized loan), the scope and 
complexity of aid programs has grown. This expansion resulted in 60% of college graduates 
from public and private not-for-profit institutions in AY 2012–2013 graduating with debt 
(College Board, 2014), which left a majority of college graduates in the unfortunate position 
of assessing how to repay their undergraduate student loans. The year 2011 saw the 
highest cohort default rate on federal student loans in more than 15 years (College Board, 
2012). Furthermore, the percentage of total outstanding student loan debt held by 
consumers that was 90 days or more delinquent grew from 6.1% in 2003 to 11.0% in 2012 
(U.S.D.O.E. National Center for Education Statistics, 2013). These potential adverse effects 
appear to affect minority students disproportionately. For example, debt burden is one 
measure of a student’s ability to meet repayment requirements. Approximately 24% of 
African American graduates held debt burden greater than 8%, whereas 21% of White 
graduates held an excessive debt burden (Price, 2004). This raw difference is significant, 
but smaller than might be anticipated. Controlling for individual and institutional 
characteristics, African American college graduates in 1997 had a 1.5 times greater risk 
than their White peers of having a debt burden over 8%, which was declared the excessive 
cutoff by the federal government (Price, 2004).  
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Research illuminating the influence of undergraduate debt on postbaccalaureate 
decision-making and how underrepresented students create their belief structures about 
undergraduate debt and postbaccalaureate options could aid in explicating why these 
students do not appear to make the same choices as their peers. Even when controlling for 
graduate school aspirations, African American students are less likely to enroll in graduate 
school and more likely to report a change in their postbaccalaureate career plans due to 
their undergraduate debt (Baum & Saunders, 1998; Weiler, 1994). These students are 
more likely than their peers, particularly White peers, to borrow; to borrow at higher rates; 
to have higher monthly debt burdens; and to default on repayment. Evidence generally 
points to these students being less likely to enroll in postbaccalaureate education unless 
they are compared to their peers (generally White students) who are at the same amount 
of undergraduate debt, self-report the same demographics, and attend similar institutions. 
African American students disproportionately come from low-income backgrounds, take 
longer to graduate, borrow more, and are less likely to come from families with abundant 
social and cultural capital. This means that, without artificially created statistically equal 
conditions, these students face larger hurdles to their postbaccalaureate decision-making. 
Research question 2 asks:  
How do underrepresented students conceptualize undergraduate debt and their 
repayment options? How does this change closer to time of repayment? 
My goal for this study is to gather and analyze evidence that could clarify the 
nuanced relationship between human capital theory and loan/debt aversion and how this 
relationship changes over time (part of the reassessment cycle mentioned in my conceptual 
framework). As a refresher, I posit that before college enrollment, students select a major 
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and choose postbaccalaureate plans, such as to enter an occupation or to attain a 
postbaccalaureate degree directly after graduating. While they are in college, their tuition 
increases. Students choose to borrow or not to borrow in order to continue attending the 
initial institution. If students do choose to borrow the additional amount, they must 
evaluate and reassess their prior decision of an occupation or attending graduate school. 
This reassessment can happen several times during the students’ undergraduate career. 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the process of reassessment students with 
undergraduate debt experience while making postbaccalaureate education and occupation 
decisions.  
It is difficult to disentangle the processes that produce quantitative evidence on this 
topic. Understanding undergraduate debt’s effect requires understanding why students 
react to an increase in cumulative loan amounts by choosing not to enroll in graduate 
school or choosing higher-salary early-career occupations. Qualitative data provides the 
potential for deeper clarification of the processes students use to make postbaccalaureate 
decisions and for further refinement of my conceptual framework, particularly with regard 
to how the reassessment process occurs. 
In this chapter, I outline the research methods first. I discuss the participants, 
sampling strategy, data sources, data analysis methods, and my background as a 
researcher. I follow this by sharing the results of the qualitative interviews. This includes 
the emergent themes of timing and structure of information, family as a source of 
knowledge, comfort with amount borrowed, and postbaccalaureate decision-making. I end 
the results section with a discussion of the connections between qualitative and 
quantitative results and conclusions. 
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Research Methods 
Participants 
I interviewed six undergraduate students who held federal undergraduate loans and 
graduated from an HBCU. The institution the students graduated from, referred to as 
Southern University (SU), is located in the southern region of the United States. SU is a 
small, private institution. At the end of AY 2014–2015, approximately 60 students who 
borrowed federal undergraduate loans graduated. Of those students, 80% were female and 
the average cumulative amount borrowed was almost $23,000 in combined Federal Direct 
Subsidized and Unsubsidized loans. In the closest comparison year (2013–2014), 
approximately 64% of all U.S. college graduates from private not-for-profit institutions 
borrowed to finance their undergraduate education (College Board, 2015). On average, 
private not-for-profit college graduates in the same year who used undergraduate loans to 
finance their undergraduate education borrowed $30,200 (College Board, 2015). 
Therefore, SU follows national trends on the number of students who borrow, though the 
cumulative amount is smaller than the national average. 
Sampling 
A member of the Office of Financial Aid sent out my recruitment email for this study 
to all students who had completed or would be completing repayment counseling on their 
federal student loans (see Appendix B, Item B1). Those students then had the opportunity 
to contact me if interested in participating in the study. I employed this purposive sampling 
method due to the highly sensitive nature of the information about the students. SU was 
unable to grant me access to financial aid data on its students, which would have allowed 
me to sample students randomly or to contact all students directly. Unfortunately, this also 
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meant that I could not stratify the sample based on gender or the cumulative amount of 
loans borrowed by the students. Thus, the sample comprises five women who were 
presumably eager to discuss their undergraduate debt (10% response rate). To increase 
the sample size, I asked students after completing their interview if they knew of anyone 
else who would be a good fit for the research study (snowball sampling). This produced 
one additional participant, who brought the total up to six. 
Data Sources 
 I used both document/artifact analysis and semi-structured interviews with these 
recent graduates of SU. The document analysis included close reading of the United States 
Department of Education website and publicly available financial aid documentation from 
SU. I analyzed both the Department of Education’s Financial Aid website (U.S. Department 
of Education, 2015b) and the Federal Student Aid website (a more user-friendly version, 
U.S. Department of Education, 2015a). I analyzed approximately 40 documents on the 
student loan process in the United States and the options for students to repay those loans 
(see Table 24). 
I conducted semi-structured one-on-one telephone interviews with recent SU 
graduates. As recommended by Yin (2003), I developed interview protocols based on the 
conceptual framework and review of the literature (see Appendix B, Items B2 and B3). The 
focus of the interviews was how students conceptualize undergraduate debt and their 
repayment options. I interviewed participants at two different points in time, referred to as 
phase one  
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Table 24 
 
Artifacts Analyzed 
Southern University Source  
Descriptions of types of aid Website [Confidential] 
Entrance and exit counseling Website [Confidential] 
Financial aid summary checklist Website [Confidential] 
Handbook on financial aid Paper  
Key financial aid terms  Website [Confidential] 
U.S. Department of Education   
Aid for military families website Website https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/grants-
scholarships/military 
Basic eligibility criteria website Website https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/eligibility/basic-criteria 
Basics for students Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/direct-
loan-basics-students.pdf 
Be a responsible borrower: Plan 
ahead and graduate with less debt 
Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/responsibl
e-borrower.pdf 
Choose a career school carefully Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/choose-
school.pdf 
Comparing federal and private 
student loans graphic 
Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/federal-vs-
private-loans-graphic.png 
Deferment and forbearance website Website https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/deferment-
forbearance 
Don’t get scammed on your way to 
college! 
Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/dont-get-
scammed.pdf 
Entrance counseling module Website https://studentloans.gov/myDirectLoan/entranceCounselin
g.action?execution=e2s1 
Exit counseling module Website https://studentloans.gov/myDirectLoan/exitCounseling.acti
on?execution=e5s1 
Federal student aid and identity theft Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/student-
aid-and-identity-theft.pdf 
Federal student loan programs Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/federal-
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loan-programs.pdf 
Federal student loans  Website https://studentloans.gov/myDirectLoan/index.action 
Federal Student Loans: Direct PLUS 
loan basics for parents 
Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/direct-
loan-basics-parents.pdf 
Financial awareness counseling 
module 
Website https://studentloans.gov/myDirectLoan/financialAwarenes
sCounseling.action?execution=e3s1 
Forgiveness, cancellation, and 
discharge website 
Website https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/forgiveness-
cancellation 
Getting a federal student loan graphic Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/get-
loan.png 
Glossary  Website https://studentloans.gov/myDirectLoan/glossary.action 
How to repay your loans website Website https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans 
Income-driven repayment plans for 
federal student loans 
Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/income-
driven-repayment.pdf 
Interest rates and fees website Website https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/interest-rates 
Loans overview website Website https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans 
Non-U.S. citizens website Website https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/eligibility/non-us-citizens 
Peace Corps and repayment of your 
federal student loans 
Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/peace-
corps-and-loan-repayment_1.pdf 
Public service loan forgiveness 
program 
Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/public-
service-loan-forgiveness.pdf 
Repaying your loans Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/repaying-
your-loans.pdf 
Repayment calculator Website https://studentloans.gov/myDirectLoan/mobile/repayment
/repaymentEstimator.action 
Trouble making your federal student 
loan payments? Graphic 
Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/trouble-
paying-graphic.png 
Understanding default website Website https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/repay-loans/default 
When it’s time to repay graphic Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/repayment
-plans-graphic.png 
Why get a federal student loan? Paper https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/sites/default/files/why-get-
fed-loan.pdf 
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Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau 
  
Repay student debt Website http://www.consumerfinance.gov/paying-for-
college/repay-student-debt/#Question-1:federal 
Federal Trade Commission   
Student loans Paper https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0048-student-
loans.pdf 
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and phase two. As these interviews were semi-structured, I allowed participants to deviate 
from the protocol if interesting and relevant information emerged. In phase one, I 
interviewed students during the summer directly after the students graduated in 2015. 
Participants received a $25 gift card as compensation. In phase two, I interviewed each 
student again at least 6 months after graduation, closer to the time when the students must 
make repayment decisions with the federal government. Participants received a $15 gift 
card for participating in the second interview. This follow-up interview was critical 
because research shows that students generally cannot correctly estimate the dollar 
amount of student loans they have borrowed while still enrolled (Akers & Chingos, 2014; 
Andruska et al., 2014). During these interviews, I wrote field notes for each student. After 
each interview, audio recordings were transcribed verbatim. Phase one interviews lasted 
approximately 1 hour and phase two interviews lasted approximately 30 minutes. The 
Vanderbilt University and SU Institutional Review Boards approved this research. 
Data Analysis Methods 
Once the interviews were transcribed, I used NVivo 11 software to analyze the data 
in an iterative process. First, I read the full transcripts and expanded on the field notes 
written while I interviewed the students. These field notes included methodological notes 
and theoretical notes on emerging themes. From there, I read the transcripts again and 
coded them for broad categories influenced by the previously created methodological and 
theoretical notes. In the pilot study of the interview protocol, general categories such as 
“amount of debt as a moderator,” “family,” and “comfort with debt” emerged, and so I 
expected these themes to be present in the actual interviews. At this point, I wrote memos 
summarizing the emerging themes in each interview. I sent the memos to the participants 
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to give them the opportunity to correct any of the interpretations (member check-ins; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985). None of the participants responded. During this entire analytical 
process, I discussed the emerging themes and field notes with a peer debriefer to get a 
second opinion on the analysis and to make sure I was acknowledging and attempting to 
minimize my personal biases in interpreting participants’ statements. Once I had coded all 
the transcripts for the macro concepts and more granular facets, I analyzed the coding on 
all the transcripts in order to code for themes across students.  
Background of Researcher 
I am a doctoral candidate who is dedicated to studying how loans affect college 
students. I have previously worked as an assistant dean of admissions in charge of low-
income and first-generation college students and as a financial aid liaison for a selective 
institution in the southeastern United States. This practical experience led to a deep 
understanding of the student financial aid process, particularly loans and the effects they 
can have on students’ postbaccalaureate decision-making. I gained this experience at a 
selective public institution in the same region of the country as SU. I acknowledge that the 
financial aid priorities might have been different for the two institutions, but the manner of 
packaging students' financial aid awards were similar (based on informal conversations 
with staff in SU's financial aid office).  
Limitations  
The qualitative portion of this dissertation has a small number of participants, 
primarily because of two issues. First, in order to gain permission from an institution to 
participate in this research, I had to allow the Office of Financial Aid to contact the 
population of students completing exit counseling and graduating that year. Although this 
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could have made students take the email more seriously, it also limited the number of 
times potential participants were contacted about participating in the study. It would have 
been useful to be able to contact students directly about participation in this research. 
Second, the timing of the first email to students, April 2015, was likely an extremely busy 
time as students prepared for graduation and/or moving away from college. The Office of 
Financial Aid sent follow-up emails after graduation in order to mitigate this. If I had been 
able to participate in SU’s loan counseling session and meet with students, I believe I would 
have a larger sample. In future work building on this study, I plan to attend at least one on-
campus event that will allow me to build rapport with and increase the participation rates 
in future research.  
Having several sources of data for triangulation would have been advantageous. As 
previously mentioned, SU could not give me actual cumulative loan amounts for each 
student, so I could not verify the figures students reported to me in our interviews. Future 
research will also involve interviews with stakeholders in counseling students on loan 
repayment and students not attending HBCUs (as contrast cases). This, in addition to more 
interviews with students at more institutions, should create a more robust compilation of 
data about perceptions of undergraduate student loan debt and its influences on the future 
decision-making of underrepresented students.  
Results 
I conducted interviews with six recent SU graduates. I use pseudonyms to protect 
participants’ confidentiality in the results that follow. Table 25 gives a brief overview of 
each student from SU. 
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Table 25 
 
Information about Participating Students 
 
Pseudonym Amount of Debt 
Phase One 
Amount of Debt 
Phase Two 
Amanda $10,000–$19,999 $10,000–$19,999 
Sandra $10,000–$19,999 $30,000–$39,999 
Jocelyn $50,000+ $50,000+ 
Annie <$2,500 $10,000–$19,999 
Nicole $20,000–$29,999 $20,000–$29,999 
Cecelia $50,000+ $50,000+ 
 
Graduates borrowed a combination of Direct Loans, subsidized and unsubsidized, 
from the federal government. At least three of these graduates had parents who also 
borrowed PLUS loans. The students were 21–22 years old when they graduated from SU. 
All the graduates self-identified as African American, Black, or Black American and 
reported majoring in either social sciences or humanities fields. 
The primary themes I found with regard to undergraduate debt and 
postbaccalaureate decision-making were timing and structure of information, family as a 
source of knowledge, comfort/discomfort with the amount borrowed, and realities of 
postbaccalaureate decision-making. Based on the conceptual framework, I expected that 
timing and structure of information on undergraduate borrowing and repayment would be 
critical to students’ conceptions of undergraduate debt and postbaccalaureate decision-
making. Though I never directly asked about families in the interview protocols, students 
consistently pointed to their families as primary sources of knowledge about 
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undergraduate debt and repayment. This aligns with the general emphasis in prior 
research on parents’ transfer of knowledge and financial and cultural capital to their 
children, which influences children’s decision-making (Houle, 2013). I directly probed 
students about their comfort with the amount borrowed and the realities of 
postbaccalaureate decision-making; therefore, it is not surprising that students provided 
information on these topics. 
Timing and Structure of Information 
 SU students directly reported that the sources they consulted for information on 
loan repayment were federal exit counseling (all six), friends (four), family (two), federal 
government websites (two), loan servicers (one), and job recruiters (one). During the 
phase one interviews, students reported finding the federally mandated exit counseling 
useful in preparing them for understanding their monthly repayment. Exit counseling 
involved students completing an internet module created by the federal government that 
covers how students can repay their federal student loans. The module outlined the 
cumulative amount the student owed (including interest) as well as the monthly payment 
based on the student’s repayment options. Students were required to complete exit 
counseling in order to obtain their degree or their transcript from SU. To be clear, students 
would often refer to federal exit counseling as “the pie chart” or “the website where I found 
out how much I have to pay.” Only twice during all the interviews, both phase one and 
phase two, did students actually refer to exit counseling by name. Annie, who reported 
borrowing less than $2,500 during the phase one interview, said, “I recently completed the 
exit counseling for the loan, so that was most recently what really helped me, you know, 
concretely set pay, schedule the pay in the amount that I’m comfortable with.” She, and 
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three other students, said the exit counseling put her debt in perspective and helped her to 
conceptualize the amount she owed. This benefit of exit counseling was sometimes 
overshadowed by its timing during the undergraduate’s career. SU students emphasized 
that the timing of counseling on borrowing and repayment of their undergraduate debt was 
critical.  
The federal government mandates entrance counseling when students begin their 
postsecondary studies if the students are borrowing federal loans. The next time students 
are mandated to participate in financial counseling is when they are graduating and 
therefore exiting the institution. During both phase one and phase two interviews, no 
graduates had any recollection of income-based repayment plans (even though I brought 
them up at the end of phase one interviews); they discussed deferring loans only in relation 
to a relative or friend who had previously done so. It is not surprising then that five of the 
six graduates did not find the federally mandated exit counseling to be enough preparation. 
Amanda, who reported borrowing between $10,000 and $19,999, discussed the issues with 
the timing of exit counseling in her phase one interview. 
I had the freshman introductory blah blah blah, here’s the loans. I don’t recall them 
saying my loans would start accumulating [interest]. There’s no follow-up during 
sophomore or junior year. I heard during the final semester from an 
underclassman…They know that you’re not interested [as a] freshman so they don’t 
spend as much time on the introductory mandatory entrance counseling…Moving 
forward, I hope that the financial aid office is a little more proactive in reaching out 
to students and making sure to reach out to students to make sure they are given 
correct and complete information regarding their loans. A lot of what you hear 
about loans in college is hearsay and unless you sit down with someone from 
financial aid it’s hearsay. 
While it is likely that the entrance counseling did include interest rate accumulation 
for unsubsidized loans, Amanda reported having no knowledge of this accumulation until 
she completed exit counseling. She said, “Had I known I was going to start accumulating 
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interest while I was in school I would’ve used the money to pay it off.” She also emphasized 
that the financial aid office should be more proactive in contacting students to share 
information about financial aid. Students did have the ability to contact financial aid 
administrators at any time to arrange a meeting to discuss their undergraduate debt. 
However, five of the six participants indicated that they did not know there was a deficit in 
their understanding of their debt and repayment, which made it unlikely that they would 
have approached an administrator. Unease with the timing of information delivery was 
common. Sandra, who reported borrowing between $10,000 and $19,999, discussed a 
session SU held for graduating seniors about financial aid. 
Me: Did [SU] do anything? 
Sandra: They did but it was not helpful. It was during graduation season, a couple of 
weeks before graduation, people were trying to graduate and had exams so no one 
went. Even though in my head I was like "Oh it’s important I should go” …send me 
emails at the end of the semester it seems like you don’t care and if you don’t care, 
why should I care? 
Sandra’s quote highlights a sentiment about the SU loan programming shared by the 
other five graduates. They perceived the timing of both the federally mandated exit 
counseling and the SU-specific loan discussion as being too late to affect actual borrowing 
behaviors. During the phase one interviews, Annie was the only SU graduate who 
mentioned feeling more secure in making decisions about repayment based on the federal 
exit counseling. She also reported the smallest amount of undergraduate debt (less than 
$2,500). When I questioned students about their experiences with federal exit counseling, 
the five who were dissatisfied all discussed wishing they had a better understanding of how 
much they were borrowing each year. The intention of federal exit counseling is not to 
notify students of cumulative debt amounts at the end of each academic year (U.S. 
Department of Education, 2016); its intention is to prepare students for entering 
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repayment once they leave higher education. Thus, it appeared that part of the 
dissatisfaction with exit counseling stemmed from a lack of information on topics that exit 
counseling was never intended to affect.  
 The conceptual framework posits that students can reassess their postbaccalaureate 
decision-making based on the amount of undergraduate debt they hold in an iterative 
process throughout the undergraduate career. My findings suggest that students may not 
reassess based on undergraduate debt until they exit higher education. None of the 
students reported noticing SU's changes in tuition (over the students’ undergraduate 
careers, the average tuition and fees increased by approximately $1,400). This could 
explain in part why it is difficult to find variation in graduate school aspirations while 
students are in college (as shown in the quantitative results); the peak time to reassess 
would not have arrived yet. If students truly do not have a clear understanding of the 
amount of undergraduate debt they hold from year to year, it would be difficult for this 
amount to influence their future decision-making. 
Family as a Source of Knowledge 
 SU students often reported consulting with family members as a source of 
knowledge about debt and repayment. (In the Timing and Structure of Information section, 
I was referring to students’ answer to the question, “What sources have you consulted 
about loan repayment?” whereas this section discusses all instances of student mentions of 
family). Sandra reported that she had learned from a family member that a student could 
defer payment on her undergraduate loans if she enrolled in a postbaccalaureate education 
program. She said, “I didn’t know that you could defer your school loans. I found that out 
from [my sibling].” There was an emphasis on family as a resource for information as well 
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as emotional support. While this reliance was expected based on prior research, the 
overwhelming focus on the family was not. Despite the fact that the words family and 
parent were not used in my research protocol questions, students used these words more 
than 60 times during the interviews. I did probe once students began to discuss their 
families and it became clear their families were a central area of support for participating 
students, with friends/peers being a close second (based on the number of mentions). All 
students readily reported using their families either directly, as sources of advice on how to 
navigate the financial aid system, or indirectly, by informing how the students 
conceptualized debt and the extent to which they were comfortable with it (which ranged 
from complete comfort to anxiety and fear). For example, Amanda said that her parents 
were constantly hiding from student loan creditors. 
Me: Can you tell me more about what you meant by dodging Sallie Mae? 
Amanda: My parents [are] still paying back their student loans from when they were 
in school. Mom is unemployed so she kind of avoids those letters and those phone 
calls. 
Other graduates reinforced this discomfort, speaking of family members “not moving out 
[of parents’ homes] yet because they’re saving up to pay back their loans.” In fact, Nicole, 
who owed between $20,000 and $29,999, said she would rather work full-time while 
attending graduate school full-time. 
Nicole: I just don’t like the concept of knowing that I owe somebody so the sooner I 
can pay them back or make a dent in paying it back [the better]. Debt I just uhh I 
don’t like the sound of that, I don’t like the word. So any of the free time I had I 
would like to work to pay back something. 
 Me: Why do you think you feel that way? 
 Nicole: Maybe upbringing? My parents taught me [to] try not to owe somebody 
Nicole appeared anxious to repay her undergraduate debt and reported wanting to 
do so as quickly as possible. She reported not being willing to put her loans into 
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forbearance while enrolled in graduate school because of the interest that would continue 
accruing. She also reported that she had absorbed these feelings of anxiety around debt 
from her parents, who repeatedly emphasized that debt is not a good thing. It did not 
appear that her parents had a great deal of experience with debt, however, as the only debt 
she could think of that they might have had was an auto loan. During her phase two 
interview, when she had begun repayment, Nicole said that she was “pretty nonchalant” 
about repaying her student loans. She did not get accepted to graduate school and decided 
to work while taking a year off from school, which allowed her to meet her monthly 
payments in the “good old-fashioned way,” as she called it. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Annie reported that the amount she was 
borrowing did not concern her. 
Me: How do you feel about that amount [you borrowed]? 
Annie: The [less than $2,500] doesn’t overwhelm me but my parents are paying back 
the larger portion. Not too concerned…You know my mom and I discussed getting 
[me] getting a part-time job…my mom said "No your job right now is to be a 
student.” 
Annie reported not feeling anxious during our phase one interview because her parents 
would be repaying the majority of her undergraduate debt. She went further during her 
phase two interview, saying, “It’s kind of [my parents’] gift to me…I figured I would just 
work and pay off my portion of my debt and my parents help me pay off my portion of my 
loans.”  
The conceptual framework posits that students might reassess their 
postbaccalaureate decision-making after borrowing additional undergraduate debt. From 
the interviews, it appeared that the process of reassessment might partially rely on the 
knowledge and understanding of debt and repayment these students had learned from 
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their families. The students with more knowledge were able to reassess and find ways to 
continue pursuing their interests. Participants with less knowledge appeared to reassess 
and make different education and occupation decisions than they had discussed in the 
phase one interviews. This could mean that new ways of introducing students to 
knowledge about debt and its consequences for their lives might mitigate information 
asymmetries present in students' understanding of debt. 
Comfort with Amount Borrowed 
 The SU graduates expressed a range of feelings, from mild discomfort with the 
amount they had borrowed to more severe apprehension. Where a graduate fell on this 
continuum generally corresponded to the amount borrowed, with those borrowing more 
than $20,000 tending to express more discomfort. The two graduates with less than 
$20,000 in debt often expressed more comfort with the amount they borrowed (I include 
Annie here because, even though she changed her reported amount between phase one and 
phase two, both amounts were less than $20,000). These graduates shared sentiments like 
this: “I’m kinda still in that indifferent [space]” (Amanda).  
 The three students who borrowed more than $20,000 tended to express surprise at 
the final amount borrowed (Sandra is counted separately because her reported amount 
changed substantially between interviews). Jocelyn conveyed her amazement during her 
phase one interview at the amount of money she had borrowed to finance her 
undergraduate education. 
Me: And how do you feel about the amount you borrowed? 
Jocelyn: It was a shock to me. I was expecting around $30,000 when we did the exit 
counseling… 
Me: Did someone talk about that amount with you while you were at [SU]? 
Jocelyn: No I just always checked [the website] but I guess I forgot to include the 
Perkins loan [when checking]. Me and my friends just looked through [the website], 
 139 
no one ever sat down and talked to us about loans…I would get emails from only one 
service loan not all of them that would also be a factor too 
Jocelyn did not seem to have a clear understanding of how much she had borrowed 
until her exit counseling. She took personal responsibility for overlooking some of her 
loans when totaling her debt, but failing to recall all one's debt might be one reason 
students said they would have benefited from more proactive interactions with the 
financial aid office. As mentioned previously, students could initiate meetings with financial 
aid administrators but rarely took the opportunity to do so. With students typically 
meeting with the financial aid office only at the beginning and end of their undergraduate 
careers, it is understandable that they could continue to miscalculate their total debt 
(Fernandez et al., 2015). This is particularly true because the entrance counseling occurs 
during orientation, “when students aren’t paying as much attention” (Jocelyn).  
Still, it appears that exit counseling is playing at least one critical role: making sure 
that soon-to-be graduates know the final amount borrowed and the approximate monthly 
repayment. Two of the SU graduates reported different total amounts of debt at the two 
interviews. One of those students is Sandra. Sandra discussed her feelings on the amount of 
debt she had accumulated in her first interview: “as compared to [my family member] and 
what [the family member] has to pay back, I’m appreciative of the amount I borrowed.” 
These sentiments changed once she had a clearer understanding of the amount she 
borrowed and the amount of her monthly repayment (in phase one she reported $10,000–
$19,999 of debt but $30,000–$39,999 during phase two). In the second interview, she said 
that the amount she borrowed was “worthwhile only because I did get a [scholarship], so 
I’m better off than other people…With that being said, I’m still surprised at how much I owe 
back… [that amount is] a little bit ridiculous.” 
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 All the SU students reported that the amount they borrowed was worthwhile. They 
considered their undergraduate education “an investment in yourself” (Jocelyn). Four of 
the SU graduates reported career interests that required postbaccalaureate education: 
foreign service officer, dentist, school counselor, and medical doctor. Cecelia explained how 
she rationalized the amount of undergraduate debt she held. 
Me: So do you feel that it was worthwhile to borrow this amount of money? 
Cecelia: Well, because of this career path that I’m on, I do, but I feel like if the career 
path that I’m on wasn’t my – you know like [if I wanted to] be a teacher or 
something, I don’t feel like it would be worth that type of money, because that’s 
probably a teacher’s salary in one year, you know? 
Me: So can you explain that a little bit more? 
Cecelia: …if I don’t have any other – you know any other means of borrowing it, then 
I – you know to get my education, I think you know in the end, [professionals in the 
career field I am interested in] kind of – it’s always worth it for them, you know that 
amount of money, and just kind of the amount of schooling that they put in and then 
you know you can pay it back faster and you know sooner – you know faster or 
sooner or whatever. 
Cecelia suggested that, if she had planned on a less lucrative career, she would not be 
comfortable with the amount of undergraduate debt she held.  
 Students’ reported comfort with debt may influence their reassessment process for 
postbaccalaureate decision-making. As students borrowed more and evaluated the 
possibilities for their lives after college, those who had reported being more comfortable 
with debt were also continuing to pursue their original interests and preferences. 
Postbaccalaureate Decision-Making 
SU graduates had varying post-college plans. Four students planned to start careers 
that required postbaccalaureate education, but all six students reported plans to enroll in 
some type of graduate school, first professional degree, or certificate program. Annie and 
Amanda said their undergraduate debt had no effect on their decisions after graduating. 
Annie attributed her ability to continue with the same postbaccalaureate plans, regardless 
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of the amount she borrowed, to her knowledge that “education doesn’t stop after 
undergrad, so I've been preparing for… the amount I will owe after [my postbaccalaureate 
degree].” Amanda echoed these thoughts. 
The goal has always been to make – to impact change. It’s just the way that I went 
about it has varied. And so in doing so, I never – I didn’t really consider my loans 
that much because I figured I would be able to find a way, somehow, to find a 
program or to find a job that would forgive my loans or allow me to continue my 
education at no additional cost so that my loans wouldn't increase. So that you know 
with the educational backing, my pay scale and pay rate would increase, thus 
enabling me to make consistent payments and larger payments towards loans. 
Though it’s never been a real issue, per se. I’ve always considered it but it’s never 
been "Okay, well, I better do this so that I can make sure that I pay my loans." It’s 
been, "This is what I want to do." 
Amanda reported perceiving that, regardless of the postbaccalaureate education or 
occupation she chose, she would always be increasing her salary, which would allow her to 
make her payments. It is interesting that both Annie and Amanda had the lowest amounts 
of cumulative debt. Also, Annie reported familial support beyond that of her peers (parents 
willing to repay all her undergraduate debt), which could have increased her confidence in 
her ability to meet repayment responsibilities regardless of postbaccalaureate decisions. 
Four of the students reported a change in behavior between phase one and phase 
two interviews. Cecelia said that her debt “encouraged [her] even more to know that [she] 
had this much debt, [so she] got to go out to the finish line in order to be able to pay it 
back.” She said her debt motivated her to continue her education so she could obtain a 
higher-salary occupation in order to repay her undergraduate debt. She also stated that the 
debt made her take time off before starting postbaccalaureate education. Cecelia had 
performed poorly in one of the undergraduate courses necessary for admittance to the 
postbaccalaureate program she preferred. She planned to wait to enroll in the program of 
her choice until she could take the course again. When I asked if she would have retaken 
 142 
the course while still enrolled without the amount of debt she had, she replied, “Probably, 
yes. I’m definitely sure, yeah.” Both Jocelyn and Nicole planned to work while pursuing 
postbaccalaureate degrees in order to reduce the amount of debt they held, even though 
they would have had opportunities to defer repayment. 
Although three students changed their immediate plans after graduating from 
college, only Sandra changed her long-term career goals. Sandra still planned to attend 
graduate school, but in her second interview she reported placing certain restrictions on 
any postbaccalaureate education. 
Sandra: 'Cause even if I’m working I still want to continue my education but being 
financially stable is way more important…I’ve also been thinking about doing an 
online master’s program…my friend told me how much she has to borrow [to attend 
graduate school] and I’m like "Whoa!" 
Me: If you did not have any undergraduate debt, what would your plans have been 
after graduating? 
Sandra:…I wouldn’t feel so pressured to like decide, "OK, I did want to go to an on-
campus [master’s]," but now I’m like 99% sure I’m not going to be on a campus 
again. 
Sandra’s description of how she adjusted her plans for her education, and therefore her 
long-term career, tell an interesting story. During the first interview, she spoke of pursuing 
a career requiring a professional degree (e.g., JD, MD) after taking a year's break. However, 
once she experienced the academic break and began repaying her debt, she reported 
having changed her mind and decided to focus on financial stability. This does not preclude 
her attending graduate school at some point in the future, but her focus on financial 
stability drove her to report only considering online degree programs. 
 In addition to the primary focus areas of postbaccalaureate education and 
occupation, one student said that debt influenced her thoughts about starting a family. 
Jocelyn, who repeatedly expressed anxiety about the amount of undergraduate debt she 
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held, spoke of the ways debt has influenced her decision-making beyond education or 
occupation. 
Jocelyn: Thought about getting a job to pay off the loans and once that’s done I would 
pursue my passion. Think about if I want to have family all that stuff… 
Me: How would this affect you having a family? 
Jocelyn: At one point in time I was a person who wanted to get married debt-free but 
now I don’t think it’s realistic because I’ve taken on more debt. 
Me: Why get married debt-free? 
Jocelyn: I just feel like that’s a lot of baggage to take in, to ask your spouse to help 
pay [over $50,000] in debt as you all become one. 
Jocelyn reported feeling that it was inappropriate to have her romantic partner 
share responsibility for her educational debt. During her second interview, she described 
previously only wishing to marry once she had repaid her debt but, by our second 
interview, she had begun to feel that was no longer feasible. She expressed feeling hesitant 
to embark on marriage with the amount of her outstanding debt. Jocelyn's reasoning could 
partly explain what lies behind the phenomenon of the millennial generation marrying at a 
later age, which scholars and the popular press have noted (White, 2015). 
 These examples align with the suppositions of the conceptual framework. Student 
participants reported beginning higher education with an idea of their early-career 
occupation and the education required for it and for their long-term career goals. This 
decision is made jointly with how much the students would borrow to finance higher 
education. Once the amount of debt they had accumulated became real to the students, they 
reported reassessing their previous occupation and postbaccalaureate education plans.  
Conclusion 
 The quantitative results support the conceptual framework as well as the role 
undergraduate debt plays in the reassessment of postbaccalaureate decision-making. The 
qualitative results provide weak evidence, due to sample size, in support of my framework. 
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These results suggest that the relationship between undergraduate debt and 
postbaccalaureate decision-making might be partially explained by the timing and 
structure of information, family as a source of knowledge, comfort with the amount 
borrowed, and the realities of postbaccalaureate decision-making. The sample consists 
solely of students who earned a bachelor’s degree, which constrains the policy and practice 
implications of the results. In the next chapter, I relate the qualitative and quantitative 
results and the implications of this work.
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The results of this research expand our general understanding of how undergraduate 
loans influence and potentially constrain students' postbaccalaureate decision-making. My 
dissertation adds to the body of evidence by answering the following research questions: 
1. To what extent does undergraduate student loan debt affect postbaccalaureate 
educational aspirations, educational enrollment, and early-career occupational 
choice? 
2. How do underrepresented students conceptualize undergraduate debt and their 
repayment options? How does this change closer to time of repayment? 
In this chapter, I discuss the results of the quantitative and qualitative investigations. I then 
analyze the policy and practical implications of the results. I end with the future research 
needed based on an understanding of the prior literature and my own work. 
Discussion of Quantitative and Qualitative Results 
My conceptual framework relies on viewing postbaccalaureate decision-making as a 
series of sequential decisions (Altonji et al., 2012). Before enrolling in an undergraduate 
institution, a student chooses a major and either an occupation or decides to attend 
graduate school directly after graduating (initial decision). She makes these decisions 
almost simultaneously and bases them on her underlying preferences, abilities, and 
uncertainty about those two factors (no student can truly know the extent of her ability or 
preference for a certain occupation or postbaccalaureate degree; Altonji et al., 2012). While 
the student is enrolled, tuition increases at that undergraduate institution. She chooses to 
borrow or not to borrow in order to continue attending that institution. If the student does 
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choose to borrow the additional amount, she must evaluate and reassess her prior decision 
of occupation or graduate school. This reassessment can happen multiple times throughout 
the undergraduate career. I focus on this reassessment decision: the choice of occupation 
or attending graduate school after a student has responded to tuition increases by 
borrowing an additional amount. This is not a test of the conceptual framework; I merely 
use my conceptual framework as a guide for the theory of action of student borrowers. 
The quantitative results align with the findings of prior causal research on 
undergraduate debt’s effects (Malcom & Dowd, 2012; Rothstein & Rouse, 2011; Zhang, 
2013). Larger changes in tuition and fees are associated with larger amounts of 
undergraduate debt. Greater undergraduate debt leads to changes in postbaccalaureate 
decision-making. This supports the conceptual framework as a theory of behavior for 
students’ postbaccalaureate decision-making. I find no evidence that larger amounts of 
debt inhibit students from aspiring to attend graduate school. Increased undergraduate 
debt decreases the likelihood of recent bachelor’s degree earners enrolling in graduate 
school and increases their early-career occupation salaries. This research contributes to 
the field because I produce causal estimates of the effect of undergraduate debt for a recent 
national sample. According to my conceptual framework, tuition and fee changes do induce 
certain students to borrow more, which leads those students to reassess their 
postbaccalaureate decisions. My findings support all my hypotheses. A $10,000 increase in 
total undergraduate debt: does not appear to induce a change in students’ aspirations; 
decreases the likelihood of students enrolling in graduate school by 3–4%; and, increases 
the average annual salary of students by $1,550 in 2009 and $3,410 in 2012. A $10,000 
increase in federal undergraduate debt: does not appear to induce a change in students’ 
 147 
aspirations; decreased the likelihood of students enrolling in graduate school by 5%; and, 
increases the average annual salary of students by $2,100 in 2009 and $4,620 in 2012.  
My aspirations results mirror those of Rothstein and Rouse (2011). The enrollment 
estimates are smaller than Zhang’s (2013) 2.7-percentage-point reduction in the likelihood 
of graduate school enrollment for every $1,000 debt increase for students attending public 
institutions. However, this disparity could result from differences in our modeling 
strategies: the variation used to predict undergraduate debt, the Great Recession’s effect on 
my sample, and the modeling of the relationship between debt and outcome variables 
(Zhang used a linear measure of debt). Prior research emphasized that students often seek 
shelter in graduate school in order to wait out poor labor market opportunities. The 
estimates could be smaller partly because more students sought enrollment in graduate 
school to wait for better employment opportunities. My graduate school enrollment 
estimates are also smaller than Malcom and Dowd’s (2012) estimates, but again, the 
variation used is different and the authors modeled debt as a categorical variable with 
three values (no borrowing, typical borrowing, and heavy borrowing). My early-career 
occupation salary findings generally support Rothstein and Rouse’s (2011) findings. 
Rothstein and Rouse (2011) found that an increase of $10,000 in debt increased the annual 
salary of graduates by $2,000 on average. My estimates for average annual salary increase 
one year after graduate are approximately $2,000. Rothstein and Rouse (2011) obtained 
early-career occupation information from student exit surveys that the anonymous 
institution’s career services office conducted the week before students graduated. 
Therefore, the authors’ estimates are most comparable to the findings for 2009. The 
estimates from 2012 show that the relationship between undergraduate borrowing and 
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early-career occupation salary has strengthened since 2009 (though this could be due to 
students selecting higher-salary occupations directly after graduating, which allows 
students to increase their salary at a higher rate). I investigate the relationship between 
postbaccalaureate decision-making and two types of undergraduate borrowing: total debt 
and federal debt. It is logical for students who incur large amounts of federal debt to react 
more strongly to the cumulative amount since federal debt is means-tested. This is a 
consistent finding because higher amounts of federal borrowing cause greater reductions 
in graduate school enrollment and higher average salaries. 
The qualitative results align in some ways with the few prior qualitative research 
studies on this topic. The six students in the sample initially reported not allowing 
undergraduate debt to affect their postbaccalaureate plans, similar to Murphy’s (1994) 
work. However, four of the six students later reported changing either their immediate 
plans after graduating or their long-term career plan in some part because of the amount 
they had borrowed; these students also carried the highest cumulative debt loads. Students 
expressed more confidence in their ability to repay their undergraduate debt during their 
phase one interviews. This finding mirrors the high levels of confidence reported by the 
students in Fernandez and colleagues’ (2015) research on federal loan exit counseling. 
However, as I hypothesize based on the conceptual framework, by the time of the phase 
two interviews, four students who had begun repayment reported more anxiety about their 
ability to repay their undergraduate debt. The results, while preliminary in nature due to 
the small sample size, suggest that following students past graduation is key because the 
students' reported confidence or emotional state appears to change as repayment draws 
closer. 
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 My qualitative results can inform our thinking about students’ conceptualizations of 
undergraduate debt and how they reassess their postbaccalaureate plans. Future research, 
discussed below, could test the conceptual framework to find out whether the pilot results 
are more widespread. Although I found evidence of timing and structure of information, 
family as a source of knowledge, comfort with the amount borrowed, and the realities of 
postbaccalaureate decision-making supporting the framework, gaps remain in our 
understanding of how students internalize the borrowing of larger amounts. Particularly 
with the small sample size, it is inappropriate to draw conclusions about the behaviors and 
perceptions of HBCU bachelor’s degree earners. These results provide a first glimpse into 
the decision-making process among a small group of students in this population. 
With both quantitative and qualitative results in mind, I contribute to the field of 
education policy in three ways. One is identifying causal estimates from undergraduate 
debt by instrumenting with changes in cost of tuition and fees. This technique could be 
used in multiple scenarios as long as the change in tuition has no outside effect on the 
outcome variable. The second way my results contribute to education policy is suggestive 
evidence from the qualitative study on the importance of following students beyond 
graduation to investigate how undergraduate debt continues to influence their perceptions 
and decision-making. It may be more complicated to reach this population, but students’ 
reported beliefs and behaviors seemed to shift drastically as they began repayment.  
The third contribution is the creation of my conceptual framework and the evidence 
supporting or adding nuance to our understanding of human capital. The conceptual 
framework outline how students make postbaccalaureate decisions, particularly for 
graduate school enrollment and early-career occupation salary. My results support the 
 150 
notion that increased costs associated with undergraduate education does, (at least 
partially) drive the amount of undergraduate debt students hold. This in turn may result in 
a reassessment of prior plans for graduate school and early-career occupation. I found less 
evidence for the reassessment of graduate school aspirations (likely because, in part, the 
reassessment primarily occurs after leaving college and because social desirability might 
affect self-reported aspirations). With regard to human capital theory, students reacting to 
larger amounts of undergraduate debt by increasing their annual salaries follows the 
general premise of maximization of lifetime utility. Contrary to traditional conceptions of 
human capital theory, I do not find evidence that students enroll in graduate school in 
order to maximize their lifetime utility by attaining entry to a higher-paying career. The 
increased costs of enrolling in graduate school, whether due to the actual cost of 
postbaccalaureate education or the foregone earnings, might prohibit certain students 
from enrolling. Researchers can overlook this nuanced perspective of human capital theory 
if they view students as rational actors, forgetting that both the pure costs of more 
education and the discount rate of future earnings create optimal decisions different from 
the traditional expectation. With these contributions noted, I turn to implications for policy 
and practice. 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
 Cumulative undergraduate debt, both total and federal borrowing, affects students’ 
postbaccalaureate decision-making. This creates two primary areas of interest for 
policymakers and policy intermediary organizations: rising costs of attending higher 
education and undergraduate debt burdens.  
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First, the amount that colleges charge students does directly affect their borrowing, 
which directly affects their decisions after graduating from college. The National 
Conference of State Legislatures posits that the primary reasons for recent increases in 
tuition are the Great Recession’s depletion of state higher education appropriations and the 
increasing enrollments in higher education institutions, which are partly due to the 
increase in the earnings premium for a college degree compared to a high school diploma 
or its equivalent (Weeden, 2015). Although it is popular to equate a decrease in state 
appropriations with a corresponding increase in tuition, evidence suggests this is not the 
case. The relationship between state appropriations and tuition setting is not linear and is 
generally influenced by the ideological positions of state policy makers and each state's 
demographics (Doyle, 2012). Still, in response to increases in tuition, states have proposed 
varying tuition policies: limitations on annual tuition increases, linking tuition with 
institutional performance, tuition stabilization fund, tuition freezes, tuition tax credits and 
deductions, guaranteed or fixed tuition, linking tuition with financial aid, and nonresident 
enrollment increases (Weeden, 2015). Limitations on annual tuition increases and tuition 
freezes represent some of the more popular options considered by state higher education 
policymakers. According to a study by the California Legislative Analyst’s Office, tuition 
freezes bring additional challenges because institutions swiftly increase tuition after 
freezes (Taylor, 2014). Therefore, tuition freezes decrease borrowing for some students 
only to rapidly increase it for others. Less research exists on limiting annual tuition 
increases and how institutions might react. Researchers continue to investigate outcomes 
of tuition policies, but controlling the price of an undergraduate education is imperative for 
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keeping optimal postbaccalaureate decision-making unaffected by undergraduate 
borrowing.  
Second, reliance on undergraduate student loans to finance college is at an all-time 
high. From a policy perspective, it becomes critical to either decrease the amount students 
are expected to borrow or to decrease the negative effects from borrowing large amounts 
of undergraduate debt. The federal government can increase the maximum Pell award or 
increase the expected family contributions that qualify for subsidized Direct Loans. While 
there is some evidence that increasing federal financial aid creates a chain reaction 
wherein institutions raise tuition (Cellini & Goldin, 2012), it is just one of many factors that 
induce changes in the costs of college. Unless there is clear evidence that increasing Pell 
awards causes an increase in tuition and fees so large that the undergraduate loan burden 
would remain the same, increasing federal grant aid becomes an attractive solution to the 
effects of high undergraduate debt burden.  
Responsibility for decreasing the amount students borrow lies with the state as well 
as institutions. State policymakers can create additional grant aid for students to deter 
borrowing to finance attending higher education. Tennessee is a pioneer in this movement. 
In 2014, the Tennessee legislature passed the Tennessee Promise Scholarship Act, which 
provides tuition-free community college for high school graduates with a certain GPA 
(Kelderman, 2014; NPR, 2014). The state used excess funds from the state lottery reserve 
to finance the new program. This is one example of how state policy can mitigate the 
amount students borrow for their undergraduate education. Additionally, institutions 
determine how institutionally funded financial aid, often called tuition discounts, are 
disbursed to students. Evidence suggests that institutions with unfunded tuition discounts 
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less than approximately 13% can generate net tuition revenue (Hillman, 2012). However, 
on average, most institutions appear to provide tuition discounts to all students instead of 
targeting students with less ability to finance postsecondary education (Heller, 2008). 
There is room for institutions to provide tuition discounts to targeted student groups, such 
as students from low-income backgrounds, which would reduce the amount they borrow 
for higher education.  
Providing better information on repayment plans during students’ undergraduate 
careers could decrease the negative effects of larger cumulative undergraduate debt. As 
students gain greater understanding of their options for managing debt repayment, there 
could be a lessening of the potentially negative effect of undergraduate debt on graduate 
school enrollment and early-career occupation salary. As previously mentioned, federally 
mandated loan counseling occurs when students enter and exit higher education. This 
might not give many students enough information to make them cognizant of the amount 
of undergraduate debt they have accumulated. It could be useful to mandate institutional 
loan counseling in the spring of each year a student is enrolled in an undergraduate degree 
program. From my limited qualitative results, I find that students responded best to 
knowing the total amount of debt accumulated and the monthly repayment amount. If a 
larger qualitative study can replicate these preliminary findings, it might be useful for 
institutions to require students to complete a simple module that shows them their 
cumulative debt and approximate monthly repayment amount. A federal policy coupled 
with additional practical support would be required. Financial aid offices could also be 
more proactive around loan counseling, particularly when students have accumulated 90 
credits (which is 30 credits away from the minimum to earn a bachelor’s degree). This 
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would be more difficult for commuter than residential institutions due to the latter's ease 
of access to the student population. However, if the federal government mandated a 
“continual counseling” session to take place once a student reaches 90 credits, the 
institution could couple this with a counseling workshop or event held by the financial aid 
office. Because financial aid offices are understaffed and facing resource shortages 
(NASFAA, 2016), it would be useful to couple a mandate for additional counseling with 
additional funds or the streamlining of financial aid staffers' other responsibilities. If that is 
not feasible, experimenting with low-cost methods of delivering accurate and timely 
information on undergraduate borrowing, such as an interactive website, would be 
advantageous. By creating more opportunities for students to understand how much they 
have borrowed and how this will affect them in the future, we could create borrowers who 
understand better how to prepare themselves for their postbaccalaureate lives. The 
financial aid office component of this may be crucial because there is potential for perverse 
incentives if we further educate students on the amount of debt borrowed without 
including information on how students can manage their debt. Students could feel that the 
cumulative amount of undergraduate debt is too much and so they might be better off 
dropping out of college and starting to work to begin repayment. Early and frequent 
education about the ways to manage undergraduate debt repayment is critical in order to 
begin lessening the negative effects of undergraduate debt. 
All these implications focus on lessening the amount of risk students associate with 
pursing a college degree. For example, one reason to provide these options for financing 
higher education is that it would allow students to assess less risk in certain 
postbaccalaureate decisions when comparing the costs and benefits. This is particularly 
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critical when framing the issue of undergraduate debt burden for policymakers. Debt is not 
an inherently bad thing; however, certain student populations can view debt as prohibitive 
to entering certain occupations or attending graduate school. Therefore, for some students 
the costs of these postbaccalaureate decisions would be much higher than they are 
assumed to be for the average student. When policymakers seek to learn about the effects 
of undergraduate debt or the potential reasons for lower levels of graduate school 
attainment, it is imperative to understand how students assess and understand the risks 
and costs involved. 
Future Research 
To help our country create a strong and diverse labor force, additional research is 
needed into both the causal effects of undergraduate debt on postbaccalaureate decision-
making and the perceptions and beliefs that drive those decisions. Subpopulation analyses 
of the negative effects of undergraduate debt would increase our understanding of which 
students debt affects most. The subpopulation analyses suggest that African American and 
middle-income students drive significant portions of this effect, but the models do not 
produce credible causal estimates. I plan to use my causal inference method (tuition and 
fees as an instrument for undergraduate debt) to investigate whether these effects differ 
for public and private institutions. Also, there are multiple ways to conceptualize graduate 
school enrollment and early-career occupation choice. For graduate school, I plan to 
estimate the effect of undergraduate debt separately on enrollment into master’s and 
doctoral programs. For early-career occupation, I plan to estimate the effect of 
undergraduate debt on an indicator of low salary (below the 25th percentile of annual 
salaries), an indicator for nonprofit occupations, an indicator for occupational prestige, and 
 156 
a survey item on satisfaction with occupation salary. The occupational prestige 
investigation would also be able to aid in add to our understanding of the extent to which 
occupational choice is stratified by income and racial/ethnic groups. The results from these 
additional quantitative analyses would increase our understanding of whether and how 
this effect changes based on the subpopulation or the way that graduate school or early-
career occupation are defined. 
For the qualitative research, I plan to use the dissertation results as a pilot for a full-
scale qualitative investigation of how underrepresented students conceptualize 
undergraduate debt and their repayment options. As prior research and my own work 
show, African American students borrow at higher rates and accumulate greater amounts 
of both total and federal undergraduate debt. However, little is known about how these 
students think about their borrowing, repayment options, and postbaccalaureate decision-
making. I plan to conduct interviews at a number of other HBCUs, with African American 
students and with their White peers as contrast cases. I also plan to conduct interviews 
with African American and White students attending non-MSIs similar in institutional 
profile to HBCUs. By integrating the suggestions I listed in the limitations section of Chapter 
V (e.g., attending loan counseling workshops the institution holds), I hope to increase 
participation rates. This will give me a larger sample size, which will increase the 
trustworthiness and credibility of the results (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
With regard to the policy and practice implications, additional research on state 
tuition policy and loan counseling would be useful for discerning the most optimal policy 
and practice changes. With multiple states enacting different types of tuition policies, there 
are natural experiments that are already occurring throughout the United States which 
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could be studied. At present, it is not clear what type of tuition policy would be best for 
curtailing undergraduate debt burden in the long term. In addition, we need improved 
understanding of which parts of loan counseling are useful to students and how to increase 
the frequency with which students discuss or receive formal and accurate information 
about how much they are borrowing. The preliminary qualitative results suggest that 
sample students do not begin to seriously plan for repayment of their undergraduate loans 
until the repayment time draws near. If that is true broadly, more research into ways to 
make loan counseling more effective and salient could be helpful. 
Concluding Thoughts 
 This dissertation contributes both a new instrumental variable and a new 
conceptual framework for understanding how undergraduate debt affects 
postbaccalaureate decision-making. Increased undergraduate debt, whether total or 
federal, reduces the likelihood of students enrolling in graduate school and increases 
students’ average annual salary in early-career occupations. This is not inherently a bad 
thing. However, if students make decisions contrary to their underlying preferences and 
abilities because of their debt, disparities in educational attainment and low-salary 
occupations, such as teaching, may persist.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
INVESTIGATION 1 TABLES 
 
Table A1 
 
Summary Statistics for Graduate Education Aspirations Data 
 
Mean SD 
Key Variables   
Cumulative Loans 14,705.03 19,116.87 
Cumulative Federal Loans 9,033.33 10,158.99 
Change in Tuition & Fees 3,434.71 2,968.83 
Graduate School Aspirations 0.67 0.47 
   
Continuous Variables   
Prior Income 73,945.59 55,814.30 
Entrance Examination (in SAT) 1,040.70 200.72 
College GPA 3.11 0.57 
Entering Tuition & Fees 9,744.73 8,531.23 
Dependents 0.03 0.23 
   
Indicator Variables   
Female 0.57 0.49 
Mother’s Education 0.95 0.21 
Race   
White 0.72 0.45 
African American 0.10 0.30 
Latino 0.08 0.27 
Asian 0.05 0.22 
Other Race 0.05 0.21 
Selectivity   
Nonselective 0.29 0.45 
Less Selective 0.06 0.23 
Selective 0.50 0.50 
Most Selective 0.15 0.36 
Private Control 0.34 0.47 
2-Yr or Less Institution 0.26 0.44 
Married 0.01 0.10 
Entering Graduate School 
Aspirations 0.71 0.45 
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Table A2 
 
Summary Statistics for Graduate School Enrollment and Early-Career Occupation Data 
 
Mean SD 
Key Variables   
Cumulative Loans 18,062.30 18,896.27 
Cumulative Federal Loans 12,154.73 10,885.15 
Change in Tuition & Fees 2,087.49 1,737.14 
Graduate Enrollment 2009 0.28 0.45 
Graduate Enrollment 2012 0.41 0.49 
Salary 2009 30,955.22 17,612.87 
Salary 2012 41,738.93 26,579.64 
   
Continuous Variables   
Age 18.09 0.73 
Prior Income 68,159.11 62,916.52 
Entrance Examination (in SAT) 1,095.77 179.43 
College GPA 3.32 0.45 
Entering Tuition & Fees 10,883.18 9,061.56 
Dependents 0.07 0.34 
   
Indicator Variables   
Female 0.59 0.49 
Father’s Education 0.95 0.22 
Race   
White 0.78 0.41 
African American 0.06 0.24 
Latino 0.07 0.25 
Asian 0.06 0.23 
Other Race 0.03 0.18 
Selectivity   
Nonselective 0.18 0.39 
Less Selective 0.06 0.24 
Selective 0.60 0.49 
Most Selective 0.16 0.37 
Private Control 0.35 0.48 
2-Yr or Less Institution 0.15 0.36 
Married 0.09 0.28 
Entering Graduate School 
Aspirations 0.78 0.41 
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Table A3 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   Latino 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   Other Race 0.06** 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior Income 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Selective 0.09** 0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Private Control -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.01 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Dependents -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.10* -0.10* 
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 (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 8880 8880 
Note: The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed from 
2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same 
period (federal loan). Standard errors in parentheses. * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A4 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
-0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Mother’s Education 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.08 -0.08 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
Female 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   Latino 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   Other Race 0.06** 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior Income 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Selective 0.09** 0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Private Control -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00* 0.00* 
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 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.00 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Dependents -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.06 0.06 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
Observations 8880 8880 
Note: Reduced form equation for the IV model of undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
aspirations; standard errors in parentheses. * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A5 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
First Stage (Full Model) 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
0.88*** 0.83*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Mother’s Education 4.71*** 4.36*** 
 (1.19) (1.16) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.64*** -0.58*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Female 0.11 0.10 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 1.06*** 1.12*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) 
   Latino -0.17 -0.20 
 (0.18) (0.17) 
   Asian -0.92*** -0.91*** 
 (0.23) (0.22) 
   Other Race -0.28 -0.17 
 (0.22) (0.21) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00* 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.30 0.41 
 (0.28) (0.29) 
   Selective 0.01 0.16 
 (0.24) (0.24) 
   Most Selective -1.19*** -1.07*** 
 (0.29) (0.29) 
Private Control 0.50** 0.69*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
2-Year or Less -1.13*** -1.11*** 
 (0.25) (0.25) 
College GPA -0.38*** -0.30*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
 165 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00** 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.24 -0.02 
 (0.58) (0.56) 
Dependents -0.50* -0.62** 
 (0.22) (0.22) 
Constant 3.13* 2.67* 
 (1.26) (1.23) 
Observations 8880 8880 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.93 (0.165) 1.83 (0.176) 
Minimum eigenvalue 9.53 9.49 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.72 (0.697) 0.83 (0.659) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
 166 
 
Table A6 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage (Full Model) 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.18*** 0.18*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Latino 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.09*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Other Race 0.06* 0.06* 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.00+ -0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Selective 0.09** 0.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.08* 0.08* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Private Control -0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
2-Year or Less -0.16*** -0.15*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
College GPA 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.00 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Dependents -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
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Constant 0.14 0.12 
 (0.20) (0.19) 
Observations 8880 8880 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.93 (0.165) 1.83 (0.176) 
Minimum eigenvalue 9.53 9.49 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.72 (0.697) 0.83 (0.659) 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A7 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
-0.004*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.14*** 0.20*** 0.14*** 0.20*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Latino 0.04* 0.07*** 0.04* 0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.06** 0.09*** 0.06** 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Other Race 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior Income -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Selective 0.05+ 0.02 0.04+ 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.07** 0.08* 0.07** 0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Private Control 0.05* 0.03 0.05* 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
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 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
-0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dependents 0.01 0.03+ 0.01 0.03+ 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A8 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Father’s Education 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.00 0.02+ 0.00 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Latino 0.04* 0.06** 0.04* 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.06** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Other Race 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior Income -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Selective 0.05+ 0.03 0.05+ 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
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   Most Selective 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 0.08** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Private Control 0.06** 0.04* 0.06** 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
-0.00 0.00* -0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.06** -0.07*** -0.06** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dependents 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant 0.23 0.28+ 0.23 0.28+ 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school enrollment. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = 
p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A9 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.78*** 0.78*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Father’s Education 2.55** 2.55** 2.19* 2.19* 
 (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) (0.96) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education -0.38** -0.38** -0.33* -0.33* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Age 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female 0.22* 0.22* 0.22* 0.22* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White)     
   African American 0.43** 0.43** 0.45** 0.45** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
   Latino -0.20 -0.20 -0.37* -0.37* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) 
   Asian -0.92*** -0.92*** -0.94*** -0.94*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) 
   Other Race -0.11 -0.11 -0.23 -0.23 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.46 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
   Selective 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.33 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
   Most Selective -0.46+ -0.46+ -0.53+ -0.53+ 
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 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Private Control 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) 
2-Year or Less 1.08*** 1.08*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) 
College GPA -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.35*** -0.35*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.61*** -0.61*** -0.68*** -0.68*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Dependents 0.30* 0.30* 0.33** 0.33** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Constant 4.33** 4.33** 4.22** 4.22** 
 (1.49) (1.49) (1.51) (1.51) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 43.31 (0.000) 47.99 (0.000) 44.68 (0.000)  48.56 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 37.18 37.182 33.91 33.91 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 3.90 (0.142) 2.23 (0.329) 3.19 (0.203) 1.75 (0.416) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A10 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.02+ 0.04** 0.02+ 0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
   Latino 0.02 0.05* 0.01 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Other Race 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Selective 0.07* 0.06 0.07* 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
   Most Selective 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Private Control 0.06* 0.04+ 0.05* 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
College GPA 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
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Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Dependents 0.03* 0.06** 0.04* 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.71*** 0.75*** 0.71*** 0.75*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 43.31 (0.000) 47.99 (0.000) 44.68 (0.000)  48.56 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 37.18 37.182 33.91 33.91 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 3.90 (0.142) 2.23 (0.329) 3.19 (0.203) 1.75 (0.416) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A11 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.003 0.010+ 0.001 0.009+ 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) 
Age 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Female -0.19*** -0.26*** -0.19*** -0.26*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American -0.06+ -0.50*** -0.06+ -0.50*** 
 (0.03) (0.13) (0.03) (0.13) 
   Latino 0.02 -0.18 0.02 -0.18 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.11) 
   Asian 0.02 -0.48*** 0.02 -0.48*** 
 (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) 
   Other Race -0.02 -0.11 -0.03 -0.11 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
-0.00 0.00*** -0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.02 0.18 -0.02 0.18 
 (0.05) (0.16) (0.05) (0.16) 
   Selective -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) 
   Most Selective 0.09* 0.18 0.09* 0.18 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.15) 
Private Control -0.08** -0.08 -0.08** -0.08 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
2-Year or Less -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
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 (0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.15) 
College GPA -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.10*** 0.07 0.10*** 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) 
Dependents 0.06* 0.04 0.06* 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.08) 
Constant 10.16*** 10.04*** 10.18*** 10.06*** 
 (0.22) (0.83) (0.22) (0.83) 
Observations 8030    8030       8030      8030 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A12 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1,271.66* 1,390.70 1,271.66* 1,390.70 
 (587.57) (1,004.87) (587.57) (1,004.87) 
Father’s Education 31.29 -1,041.51 31.29 -1041.51 
 (602.50) (1,021.86) (602.50) (1,021.86) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-606.66 5,963.83 -606.66 5,963.83 
 (4,316.96) (7,270.90) (4,316.96) (7,270.90) 
Age 344.79 287.37 344.79 287.37 
 (289.12) (464.32) (289.12) (464.32) 
Female -6,264.99*** -10,201.01*** -6264.99*** -10,201.01*** 
 (421.85) (643.05) (421.85) (643.05) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American -490.43 -1,982.22+ -490.43 -1,982.22+ 
 (785.24) (1,143.88) (785.24) (1,143.88) 
   Latino 1,319.59+ 1,471.21 1,319.59+ 1,471.21 
 (794.22) (1,198.50) (794.22) (1,198.50) 
   Asian 2,620.27* 3,368.56* 2,620.27* 3,368.56* 
 (1,020.87) (1,607.12) (1,020.87) (1,607.12) 
   Other Race 615.27 -1,577.67 615.27 -1,577.67 
 (1,337.01) (1,573.44) (1,337.01) (1,573.44) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
0.95 8.08*** 0.95 8.08*** 
 (1.29) (1.99) (1.29) (1.99) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -1,127.09 -624.78 -1,127.09 -624.78 
 (1,202.47) (1,657.22) (1,202.47) (1,657.22) 
   Selective -985.19 -453.53 -985.19 -453.53 
 (1,017.50) (1,435.71) (1,017.50) (1,435.71) 
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   Most Selective 3,358.94** 4,381.61** 3,358.94** 4,381.61** 
 (1,200.57) (1,694.57) (1,200.57) (1,694.57) 
Private Control -2,886.06*** -4,844.73*** -2,886.06*** -4,844.73*** 
 (839.90) (1,221.03) (839.90) (1,221.03) 
2-Year or Less -334.92 -251.94 -334.92 -251.94 
 (1,106.79) (1,563.63) (1,106.79) (1,563.63) 
College GPA 1,131.56** 1,626.80* 1,131.56** 1,626.80* 
 (430.36) (648.40) (430.36) (648.40) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
-0.02 0.16* -0.02 0.16* 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) 
Married 2,416.00** 2,262.39* 2,416.00** 2,262.39* 
 (735.40) (1,084.79) (735.40) (1,084.79) 
Dependents 1,629.00** 2,075.56 1,629.00** 2,075.56 
 (630.82) (1,423.27) (630.82) (1,423.27) 
Constant 15,587.27* 18,979.25 15,587.27* 18,979.25 
 (7,254.99) (11,597.25) (7,254.99) (11,597.25) 
Observations 8030    8030       8030      8030 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career 
occupation salary. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = 
p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A13 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.83*** 0.83*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Father’s Education 2.70* 2.70* 2.39* 2.39* 
 (1.19) (1.19) (1.19) (1.19) 
Change in Average 
tuition and Fees *  
Father’s education 
-0.40* -0.40* -0.35* -0.35* 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Age 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Female 0.25* 0.25* 0.27** 0.27** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.50** 0.50** 0.52** 0.52** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
   Latino -0.04 -0.04 -0.23 -0.23 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
   Asian -0.87*** -0.87*** -0.90*** -0.90*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
   Other Race -0.14 -0.14 -0.21 -0.21 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.68* 0.68* 0.65* 0.65* 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
   Selective 0.49+ 0.49+ 0.46+ 0.46+ 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
   Most Selective -0.36 -0.36 -0.43 -0.43 
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 (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) 
Private Control 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
2-Year or Less 1.17*** 1.17*** 1.06*** 1.06*** 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
College GPA -0.42*** -0.42*** -0.32** -0.32** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Married -0.54** -0.54** -0.56** -0.56** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Dependents 0.27+ 0.27+ 0.28* 0.28* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Constant 4.24* 4.24* 3.95* 3.95* 
 (1.77) (1.77) (1.79) (1.79) 
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 28.96 (0.000) 9.220 (0.002) 30.60 (0.000) 9.13 (0.003) 
Minimum eigenvalue 26.27 26.27 24.07 24.07 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 3.04 (0.219) 1.01 (0.604) 2.44 (0.295) 1.16 (0.561) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A14 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.10*** 0.18* 0.11*** 0.18* 
 (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) 
Age 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Female -0.22*** -0.30*** -0.22*** -0.30*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American -0.10** -0.57*** -0.11** -0.58*** 
 (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) 
   Latino 0.03 -0.17 0.05 -0.13 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) 
   Asian 0.12* -0.32+ 0.13* -0.30+ 
 (0.05) (0.16) (0.05) (0.17) 
   Other Race -0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.06 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.14) 
Prior Income 0.00*** 0.00+ 0.00*** 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.09 0.06 -0.09 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.18) (0.06) (0.18) 
   Selective -0.09+ -0.06 -0.09+ -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.15) 
   Most Selective 0.13* 0.24 0.14* 0.25 
 (0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.17) 
Private Control -0.10** -0.10 -0.10* -0.10 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10) 
2-Year or Less -0.13* -0.19 -0.12* -0.18 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.17) 
College GPA 0.04+ 0.08 0.03 0.07 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.06) 
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Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00* -0.00* -0.00+ -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.15*** 0.16 0.16*** 0.16+ 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10) 
Dependents 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Constant 9.06*** 8.21*** 9.08*** 8.27*** 
 (0.37) (1.22) (0.37) (1.21) 
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 28.96 (0.000) 9.220 (0.002) 30.60 (0.000) 9.13 (0.003) 
Minimum eigenvalue 26.27 26.27 24.07 24.07 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 3.04 (0.219) 1.01 (0.604) 2.44 (0.295) 1.16 (0.561) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A15 
  
Results of OLS Reduced Form (Just Identified), Dependent Variable: Graduate School 
Aspirations 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
-0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   Latino 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   Other Race 0.06** 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Mother’s Education 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior Income 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Selective 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Private Control -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.13*** -0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
   
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
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Married 0.00 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Dependents -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Observations 8880 8880 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A16 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations. 
First Stage Full Model, Just Identified 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
0.30*** 0.30*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Female 0.12 0.11 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 1.05*** 1.12*** 
 (0.15) (0.16) 
   Latino -0.19 -0.22 
 (0.18) (0.17) 
   Asian -0.90*** -0.90*** 
 (0.23) (0.22) 
   Other Race -0.28 -0.17 
 (0.22) (0.21) 
Mother’s Education 0.17 0.25 
 (0.22) (0.22) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00* 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.31 0.42 
 (0.28) (0.29) 
   Selective -0.01 0.14 
 (0.24) (0.24) 
   Most Selective -1.21*** -1.08*** 
 (0.29) (0.29) 
Private Control 0.51** 0.69*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
2-Year or Less -1.14*** -1.12*** 
 (0.25) (0.25) 
College GPA -0.37*** -0.30*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
   
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00** 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
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Married -0.30 -0.07 
 (0.58) (0.56) 
Dependents -0.52* -0.63** 
 (0.22) (0.22) 
Constant 7.30*** 6.47*** 
 (0.73) (0.71) 
Observations 8880 8880 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.52 (0.217) 1.57 (0.211) 
Minimum eigenvalue 15.46 16.74 
F-size crit 16.38 16.38 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A17 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage Full Model, Just Identified 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Female 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.18*** 0.18*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Latino 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.09*** 0.09** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Other Race 0.06* 0.06* 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Mother’s Education 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Selective 0.09** 0.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.07 0.08+ 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Private Control 0.00 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
2-Year or Less -0.16*** -0.16*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
College GPA 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
   
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.01 0.00 
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 (0.06) (0.06) 
Dependents -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.18 0.15 
 (0.26) (0.23) 
Observations 8880 8880 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.52 (0.217) 1.57 (0.211) 
Minimum eigenvalue 15.46 16.74 
F-size crit 16.38 16.38 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A18 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form (Just Identified), Dependent Variable: Graduate School 
Enrollment 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.00 0.02+ 0.00 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White)     
   African American 0.13*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Latino 0.04* 0.06** 0.04* 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.06** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Other Race 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Father’s Education 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior Income -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Selective 0.05+ 0.03 0.05+ 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.08** 0.08* 0.08** 0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Private Control 0.06** 0.04* 0.06** 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
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 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 0.00* -0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.06** -0.07*** -0.06** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dependents 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant 0.24+ 0.27+ 0.24+ 0.27+ 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A19 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model, Just Identified 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.50*** 0.50*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female 0.22* 0.22* 0.23* 0.23* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White)     
   African American 0.43** 0.43** 0.45** 0.45** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
   Latino -0.20 -0.20 -0.37* -0.37* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) 
   Asian -0.93*** -0.93*** -0.95*** -0.95*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) 
   Other Race -0.11 -0.11 -0.23 -0.23 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Father’s Education -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.47 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
   Selective 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.34 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
   Most Selective -0.45 -0.45 -0.53+ -0.53+ 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Private Control 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) 
2-Year or Less 1.09*** 1.09*** 0.98*** 0.98*** 
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 (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) 
College GPA -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.35*** -0.35*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.62*** -0.62*** -0.68*** -0.68*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Dependents 0.30* 0.30* 0.33** 0.33** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Constant 6.66*** 6.66*** 6.24*** 6.24*** 
 (1.24) (1.24) (1.26) (1.26) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 47.89 (0.000) 51.04 (0.000) 48.44 (0.000)  51.01 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 103.41 103.41 95.65 95.65 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines.
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Table A20 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model, Just Identified 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.02+ 0.04** 0.02+ 0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
   Latino 0.03 0.05+ 0.01 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
   Asian -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Other Race 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Father’s Education 0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00* 0.00 0.00** 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Selective 0.08* 0.06 0.08* 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
   Most Selective 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Private Control 0.06* 0.04+ 0.05* 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less 0.05 0.07+ 0.04 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
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College GPA 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00+ 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.10*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Dependents 0.04* 0.06** 0.04* 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.76*** 0.81*** 0.75*** 0.80*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 47.89 (0.000) 51.04 (0.000) 48.44 (0.000)  51.01 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 103.41 103.41 95.65 95.65 
F-size crit 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A21 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form (Just Identified), Dependent Variable: Salary 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1,300.02*** 446.68 1,300.02*** 446.68 
 (225.72) (360.13) (225.72) (360.13) 
Age 344.80 287.09 344.80 287.09 
 (289.09) (464.44) (289.09) (464.44) 
Female -6,265.19*** -10,194.60*** -6,265.19*** -10,194.60*** 
 (421.87) (643.06) (421.87) (643.06) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White)     
   African American -490.12 -1,992.56+ -490.12 -1,992.56+ 
 (785.23) (1,143.27) (785.23) (1,143.27) 
   Latino 1,319.23+ 1,483.05 1,319.23+ 1,483.05 
 (794.32) (1,198.96) (794.32) (1,198.96) 
   Asian 2,621.91* 3,313.95* 2,621.91* 3,313.95* 
 (1,019.20) (1,606.54) (1,019.20) (1,606.54) 
   Other Race 615.07 -1,570.83 615.07 -1,570.83 
 (1,336.91) (1,573.15) (1,336.91) (1,573.15) 
Father’s Education -388.98 -1,281.66 -388.98 -1,281.66 
 (875.06) (1,319.99) (875.06) (1,319.99) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.95 8.10*** 0.95 8.10*** 
 (1.29) (1.99) (1.29) (1.99) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -1,128.36 -582.44 -1,128.36 -582.44 
 (1,202.84) (1,656.10) (1,202.84) (1,656.10) 
   Selective -985.63 -438.83 -985.63 -438.83 
 (1,017.71) (1,435.09) (1,017.71) (1,435.09) 
   Most Selective 3,358.26** 4,404.22** 3,358.26** 4,404.22** 
 (1,200.89) (1,693.58) (1,200.89) (1,693.58) 
Private Control -2,885.10*** -4,876.73*** -2,885.10*** -4,876.73*** 
 (839.32) (1,220.26) (839.32) (1,220.26) 
2-Year or Less -335.87 -220.33 -335.87 -220.33 
 (1,107.34) (1,563.53) (1,107.34) (1,563.53) 
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College GPA 1,131.89** 1,615.66* 1,131.89** 1,615.66* 
 (430.35) (648.23) (430.35) (648.23) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.02 0.16* -0.02 0.16* 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) 
Married 2,416.63** 2,241.62* 2,416.63** 2,241.62* 
 (735.35) (1,083.84) (735.35) (1,083.84) 
Dependents 1,628.73** 2,084.67 1,628.73** 2,084.67 
 (630.84) (1,422.89) (630.84) (1,422.89) 
Constant 15,389.96* 25,546.42** 15,389.96* 25,546.42** 
 (6,132.85) (9,579.34) (6,132.85) (9,579.34) 
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A22 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model, Just Identified 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.47*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Age 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Female 0.26** 0.26** 0.27** 0.27** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.49** 0.49** 0.52** 0.52** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
   Latino -0.03 -0.03 -0.22 -0.22 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
   Asian -0.89*** -0.89*** -0.92*** -0.92*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
   Other Race -0.14 -0.14 -0.20 -0.20 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Father’s Education -0.11 -0.11 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.69* 0.69* 0.66* 0.66* 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
   Selective 0.49+ 0.49+ 0.46+ 0.46+ 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) 
   Most Selective -0.35 -0.35 -0.42 -0.42 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) 
Private Control 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) 
2-Year or Less 1.18*** 1.18*** 1.07*** 1.07*** 
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 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
College GPA -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.33** -0.33** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.54** -0.54** -0.56** -0.56** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Dependents 0.27* 0.27* 0.28* 0.28* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Constant 6.78*** 6.78*** 6.18*** 6.18*** 
 (1.41) (1.41) (1.43) (1.43) 
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 32.71 (0.000) 6.70 (0.010) 33.68 (0.000) 6.76 (0.009) 
Minimum eigenvalue 71.89 71.89 66.92 66.92 
F-size crit 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A23 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model, Just Identified 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.11*** 0.16* 0.12*** 0.16* 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) 
Age 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Female -0.22*** -0.29*** -0.22*** -0.30*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American -0.11** -0.56*** -0.11** -0.57*** 
 (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) 
   Latino 0.03 -0.17 0.05 -0.14 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) 
   Asian 0.13* -0.33* 0.14* -0.32+ 
 (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.17) 
   Other Race -0.00 -0.08 0.01 -0.07 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13) 
Father’s Education 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.14) 
Prior Income 0.00*** 0.00+ 0.00*** 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00+ 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.10 0.07 -0.10 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.18) 
   Selective -0.09+ -0.05 -0.09+ -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.15) 
   Most Selective 0.13* 0.23 0.14* 0.24 
 (0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.16) 
Private Control -0.10** -0.10 -0.10* -0.10 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10) 
2-Year or Less -0.14* -0.18 -0.13* -0.17 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.16) 
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College GPA 0.05+ 0.07 0.04 0.06 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.16*** 0.15 0.16*** 0.15 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.10) 
Dependents 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Constant 8.92*** 8.39*** 8.96*** 8.46*** 
 (0.38) (1.22) (0.39) (1.20) 
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 32.71 (0.000) 6.70 (0.010) 33.68 (0.000) 6.76 (0.009) 
Minimum eigenvalue 71.89 71.89 66.92 66.92 
F-size crit 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
 
 202 
 
Table A24 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: White 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.004** 0.004** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Prior Income 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.032 0.032 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Selective 0.099** 0.098** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.129*** 0.129*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Private Control -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.106** -0.106** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.095*** 0.095*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000+ 0.000+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.013 0.013 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Dependents -0.118*** -0.119*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant -0.217*** -0.215*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 6410 6410 
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Note: The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed from 
2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same 
period (federal loan). Models run solely for students self-identifying as White. Standard 
errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are 
rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A25 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model); 
Subpopulation: White 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
-0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Mother’s Education 0.00 0.00 
 (0.30) (0.30) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
0.01 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Female 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Prior Income 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.03 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Selective 0.10** 0.10** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Private Control 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.11** -0.11** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00+ 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.02 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Dependents -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant -0.20 -0.20 
 (0.30) (0.30) 
Observations 6410 6410 
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Note: Reduced form equation for the IV model of undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school aspirations. Models run solely for students self-identifying as White. Standard errors 
in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A26 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: White 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
0.14 0.12 
 (0.39) (0.38) 
Mother’s Education 1.12 0.79 
 (2.87) (2.78) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.11 -0.06 
 (0.38) (0.37) 
Female 0.14 0.13 
 (0.12) (0.11) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  -0.00** -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.14 0.22 
 (0.36) (0.36) 
   Selective -0.19 -0.01 
 (0.28) (0.28) 
   Most Selective -1.49*** -1.37*** 
 (0.34) (0.35) 
Private Control 0.50* 0.69** 
 (0.23) (0.22) 
2-Year or Less -1.22*** -1.19*** 
 (0.30) (0.30) 
College GPA -0.39*** -0.29** 
 (0.11) (0.10) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00*** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.23 0.14 
 (0.76) (0.73) 
Dependents -1.05** -0.97** 
 (0.38) (0.37) 
Constant 8.68** 7.98** 
 (2.95) (2.86) 
Observations 6410 6410 
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Wu-Hausman (p-value) 2.75 (0.097) 2.53 (0.112) 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.29 0.32 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.16 (0.923) 0.25 (0.883) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students self-identifying as White. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A27 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: White. 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.18 0.17 
 (0.21) (0.19) 
Female 0.05 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.03) 
Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00* 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
   Selective 0.13+ 0.10+ 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
   Most Selective 0.39 0.35 
 (0.32) (0.27) 
Private Control -0.09 -0.12 
 (0.12) (0.15) 
2-Year or Less 0.11 0.09 
 (0.27) (0.25) 
College GPA 0.16+ 0.14* 
 (0.09) (0.06) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.15) (0.14) 
Dependents 0.06 0.04 
 (0.23) (0.20) 
Constant -1.95 -1.69 
 (2.11) (1.78) 
Observations 6410 6410 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 2.75 (0.097) 2.53 (0.112) 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.29 0.32 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.16 (0.923) 0.25 (0.883) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
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for students self-identifying as White. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A28 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.110*** 0.108*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior Income 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
   Selective 0.070 0.066 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
   Most Selective 0.133 0.130 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Private Control -0.005 -0.008 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
2-Year or Less -0.167+ -0.169+ 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
College GPA 0.005 0.005 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.212 0.208 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
Dependents 0.024 0.026 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 0.424** 0.432** 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
Observations 860 860 
Note: The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed from 
2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same 
period (federal loan). Models run solely for students self-identifying as African American. 
Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A29 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
0.01 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Mother’s Education 0.44 0.44 
 (0.40) (0.40) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.06 -0.06 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Female 0.11** 0.11** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.01 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
   Selective 0.10 0.10 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
   Most Selective 0.16 0.16 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Private Control 0.01 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
2-Year or Less -0.21* -0.21* 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
College GPA 0.00 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00+ 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.19 0.19 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
Dependents 0.03 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 0.43 0.43 
 (0.44) (0.44) 
Observations 860 860 
 212 
Note: Reduced form equation for the IV model of undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school aspirations. Models run solely for students self-identifying as African American. 
Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A30 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
0.58+ 0.60 
 (0.33) (0.43) 
Mother’s Education -3.73 -3.46 
 (2.35) (3.00) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
0.39 0.42 
 (0.31) (0.41) 
Female -0.09 0.12 
 (0.26) (0.27) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 1.09 1.48+ 
 (0.75) (0.80) 
   Selective 1.30+ 1.81* 
 (0.74) (0.78) 
   Most Selective 0.66 1.07 
 (0.89) (0.92) 
Private Control -0.48 -0.07 
 (0.48) (0.50) 
2-Year or Less -0.21 0.06 
 (0.76) (0.80) 
College GPA -0.23 -0.25 
 (0.23) (0.23) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -2.28 -1.82 
 (1.83) (1.82) 
Dependents 0.33 0.11 
 (0.34) (0.38) 
Constant 5.58* 4.43 
 (2.77) (3.28) 
Observations 860 860 
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Wu-Hausman (p-value) 6.06 (0.014) 6.48 (0.011) 
Minimum eigenvalue 10.21 9.19 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.95 (0.622) 0.55 (0.759) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students self-identifying as African American. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 
0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A31 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.05+ -0.05+ 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Female 0.10** 0.11** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.07 0.09 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
   Selective 0.16 0.19+ 
 (0.10) (0.11) 
   Most Selective 0.18 0.21+ 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
Private Control -0.01 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
2-Year or Less -0.21* -0.21+ 
 (0.10) (0.11) 
College GPA -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.08 0.09 
 (0.20) (0.20) 
Dependents 0.04 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant 0.90** 0.90** 
 (0.28) (0.28) 
Observations 860 860 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 6.06 (0.014) 6.48 (0.011) 
Minimum eigenvalue 10.21 9.19 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.95 (0.622) 0.55 (0.759) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
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change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students self-identifying as African American. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 
0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A32 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.009*** 0.012*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.050 0.051 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.080 -0.080 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
   Selective 0.014 0.015 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
   Most Selective -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Private Control -0.173* -0.178* 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
2-Year or Less -0.173* -0.161* 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
College GPA 0.035 0.037 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.022 0.011 
 (0.13) (0.12) 
Dependents -0.011 -0.006 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 0.229 0.199 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Observations 730 730 
Note: The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed from 
2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same 
period (federal loan). Models run solely for students self-identifying as Latino. Standard 
errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are 
rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A33 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full model) 
Subpopulation: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Mother’s Education 0.24 0.24 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Female 0.05 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
   Selective 0.02 0.02 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
   Most Selective -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Private Control -0.17* -0.17* 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
2-Year or Less -0.20* -0.20* 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
College GPA 0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00+ 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.03 0.03 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Dependents -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 0.15 0.15 
 (0.25) (0.25) 
Observations 730 730 
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Note: Reduced form equation for the IV model of undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
aspirations. Models run solely for students self-identifying as Latino. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
 220 
 
Table A34 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
0.92*** 0.81** 
 (0.26) (0.25) 
Mother’s Education 5.58** 5.04** 
 (1.86) (1.80) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.72** -0.65* 
 (0.26) (0.26) 
Female -0.29 -0.35 
 (0.33) (0.32) 
Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income *Prior Income -0.00+ -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.50 0.31 
 (0.80) (0.82) 
   Selective 0.15 -0.05 
 (0.68) (0.71) 
   Most Selective -0.85 -1.21 
 (0.92) (0.93) 
Private Control 0.93 1.13 
 (0.75) (0.73) 
2-Year or Less -2.02** -2.40** 
 (0.71) (0.74) 
College GPA -0.29 -0.39 
 (0.33) (0.32) 
   
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.51 1.37 
 (1.15) (1.15) 
Dependents -0.14 -0.54 
 (0.53) (0.49) 
Constant 2.35 3.30 
 (2.26) (2.21) 
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Observations 730 730 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.10 (0.748) 0.06 (0.805) 
Minimum eigenvalue 4.66 3.83 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 1.32 (0.518) 1.34 (0.512) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students self-identifying as Latino. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A35 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Female 0.05 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.09 -0.08 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
   Selective 0.01 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
   Most Selective 0.00 0.01 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Private Control -0.18* -0.19* 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
2-Year or Less -0.15 -0.14 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
College GPA 0.04 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.02 0.00 
 (0.12) (0.13) 
Dependents -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 0.15 0.13 
 (0.31) (0.34) 
Observations 730 730 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.10 (0.748) 0.06 (0.805) 
Minimum eigenvalue 4.66 3.83 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 1.32 (0.518) 1.34 (0.512) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
 223 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students self-identifying as Latino. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A36 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.001 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.031 0.032 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.080 -0.082 
 (0.18) (0.18) 
   Selective -0.054 -0.056 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
   Most Selective -0.105 -0.107 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
Private Control -0.218* -0.219* 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
2-Year or Less -0.220 -0.221 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
College GPA 0.080+ 0.080+ 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000+ 0.000+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
Dependents 0.017 0.017 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 0.356* 0.353* 
 (0.18) (0.18) 
Observations 440 440 
Note: The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed from 
2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same 
period (federal loan). Models run solely for students self-identifying as Asian. Standard 
errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are 
rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A37 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
-0.07 -0.07 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Mother’s Education -0.39 -0.39 
 (0.38) (0.38) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
0.06 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Female 0.04 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.10 -0.10 
 (0.18) (0.18) 
   Selective -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
   Most Selective -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
Private Control -0.20* -0.20* 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
2-Year or Less -0.25+ -0.25+ 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
College GPA 0.08+ 0.08+ 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
Dependents 0.03 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 0.81+ 0.81+ 
 (0.42) (0.42) 
Observations 440 440 
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Note: Reduced form equation for the IV model of undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
aspirations. Models run solely for students self-identifying as Asian. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A38 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
1.35** 1.22** 
 (0.46) (0.44) 
Mother’s Education 4.19 4.31 
 (3.41) (3.26) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.71 -0.74+ 
 (0.47) (0.45) 
Female 0.28 0.04 
 (0.46) (0.44) 
Prior Income -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00+ 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.46 0.81 
 (1.90) (1.80) 
   Selective 0.24 1.10 
 (1.44) (1.36) 
   Most Selective -0.59 0.57 
 (1.55) (1.47) 
Private Control 2.31* 2.21* 
 (1.02) (0.99) 
2-Year or Less 0.40 1.24 
 (1.43) (1.34) 
College GPA -0.71 -0.48 
 (0.44) (0.43) 
   
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -2.87 -2.38 
 (2.25) (2.22) 
Dependents -1.17* -1.01* 
 (0.45) (0.46) 
Constant -1.07 -1.31 
 (3.98) (3.76) 
 228 
Observations 440 440 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 2.31 (0.136) 2.93 (0.088) 
Minimum eigenvalue 3.41 2.99 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 1.54 (0.462) 0.95 (0.623) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students self-identifying as Asian. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A39 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.04) 
Female 0.05 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.07 -0.02 
 (0.18) (0.19) 
   Selective -0.02 0.02 
 (0.12) (0.13) 
   Most Selective -0.11 -0.07 
 (0.14) (0.13) 
Private Control -0.12 -0.10 
 (0.13) (0.14) 
2-Year or Less -0.23+ -0.19 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
College GPA 0.05 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.16) (0.15) 
Dependents -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 0.67* 0.69* 
 (0.30) (0.30) 
Observations 440 440 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 2.31 (0.136) 2.93 (0.088) 
Minimum eigenvalue 3.41 2.99 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 1.54 (0.462) 0.95 (0.623) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
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change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students self-identifying as Asian. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A40 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.011* 0.011* 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
Female 0.166*** 0.168*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.128 0.129 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
   Selective 0.222+ 0.225+ 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
   Most Selective 0.276+ 0.278+ 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
Private Control 0.040 0.042 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
2-Year or Less 0.061 0.060 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
College GPA 0.001 0.000 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.609*** -0.614*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Dependents 0.033 0.034 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Constant -0.102 -0.094 
 (0.21) (0.21) 
Observations 430 430 
Note: The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed from 
2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same 
period (federal loan). Models run solely for students self-identifying as American 
Indian/Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander, other, or more than one 
race. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
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Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A41 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
-0.16* -0.16* 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Mother’s Education -1.20* -1.20* 
 (0.53) (0.53) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
0.14+ 0.14+ 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Female 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.15 0.15 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
   Selective 0.23+ 0.23+ 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
   Most Selective 0.26+ 0.26+ 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
Private Control 0.08 0.08 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
2-Year or Less 0.02 0.02 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
College GPA -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.55*** -0.55*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Dependents 0.03 0.03 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
Constant 1.25* 1.25* 
 (0.56) (0.56) 
Observations 430 430 
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Note: Reduced form equation for the IV model of undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
aspirations. Models run solely for students self-identifying as American Indian/Alaskan 
Native, Native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander, other, or more than one race. Standard 
errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are 
rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A42 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
0.60 0.43 
 (0.79) (0.78) 
Mother’s Education 3.26 1.14 
 (5.74) (5.62) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.43 -0.12 
 (0.75) (0.74) 
Female 0.63 0.42 
 (0.44) (0.43) 
Prior Income -0.00** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 1.22 1.14 
 (1.49) (1.48) 
   Selective 0.72 0.47 
 (1.40) (1.38) 
   Most Selective -0.84 -0.95 
 (1.59) (1.56) 
Private Control 2.21* 1.97* 
 (0.91) (0.92) 
2-Year or Less -1.22*** -1.19*** 
 (0.30) (0.30) 
College GPA -0.23 -0.14 
 (0.40) (0.39) 
   
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 2.94*** 3.45*** 
 (0.88) (0.87) 
Dependents -0.24 -0.38 
 (0.89) (0.86) 
Constant 3.66 4.15 
 (6.27) (6.17) 
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Observations 430 430 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 4.97 (0.026) 3.08 (0.080) 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.21 0.32 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.33 (0.846) 1.15 (0.562) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students self-identifying as American Indian/Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/other 
Pacific Islander, other, or more than one race. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * 
= p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A43 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.26 -0.17 
 (0.36) (0.22) 
Female 0.33 0.24* 
 (0.24) (0.12) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.46 0.34 
 (0.65) (0.43) 
   Selective 0.42 0.31 
 (0.52) (0.34) 
   Most Selective 0.03 0.10 
 (0.60) (0.43) 
Private Control 0.67 0.41 
 (0.86) (0.50) 
2-Year or Less -0.37 -0.21 
 (0.74) (0.47) 
College GPA -0.06 -0.03 
 (0.14) (0.09) 
   
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.22 0.02 
 (1.12) (0.80) 
Dependents -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.25) (0.19) 
Constant 2.13 1.25 
 (3.00) (1.70) 
Observations 430 430 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 4.97 (0.026) 3.08 (0.080) 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.21 0.32 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.33 (0.846) 1.15 (0.562) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
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change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students self-identifying as American Indian/Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/other 
Pacific Islander, other, or more than one race. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * 
= p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
 
 239 
 
Table A44 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: White 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
-0.004*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.003** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.018* -0.020* -0.018* -0.020* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.005 0.020+ 0.005 0.020+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Prior Income -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination 
(in SAT)  
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.005 -0.040 -0.005 -0.040 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Selective 0.065* 0.040 0.065* 0.040 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.096** 0.098** 0.095** 0.097** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Private Control 0.042+ 0.021 0.041+ 0.020 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less 0.010 0.024 0.009 0.023 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.163*** 0.198*** 0.163*** 0.198*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000* 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.059** -0.060** -0.059** -0.060** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dependents -0.025 -0.012 -0.025 -0.011 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.101 -0.146 -0.105 -0.147 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) 
 240 
Observations 7490 7490 7490 7490 
Note: Models run solely for students self-identifying as White. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A45 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: White 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.05+ -0.06* -0.05+ -0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Father’s Education -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.15 
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Prior Income -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination 
(in SAT)  
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Selective 0.07* 0.05 0.07* 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Private Control 0.05* 0.03 0.05* 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
-0.00 0.00** -0.00 0.00** 
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 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dependents -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.27 0.41 0.27 0.41 
 (0.26) (0.28) (0.26) (0.28) 
Observations 7490 7490 7490 7490 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school enrollment. Models run solely for students self-identifying as White. Standard errors 
in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A46 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: White 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.47+ 0.47+ 0.45+ 0.45+ 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Father’s Education 0.14 0.14 0.26 0.26 
 (1.80) (1.80) (1.83) (1.83) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Female 0.20+ 0.20+ 0.18+ 0.18+ 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.67+ 0.67+ 0.67+ 0.67+ 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
   Selective 0.36 0.36 0.21 0.21 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
   Most Selective -0.62* -0.62* -0.82** -0.82** 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
Private Control 0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
2-Year or Less 1.09*** 1.09*** 0.89** 0.89** 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
College GPA -0.36** -0.36** -0.29* -0.29* 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.86*** -0.86*** -0.86*** -0.86*** 
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 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Dependents 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.64*** 0.64*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Constant 8.37*** 8.37*** 7.88*** 7.88*** 
 (2.31) (2.31) (2.34) (2.34) 
Observations 7490 7490 7490 7490 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 43.52 (0.000) 44.26 (0.000) 43.93 (0.000)  45.08 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 14.92 14.92 12.85 12.85 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.07 (0.965) 3.32 (0.190) 0.03 (0.984) 2.72 (0.257) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as White. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A47 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: White 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age -0.02* -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
   Selective 0.11* 0.09+ 0.09* 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Private Control 0.06+ 0.04 0.05 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
2-Year or Less 0.10* 0.12* 0.09+ 0.11+ 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
College GPA 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00* 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Dependents 0.04 0.06* 0.05+ 0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 1.18*** 1.22*** 1.22** 1.26** 
 (0.35) (0.37) (0.37) (0.39) 
Observations 7490 7490 7490 7490 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 43.52 (0.000) 44.26 (0.000) 43.93 (0.000)  45.08 (0.000) 
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Minimum eigenvalue 14.92 14.92 12.85 12.85 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.07 (0.965) 3.32 (0.190) 0.03 (0.984) 2.72 (0.257) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as White. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A48 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
0.004 0.001 0.003 0.003 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.008 -0.025 -0.008 -0.025 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female -0.005 0.044 -0.005 0.042 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.108 0.018 -0.106 0.018 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
   Selective -0.145 -0.026 -0.144 -0.027 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
   Most Selective 0.022 0.111 0.023 0.111 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Private Control 0.076 0.146* 0.076 0.146+ 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
2-Year or Less -0.198+ -0.111 -0.197+ -0.109 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
College GPA 0.205*** 0.192*** 0.204*** 0.194*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.085 -0.051 0.086 -0.052 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Dependents -0.008 0.053 -0.008 0.052 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant -0.043 0.209 -0.028 0.183 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) 
Observations 660 660 660 660 
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Note: Models run solely for students self-identifying as African American. Standard errors 
in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A49 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.06+ -0.04 -0.06+ -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) 
Father’s Education -0.24 -0.19 -0.24 -0.19 
 (0.27) (0.37) (0.27) (0.37) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Age -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female -0.00 0.04 -0.00 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination 
(in SAT)  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.08 0.04 -0.08 0.04 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
   Selective -0.11 -0.00 -0.11 -0.00 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
   Most Selective 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.13 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Private Control 0.07 0.14+ 0.07 0.14+ 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
2-Year or Less -0.20+ -0.11 -0.20+ -0.11 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
College GPA 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
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 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.10 -0.04 0.10 -0.04 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Dependents 0.00 0.06+ 0.00 0.06+ 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.44 0.54 0.44 0.54 
 (0.46) (0.54) (0.46) (0.54) 
Observations 660 660 660 660 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school enrollment. Models run solely for students self-identifying as African American. 
Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A50 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1.01* 1.01* 0.93* 0.93* 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43) 
Father’s Education 2.71 2.71 2.01 2.01 
 (3.27) (3.27) (3.15) (3.15) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.42 -0.42 -0.32 -0.32 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.43) (0.43) 
Age 0.14 0.14 0.19 0.19 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Female 0.62+ 0.62+ 0.63+ 0.63+ 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.06 0.06 -0.38 -0.38 
 (0.77) (0.77) (0.77) (0.77) 
   Selective -0.09 -0.09 -0.19 -0.19 
 (0.73) (0.73) (0.72) (0.72) 
   Most Selective -0.00 -0.00 -0.17 -0.17 
 (0.89) (0.89) (0.88) (0.88) 
Private Control 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.12 
 (0.54) (0.54) (0.59) (0.59) 
2-Year or Less -0.24 -0.24 -0.78 -0.78 
 (0.85) (0.85) (0.84) (0.84) 
College GPA -1.08*** -1.08*** -0.99** -0.99** 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.53 0.53 0.39 0.39 
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 (0.55) (0.55) (0.62) (0.62) 
Dependents -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) 
Constant 4.86 4.86 5.18 5.18 
 (4.33) (4.33) (4.29) (4.29) 
Observations 660 660 660 660 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 3.56 (0.060) 1.65 (0.200) 3.27 (0.071)  1.79 (0.182) 
Minimum eigenvalue 7.45 7.45 6.83 6.83 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.30 (0.862) 0.08 (0.960) 0.39 (0.822) 0.131 (0.936) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as African American. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * 
= p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A51 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.07 0.04 -0.09 0.03 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
   Selective -0.12 -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
   Most Selective 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.12 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) 
Private Control 0.08 0.15* 0.08 0.15+ 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
2-Year or Less -0.21+ -0.12 -0.24* -0.14 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
College GPA 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.13 -0.02 0.12 -0.03 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Dependents -0.00 0.06 0.00 0.06+ 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.61 0.66 0.59 0.65 
 (0.59) (0.55) (0.60) (0.56) 
Observations 660 660 660 660 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 3.56 (0.060) 1.65 (0.200) 3.27 (0.071)  1.79 (0.182) 
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Minimum eigenvalue 7.45 7.45 6.83 6.83 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.30 (0.862) 0.08 (0.960) 0.39 (0.822) 0.131 (0.936) 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as African American. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * 
= p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A52 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
-0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.042 -0.060* -0.042+ -0.060* 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Female -0.005 0.004 -0.005 0.005 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.039 -0.070 0.041 -0.071 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) 
   Selective 0.060 -0.070 0.058 -0.067 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
   Most Selective 0.057 -0.047 0.057 -0.046 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) 
Private Control 0.215* 0.120 0.215* 0.120 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
2-Year or Less -0.021 -0.110 -0.023 -0.108 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
College GPA 0.181*** 0.233*** 0.183*** 0.232*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000+ -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.079 -0.076 -0.080 -0.077 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Dependents 0.098* 0.115* 0.098* 0.115* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 0.199 0.615 0.173 0.631 
 (0.51) (0.46) (0.51) (0.47) 
Observations 680 680 680 680 
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Note: Models run solely for students self-identifying as Latino. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A53 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Father’s Education 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age -0.04+ -0.06** -0.04+ -0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Female -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.04 -0.07 0.04 -0.07 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) 
   Selective 0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.07 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
   Most Selective 0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.04 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Private Control 0.23* 0.12 0.23* 0.12 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
2-Year or Less -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
College GPA 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.23*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00+ -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 
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 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Dependents 0.10* 0.12* 0.10* 0.12* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 0.20 0.70 0.20 0.70 
 (0.56) (0.52) (0.56) (0.52) 
Observations 680 680 680 680 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school enrollment. Models run solely for students self-identifying as Latino. Standard 
errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are 
rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
 259 
 
Table A54 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.87* 0.87* 0.90** 0.90** 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Father’s Education 2.91 2.91 1.76 1.76 
 (2.44) (2.44) (2.43) (2.43) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.36 -0.36 -0.18 -0.18 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Age 0.08 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) 
Female 0.08 0.08 0.34 0.34 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) 
Prior Income -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -1.17 -1.17 -0.67 -0.67 
 (1.01) (1.01) (1.13) (1.13) 
   Selective 0.39 0.39 1.46 1.46 
 (0.85) (0.85) (0.96) (0.96) 
   Most Selective -0.59 -0.59 0.55 0.55 
 (0.98) (0.98) (1.09) (1.09) 
Private Control -0.54 -0.54 -0.44 -0.44 
 (0.75) (0.75) (0.78) (0.78) 
2-Year or Less 0.80 0.80 1.85+ 1.85+ 
 (0.89) (0.89) (1.00) (1.00) 
College GPA -0.80+ -0.80+ -0.57 -0.57 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.78 0.78 0.10 0.10 
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 (0.56) (0.56) (0.63) (0.63) 
Dependents -0.09 -0.09 -0.38 -0.38 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.43) (0.43) 
Constant 3.97 3.97 3.45 3.45 
 (5.06) (5.06) (5.15) (5.15) 
Observations 680 680 680 680 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.27 (0.603) 0.02 (0.882) 0.73 (0.394)  0.01 (0.928) 
Minimum eigenvalue 5.11 5.11 7.12 7.12 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 1.80 (0.406) 1.47 (0.480) 1.47 (0.480) 1.46 (0.482) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as Latino. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A55 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulations: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
Age -0.04 -0.06* -0.04 -0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Female -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.07 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
   Selective 0.06 -0.07 0.08 -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
   Most Selective 0.04 -0.05 0.06 -0.05 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
Private Control 0.21* 0.12 0.22* 0.12 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
2-Year or Less -0.02 -0.11 -0.00 -0.11 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
College GPA 0.17** 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Dependents 0.10* 0.12* 0.09+ 0.11* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 0.36 0.66 0.39 0.66 
 (0.62) (0.55) (0.59) (0.52) 
Observations 680 680 680 680 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.27 (0.603) 0.02 (0.882) 0.73 (0.394)  0.01 (0.928) 
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Minimum eigenvalue 5.11 5.11 7.12 7.12 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 1.80 (0.406) 1.47 (0.480) 1.47 (0.480) 1.46 (0.482) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as Latino. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A56 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full model) 
Subpopulation: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
-0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.064** -0.025 -0.065** -0.026 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Female 0.048 0.103** 0.048 0.102** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.000+ 0.000* 0.000+ 0.000* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.036 -0.241 -0.035 -0.239 
 (0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19) 
   Selective -0.014 -0.068 -0.014 -0.066 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) 
   Most Selective 0.003 -0.039 0.004 -0.037 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) 
Private Control 0.043 0.015 0.043 0.017 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
2-Year or Less -0.059 -0.049 -0.058 -0.048 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) 
College GPA 0.243*** 0.260*** 0.244*** 0.260*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.070 -0.107 -0.069 -0.105 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Dependents 0.026 0.035 0.026 0.035 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Constant 0.502 -0.144 0.508 -0.128 
 (0.52) (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) 
Observations 660 660 660 660 
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Note: Models run solely for students self-identifying as Asian. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A57 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.05+ -0.05* -0.05+ -0.05* 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Father’s Education -0.12 0.08 -0.12 0.08 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
0.03 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age -0.07** -0.03 -0.07** -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Female 0.04 0.10* 0.04 0.10* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00+ 0.00* 0.00+ 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.02 -0.24 -0.02 -0.24 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
   Selective -0.00 -0.06 -0.00 -0.06 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) 
   Most Selective 0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
Private Control 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
2-Year or Less -0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) 
College GPA 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.09 -0.14 -0.09 -0.14 
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 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Dependents 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Constant 0.80 0.20 0.80 0.20 
 (0.55) (0.56) (0.55) (0.56) 
Observations 660 660 660 660 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school enrollment. Models run solely for students self-identifying as Asian. Standard errors 
in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A58 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulations: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1.03*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 1.03*** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Father’s Education 1.29 1.29 0.66 0.66 
 (1.82) (1.82) (1.77) (1.77) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.24 -0.24 -0.18 -0.18 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) 
Age 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.02 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
Female -0.13 -0.13 -0.20 -0.20 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) 
Prior Income -0.00** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.39 0.39 0.57 0.57 
 (2.11) (2.11) (2.04) (2.04) 
   Selective 1.43 1.43 1.32 1.32 
 (1.75) (1.75) (1.67) (1.67) 
   Most Selective 1.85 1.85 1.76 1.76 
 (1.79) (1.79) (1.70) (1.70) 
Private Control 1.74+ 1.74+ 1.54 1.54 
 (0.96) (0.96) (0.94) (0.94) 
2-Year or Less 2.36 2.36 2.29 2.29 
 (1.82) (1.82) (1.74) (1.74) 
College GPA -0.79+ -0.79+ -0.54 -0.54 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.92 0.92 1.07 1.07 
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 (1.01) (1.01) (0.98) (0.98) 
Dependents -1.26 -1.26 -1.18 -1.18 
 (1.12) (1.12) (1.09) (1.09) 
Constant 1.12 1.12 1.42 1.42 
 (5.83) (5.83) (5.73) (5.73) 
Observations 660 660 660 660 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 2.61 (0.107) 6.57 (0.011) 2.65 (0.104)  6.49 (0.011) 
Minimum eigenvalue 9.84 9.84 10.66 10.66 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 1.11 (0.575) 0.62 (0.735) 0.97 (0.614) 0.33 (0.850) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as Asian. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A59 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.04+ -0.06** -0.04+ -0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age -0.06* -0.03 -0.07* -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Female 0.04 0.09* 0.04 0.09* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.02 -0.22 -0.02 -0.21 
 (0.19) (0.25) (0.19) (0.25) 
   Selective 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.15) (0.20) 
   Most Selective 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (0.16) (0.21) (0.16) (0.21) 
Private Control 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.12 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
2-Year or Less -0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
 (0.15) (0.21) (0.15) (0.21) 
College GPA 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) 
Dependents 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) 
Constant 0.80 0.33 0.81 0.34 
 (0.62) (0.62) (0.61) (0.62) 
Observations 660 660 660 660 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 2.61 (0.107) 6.57 (0.011) 2.65 (0.104)  6.49 (0.011) 
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Minimum eigenvalue 9.84 9.84 10.66 10.66 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 1.11 (0.575) 0.62 (0.735) 0.97 (0.614) 0.33 (0.850) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as Asian. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A60 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
-0.016* -0.015* -0.012+ -0.014* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -0.033 -0.013 -0.034 -0.014 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Female 0.031 -0.059 0.032 -0.058 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Prior Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.134 0.166 0.132 0.176 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) 
   Selective 0.121 0.082 0.124 0.094 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
   Most Selective -0.001 0.099 0.002 0.105 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) 
Private Control -0.014 -0.105 -0.016 -0.109 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
2-Year or Less 0.064 0.092 0.061 0.099 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) 
College GPA 0.155* 0.203** 0.161** 0.208*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.200* -0.228* -0.194* -0.226* 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
Dependents 0.197** 0.197** 0.195** 0.196** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Constant 0.102 -0.219 0.087 -0.241 
 (0.47) (0.58) (0.47) (0.58) 
Observations 330 330 330 330 
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Note: Models run solely for students self-identifying as American Indian/Alaskan Native, 
Native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander, other, or more than one race. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A61 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.08 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Father’s Education -0.45 -0.72 -0.45 -0.72 
 (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Age -0.04* -0.02 -0.04* -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Female 0.01 -0.08 0.01 -0.08 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Prior Income 0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
   Selective 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.04 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
   Most Selective -0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.07 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) 
Private Control 0.03 -0.08 0.03 -0.08 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
2-Year or Less -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.02 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) 
College GPA 0.16** 0.21*** 0.16** 0.21*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.17* -0.21* -0.17* -0.21* 
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 (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Dependents 0.23*** 0.21** 0.23*** 0.21** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Constant 1.04+ 0.73 1.04+ 0.73 
 (0.62) (0.73) (0.62) (0.73) 
Observations 330 330 330 330 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school enrollment. Models run solely for students self-identifying as American 
Indian/Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander, other, or more than one 
race. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A62 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1.23+ 1.23+ 1.09+ 1.09+ 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.63) (0.63) 
Father’s Education 3.61 3.61 3.60 3.60 
 (4.72) (4.72) (4.63) (4.63) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.38 -0.38 -0.43 -0.43 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.63) (0.63) 
Age 0.49 0.49 0.60 0.60 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) 
Female 0.20+ 0.20+ 0.18+ 0.18+ 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Prior Income -0.00* -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 3.88+ 3.88+ 4.58* 4.58* 
 (2.00) (2.00) (2.07) (2.07) 
   Selective 2.48 2.48 3.38+ 3.38+ 
 (1.84) (1.84) (1.85) (1.85) 
   Most Selective 0.84 0.84 1.11 1.11 
 (1.99) (1.99) (1.98) (1.98) 
Private Control -0.94 -0.94 -1.06 -1.06 
 (1.05) (1.05) (1.03) (1.03) 
2-Year or Less 4.29* 4.29* 4.62* 4.62* 
 (1.91) (1.91) (1.95) (1.95) 
College GPA -0.50 -0.50 -0.19 -0.19 
 (0.59) (0.59) (0.57) (0.57) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00+ 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -1.49 -1.49 -1.40 -1.40 
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 (1.07) (1.07) (1.09) (1.09) 
Dependents 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.26 
 (0.59) (0.59) (0.58) (0.58) 
Constant -11.08+ -11.08+ -11.17+ -11.17+ 
 (6.44) (6.44) (6.59) (6.59) 
Observations 330 330 330 330 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 5.50 (0.020) 1.26 (0.262) 5.79 (0.017)  1.49 (0.223) 
Minimum eigenvalue 4.18 4.18 2.56 2.56 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 2.07 (0.356) 1.44 (0.487) 2.05 (0.359) 1.34 (0.512) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as American Indian/Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/other Pacific 
Islander, other, or more than one race. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A63 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.09** -0.05 -0.11* -0.06 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Age -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Female 0.06 -0.05 0.08 -0.03 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.37 0.29 0.52 0.38 
 (0.29) (0.24) (0.36) (0.29) 
   Selective 0.27 0.16 0.42 0.25 
 (0.25) (0.20) (0.31) (0.24) 
   Most Selective 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.13 
 (0.25) (0.20) (0.30) (0.23) 
Private Control -0.05 -0.12 -0.08 -0.14 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) 
2-Year or Less 0.26 0.19 0.38 0.27 
 (0.27) (0.22) (0.33) (0.26) 
College GPA 0.12 0.19** 0.14+ 0.20** 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.30* -0.28* -0.32* -0.29* 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) 
Dependents 0.24** 0.22** 0.25** 0.22** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
Constant 0.03 -0.26 -0.16 -0.37 
 (0.60) (0.59) (0.70) (0.65) 
Observations 330 330 330 330 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 5.50 (0.020) 1.26 (0.262) 5.79 (0.017)  1.49 (0.223) 
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Minimum eigenvalue 4.18 4.18 2.56 2.56 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 2.07 (0.356) 1.44 (0.487) 2.05 (0.359) 1.34 (0.512) 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as American Indian/Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/other Pacific 
Islander, other, or more than one race. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A64 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: White 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
0.003 0.012* 0.001 0.010+ 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Age 0.013 -0.005 0.013 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Female -0.204*** -0.249*** -0.204*** -0.248*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Prior Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.000* 0.001*** -0.000* 0.001*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.012 0.181 0.013 0.183 
 (0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.16) 
   Selective -0.026 0.052 -0.025 0.054 
 (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.14) 
   Most Selective 0.120* 0.163 0.120* 0.164 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.16) 
Private Control -0.084* 0.018 -0.084* 0.019 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10) 
2-Year or Less -0.018 0.014 -0.016 0.018 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.15) 
College GPA -0.016 -0.005 -0.017 -0.007 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.099** 0.095 0.098** 0.094 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) 
Dependents 0.038 -0.024 0.039 -0.023 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08) 
Constant 10.202*** 9.730*** 10.221*** 9.762*** 
 (0.24) (0.87) (0.24) (0.87) 
Observations 6270 6270 6270 6270 
 280 
Note: Models run solely for students self-identifying as White. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A65 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: White 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1,005.96 2495.30 1005.96 2,495.30 
 (1238.12) (1663.17) (1238.12) (1,663.17) 
Father’s Education -1,623.08 13171.99 -1623.08 13,171.99 
 (9,052.78) (11,857.68) (9,052.78) (11,857.68) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
256.56 -1,989.99 256.56 -1,989.99 
 (1,236.61) (1,666.37) (1,236.61) (1,666.37) 
Age 346.83 873.96 346.83 873.96 
 (339.98) (552.10) (339.98) (552.10) 
Female -6,432.14*** -10,159.60*** -6432.14*** -10,159.60*** 
 (461.04) (721.83) (461.04) (721.83) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.73 4.95* -0.73 4.95* 
 (1.44) (2.21) (1.44) (2.21) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -129.57 -617.41 -129.57 -617.41 
 (1,417.96) (1,928.36) (1,417.96) (1,928.36) 
   Selective -815.99 -895.84 -815.99 -895.84 
 (1,154.88) (1,640.24) (1,154.88) (1,640.24) 
   Most Selective 3,720.79** 4,392.85* 3,720.79** 4,392.85* 
 (1,335.65) (1,930.41) (1,335.65) (1,930.41) 
Private Control -3,020.83*** -4,374.35** -3020.83*** -4,374.35** 
 (896.54) (1,360.88) (896.54) (1,360.88) 
2-Year or Less -59.02 -495.26 -59.02 -495.26 
 (1,258.79) (1,794.70) (1,258.79) (1,794.70) 
College GPA 870.11+ 942.91 870.11+ 942.91 
 (480.12) (728.15) (480.12) (728.15) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.02 0.15+ -0.02 0.15+ 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) 
Married 2,473.15** 2,764.86* 2,473.15** 2,764.86* 
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 (844.72) (1,237.13) (844.72) (1,237.13) 
Dependents 1,565.39+ 1,986.05 1,565.39+ 1,986.05 
 (893.46) (2,182.67) (893.46) (2,182.67) 
Constant 19,594.27+ 5,932.59 19,594.27+ 5,932.59 
 (11,565.21) (16,385.77) (11,565.21) (16,385.77) 
Observations 6270 6270 6270 6270 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career 
occupation salary. Models run solely for students self-identifying as White. Standard errors 
in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
 283 
 
Table A66 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: White 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
Father’s Education -0.93 -0.93 -0.71 -0.71 
 (2.00) (2.00) (2.07) (2.07) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
Age -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Female 0.25* 0.25* 0.24* 0.24* 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.75* 0.75* 0.71+ 0.71+ 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
   Selective 0.38 0.38 0.21 0.21 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
   Most Selective -0.54 -0.54 -0.77* -0.77* 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Private Control 0.13 0.13 0.07 0.07 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
2-Year or Less 1.11*** 1.11*** 0.89** 0.89** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
College GPA -0.38** -0.38** -0.31* -0.31* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Married -0.78*** -0.78*** -0.76*** -0.76*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Dependents 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) 
Constant 9.60*** 9.60*** 8.97*** 8.97*** 
 (2.57) (2.57) (2.63) (2.63) 
Observations 6270 6270 6270 6270 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 19.03 (0.000) 7.33 (0.007) 20.60 (0.000) 7.87 (0.005) 
Minimum eigenvalue 11.06 11.06 9.59 9.59 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 3.09 (0.213) 3.15 (0.207) 2.20 (0.333) 2.73 (0.255) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as White. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A67 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: White 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.12*** 0.22* 0.14*** 0.24* 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.11) 
Age 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Female -0.23*** -0.29*** -0.23*** -0.30*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) 
Prior Income 0.00** 0.00+ 0.00** 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.08 0.03 -0.08 0.02 
 (0.08) (0.19) (0.08) (0.19) 
   Selective -0.08 -0.04 -0.06 -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.15) (0.06) (0.15) 
   Most Selective 0.19** 0.28 0.23** 0.34+ 
 (0.07) (0.18) (0.08) (0.20) 
Private Control -0.11* -0.03 -0.10* -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.11) 
2-Year or Less -0.13+ -0.17 -0.11 -0.14 
 (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.17) 
College GPA 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.19*** 0.25* 0.20*** 0.26* 
 (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.12) 
Dependents -0.04 -0.16 -0.05 -0.18 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.12) 
Constant 8.72*** 7.23*** 8.64*** 7.12*** 
 (0.55) (1.57) (0.58) (1.62) 
Observations 6270 6270 6270 6270 
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Wu-Hausman (p-value) 19.03 (0.000) 7.33 (0.007) 20.60 (0.000) 7.87 (0.005) 
Minimum eigenvalue 11.06 11.06 9.59 9.59 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 3.09 (0.213) 3.15 (0.207) 2.20 (0.333) 2.73 (0.255) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as White. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A68 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
0.004 -0.013 0.003 -0.003 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Age -0.025 -0.163 -0.026 -0.162 
 (0.03) (0.17) (0.03) (0.17) 
Female -0.112 -0.473+ -0.111 -0.480+ 
 (0.08) (0.27) (0.08) (0.27) 
Prior Income -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.000 0.002* 0.000 0.002* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.019 0.203 0.021 0.191 
 (0.16) (0.65) (0.16) (0.64) 
   Selective 0.044 0.061 0.046 0.051 
 (0.16) (0.62) (0.16) (0.62) 
   Most Selective 0.156 0.794 0.158 0.784 
 (0.22) (0.72) (0.22) (0.72) 
Private Control -0.121 0.281 -0.121 0.279 
 (0.12) (0.56) (0.12) (0.56) 
2-Year or Less 0.078 -0.525 0.080 -0.524 
 (0.17) (0.75) (0.17) (0.74) 
College GPA 0.047 0.160 0.045 0.169 
 (0.07) (0.28) (0.07) (0.28) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.261* 0.103 0.263* 0.088 
 (0.12) (0.63) (0.12) (0.63) 
Dependents 0.086* 0.155 0.086* 0.154 
 (0.04) (0.24) (0.04) (0.24) 
Constant 10.236*** 10.799** 10.254*** 10.637** 
 (0.74) (3.40) (0.73) (3.39) 
Observations 510 510 510 510 
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Note: Models run solely for students self-identifying as African American. Standard errors 
in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A69 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1,450.16 -258.45 1,450.16 -258.45 
 (1,535.60) (1,798.23) (1,535.60) (1,798.23) 
Father’s Education 234.87 -4,328.55 234.87 -4,328.55 
 (11,425.58) (13,937.76) (11,425.58) (13,937.76) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-65.10 1,206.64 -65.10 1,206.64 
 (1,609.87) (1,948.80) (1,609.87) (1,948.80) 
Age 48.01 -1,673.11 48.01 -1,673.11 
 (724.66) (1,064.06) (724.66) (1,064.06) 
Female -4,823.83** -11,483.74*** -4,823.83** -11,483.74*** 
 (1,815.51) (2,622.20) (1,815.51) (2,622.20) 
Prior Income 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
10.39* 23.25*** 10.39* 23.25*** 
 (4.70) (6.59) (4.70) (6.59) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -2,769.45 2,136.68 -2,769.45 2,136.68 
 (3,414.69) (4,355.95) (3,414.69) (4,355.95) 
   Selective -1,017.93 3,044.01 -1,017.93 3,044.01 
 (3,283.01) (4,051.22) (3,283.01) (4,051.22) 
   Most Selective 2,793.87 10,091.01+ 2,793.87 10,091.01+ 
 (4,296.78) (5,234.43) (4,296.78) (5,234.43) 
Private Control -2,519.90 1,020.45 -2,519.90 1,020.45 
 (2,793.75) (4,255.26) (2,793.75) (4,255.26) 
2-Year or Less -516.00 -1,450.28 -516.00 -1,450.28 
 (3,463.88) (4,482.22) (3,463.88) (4,482.22) 
College GPA 2,532.46+ 7,063.27** 2,532.46+ 7,063.27** 
 (1,508.17) (2,236.88) (1,508.17) (2,236.88) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.25 -0.60* -0.25 -0.60* 
 (0.20) (0.30) (0.20) (0.30) 
Married 4,105.87 1,774.76 4,105.87 1,774.76 
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 (3,172.16) (5,229.65) (3,172.16) (5,229.65) 
Dependents 1,749.54+ 1,925.30 1,749.54+ 1,925.30 
 (1,007.11) (1,866.30) (1,007.11) (18,66.30) 
Constant 6,902.87 31,369.26 6,902.87 31,369.26 
 (18,465.56) (24,235.95) (18,465.56) (24,235.95) 
Observations 510 510 510 510 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career 
occupation salary. Models run solely for students self-identifying as African American. 
Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A70 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.86* 0.86* 0.78+ 0.78+ 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42) 
Father’s Education 2.69 2.69 2.11 2.11 
 (3.28) (3.28) (3.14) (3.14) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.40 -0.40 -0.31 -0.31 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.43) 
Age -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Female 0.71+ 0.71+ 0.66+ 0.66+ 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.39) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income*Prior 
Income 
-0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00* -0.00* -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.41 0.41 0.07 0.07 
 (0.88) (0.88) (0.87) (0.87) 
   Selective 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.27 
 (0.86) (0.86) (0.83) (0.83) 
   Most Selective 0.30 0.30 0.14 0.14 
 (1.06) (1.06) (1.05) (1.05) 
Private Control 0.29 0.29 0.46 0.46 
 (0.61) (0.61) (0.67) (0.67) 
2-Year or Less -0.36 -0.36 -0.96 -0.96 
 (0.99) (0.99) (0.98) (0.98) 
College GPA -0.90* -0.90* -0.74* -0.74* 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Married 1.12* 1.12* 0.88 0.88 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.58) (0.58) 
Dependents -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) 
Constant 8.54+ 8.54+ 8.99+ 8.99+ 
 (5.10) (5.10) (5.06) (5.06) 
Observations 510 510 510 510 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 4.40 (0.036) 0.05 (0.822) 4.66 (0.031) 0.04 (0.848) 
Minimum eigenvalue 4.25 4.25 3.53 3.53 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.59 (0.744) 0.76 (0.683) 0.43 (0.807) 0.76 (0.684) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as African American. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * 
= p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A71 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: African American 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.12* 0.04 0.13* 0.04 
 (0.06) (0.22) (0.06) (0.22) 
Age -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.16 
 (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.17) 
Female -0.19+ -0.51+ -0.19+ -0.51+ 
 (0.10) (0.28) (0.10) (0.28) 
Prior Income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00+ 0.00* 0.00+ 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.10 0.15 -0.06 0.16 
 (0.18) (0.69) (0.18) (0.66) 
   Selective -0.07 0.01 -0.07 0.01 
 (0.17) (0.64) (0.17) (0.64) 
   Most Selective 0.06 0.75 0.08 0.75 
 (0.23) (0.73) (0.23) (0.72) 
Private Control -0.15 0.27 -0.17 0.26 
 (0.13) (0.55) (0.14) (0.55) 
2-Year or Less 0.12 -0.51 0.20 -0.48 
 (0.18) (0.73) (0.20) (0.73) 
College GPA 0.15+ 0.21 0.14 0.20 
 (0.09) (0.30) (0.09) (0.29) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.10 0.03 0.12 0.04 
 (0.14) (0.65) (0.15) (0.64) 
Dependents 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.15 
 (0.05) (0.24) (0.05) (0.24) 
Constant 8.42*** 9.99* 8.31*** 9.92* 
 (1.19) (4.51) (1.25) (4.57) 
Observations 510 510 510 510 
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Wu-Hausman (p-value) 4.40 (0.036) 0.05 (0.822) 4.66 (0.031) 0.04 (0.848) 
Minimum eigenvalue 4.25 4.25 3.53 3.53 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.59 (0.744) 0.76 (0.683) 0.43 (0.807) 0.76 (0.684) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as African American. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * 
= p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A72 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
-0.007 -0.010 -0.006 0.002 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Age 0.092* -0.266 0.091* -0.268 
 (0.04) (0.27) (0.04) (0.27) 
Female -0.087 -0.090 -0.085 -0.090 
 (0.07) (0.25) (0.07) (0.25) 
Prior Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.229 -0.021 -0.225 -0.013 
 (0.17) (0.84) (0.17) (0.84) 
   Selective -0.116 0.142 -0.109 0.133 
 (0.14) (0.75) (0.14) (0.76) 
   Most Selective -0.127 0.311 -0.117 0.318 
 (0.17) (0.86) (0.17) (0.86) 
Private Control 0.043 -0.477 0.047 -0.474 
 (0.11) (0.40) (0.11) (0.40) 
2-Year or Less -0.321* 0.102 -0.314* 0.097 
 (0.16) (0.73) (0.16) (0.74) 
College GPA -0.004 -0.104 -0.003 -0.096 
 (0.07) (0.30) (0.07) (0.29) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.160+ -0.124 0.156+ -0.131 
 (0.09) (0.46) (0.09) (0.46) 
Dependents 0.100 0.233 0.098 0.236 
 (0.08) (0.32) (0.08) (0.32) 
Constant 8.580*** 13.964** 8.575*** 13.868** 
 (0.75) (5.04) (0.75) (5.07) 
Observations 540 540 540 540 
 296 
Note: Models run solely for students self-identifying as Latino. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A73 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
220.87 1,023.03 220.87 1,023.03 
 (1,103.56) (1,666.48) (1,103.56) (1,666.48) 
Father’s Education 1,408.69 17,347.51 1,408.69 17,347.51 
 (8,763.95) (12,914.05) (8,763.95) (12,914.05) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-332.71 -2,855.08 -332.71 -2,855.08 
 (1,232.73) (1,800.30) (1,232.73) (1,800.30) 
Age 1,760.21* -1,099.69 1,760.21* -1,099.69 
 (867.27) (1,604.62) (867.27) (1,604.62) 
Female -4,818.31** -7,159.96** -4,818.31** -7,159.96** 
 (1,701.55) (2,503.37) (1,701.55) (2,503.37) 
Prior Income 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
2.69 14.96+ 2.69 14.96+ 
 (5.25) (8.07) (5.25) (8.07) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -4,976.34 -2,262.31 -4,976.34 -2,262.31 
 (3,735.00) (5,164.85) (3,735.00) (5,164.85) 
   Selective -3,202.76 -1,281.49 -3,202.76 -1,281.49 
 (3,286.33) (4,501.17) (3,286.33) (4,501.17) 
   Most Selective -114.14 3,942.27 -114.14 3,942.27 
 (4,045.67) (5,257.38) (4,045.67) (5,257.38) 
Private Control -630.18 -4,614.67 -630.18 -4,614.67 
 (2,875.75) (4,879.64) (2,875.75) (4,879.64) 
2-Year or Less -5,401.69 465.71 -5,401.69 465.71 
 (3,619.28) (4,756.21) (3,619.28) (4,756.21) 
College GPA 1,204.01 1,862.67 1,204.01 1,862.67 
 (1,826.50) (2,634.68) (1,826.50) (2,634.68) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.11 0.45 0.11 0.45 
 (0.19) (0.29) (0.19) (0.29) 
Married 4,134.56+ 118.74 4,134.56+ 118.74 
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 (2,370.84) (3,460.58) (2,370.84) (3,460.58) 
Dependents 2,576.69 5,728.58* 2,576.69 5,728.58* 
 (1,867.95) (2,499.42) (1,867.95) (2,499.42) 
Constant -3,875.07 36,402.53 -3,875.07 36,402.53 
 (19,246.84) (33,845.11) (19,246.84) (33,845.11) 
Observations 540 540 540 540 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career 
occupation salary. Models run solely for students self-identifying as Latino. Standard errors 
in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A74 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.67 0.67 0.77+ 0.77+ 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) 
Father’s Education 1.94 1.94 0.91 0.91 
 (2.94) (2.94) (2.98) (2.98) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.24 -0.24 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) 
Age 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.06 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) 
Female -0.02 -0.02 0.28 0.28 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) 
Prior Income -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.78 -0.78 -0.29 -0.29 
 (1.11) (1.11) (1.27) (1.27) 
   Selective 0.75 0.75 2.02+ 2.02+ 
 (0.93) (0.93) (1.08) (1.08) 
   Most Selective -0.59 -0.59 0.93 0.93 
 (1.09) (1.09) (1.22) (1.22) 
Private Control -0.76 -0.76 -0.43 -0.43 
 (0.77) (0.77) (0.81) (0.81) 
2-Year or Less 0.89 0.89 2.34* 2.34* 
 (0.99) (0.99) (1.13) (1.13) 
College GPA -0.57 -0.57 -0.43 -0.43 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Married 0.72 0.72 0.23 0.23 
 (0.59) (0.59) (0.66) (0.66) 
Dependents -0.32 -0.32 -0.72 -0.72 
 (0.42) (0.42) (0.48) (0.48) 
Constant 2.88 2.88 2.65 2.65 
 (5.67) (5.67) (5.75) (5.75) 
Observations 540 540 540 540 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.04 (0.846) 0.09 (0.762) 0.04 (0.838) 0.00 (0.977) 
Minimum eigenvalue 2.43 2.43 4.52 4.52 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.35 (0.839) 2.40 (0.302) 0.35 (0.837) 2.49 (0.287) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as Latino. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A75 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Latino 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.21) (0.06) (0.15) 
Age 0.09* -0.28 0.09* -0.27 
 (0.04) (0.27) (0.04) (0.27) 
Female -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.07) (0.24) (0.07) (0.25) 
Prior Income -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.22 0.04 -0.22 -0.01 
 (0.18) (0.81) (0.16) (0.82) 
   Selective -0.12 0.10 -0.13 0.13 
 (0.14) (0.78) (0.17) (0.84) 
   Most Selective -0.12 0.37 -0.12 0.32 
 (0.18) (0.82) (0.17) (0.88) 
Private Control 0.05 -0.45 0.05 -0.47 
 (0.11) (0.41) (0.10) (0.39) 
2-Year or Less -0.32* 0.08 -0.33+ 0.09 
 (0.16) (0.74) (0.18) (0.79) 
College GPA 0.01 -0.05 0.00 -0.09 
 (0.08) (0.35) (0.08) (0.31) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.15 -0.18 0.15+ -0.13 
 (0.10) (0.49) (0.09) (0.46) 
Dependents 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.24 
 (0.08) (0.31) (0.08) (0.30) 
Constant 8.47*** 13.37* 8.49*** 13.82** 
 (1.02) (5.33) (0.93) (5.15) 
Observations 540 540 540 540 
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Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.04 (0.846) 0.09 (0.762) 0.04 (0.838) 0.00 (0.977) 
Minimum eigenvalue 2.43 2.43 4.52 4.52 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.35 (0.839) 2.40 (0.302) 0.35 (0.837) 2.49 (0.287) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as Latino. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A76 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
0.009 0.012 0.009 0.019 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Age -0.018 0.046 -0.017 0.047 
 (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.17) 
Female -0.255** -0.529+ -0.255** -0.528+ 
 (0.08) (0.29) (0.08) (0.29) 
Prior Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.000 0.002** -0.000 0.002** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.132 1.267 0.130 1.246 
 (0.29) (1.26) (0.29) (1.26) 
   Selective 0.023 0.342 0.025 0.329 
 (0.27) (1.31) (0.27) (1.30) 
   Most Selective -0.005 0.389 -0.003 0.373 
 (0.29) (1.31) (0.29) (1.31) 
Private Control -0.154 -0.366 -0.152 -0.374 
 (0.21) (0.54) (0.21) (0.54) 
2-Year or Less -0.065 -0.270 -0.062 -0.288 
 (0.29) (1.39) (0.29) (1.39) 
College GPA -0.000 0.065 -0.004 0.064 
 (0.09) (0.36) (0.09) (0.37) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.101 -0.158 -0.104 -0.166 
 (0.22) (0.92) (0.22) (0.92) 
Dependents -0.271 0.768 -0.271 0.784 
 (0.39) (0.54) (0.39) (0.54) 
Constant 10.522*** 6.219 10.523*** 6.180 
 (1.07) (4.06) (1.07) (4.05) 
Observations 440 440 440 440 
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Note: Models run solely for students self-identifying as Asian. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A77 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
2,062.10 952.03 2,062.10 952.03 
 (1,522.95) (2,935.61) (1522.95) (2,935.61) 
Father’s Education 2,198.83 5,349.11 2,198.83 5,349.11 
 (10,944.71) (21,265.89) (10,944.71) (21,265.89) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-687.42 -1,353.96 -687.42 -1,353.96 
 (1,600.03) (3,078.21) (1,600.03) (3,078.21) 
Age -447.99 69.23 -447.99 69.23 
 (1,390.04) (2,378.92) (1,390.04) (2,378.92) 
Female -6,697.77** -11,464.71*** -6,697.77** -11,464.71*** 
 (2,092.55) (3,278.20) (2,092.55) (3,278.20) 
Prior Income -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
8.91 29.39** 8.91 29.39** 
 (6.33) (10.39) (6.33) (10.39) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 2,009.55 7,105.67 2,009.55 7,105.67 
 (7,141.20) (9,237.75) (7,141.20) (9,237.75) 
   Selective 1,792.20 6,366.84 1,792.20 6,366.84 
 (6,567.29) (8,599.14) (6,567.29) (8,599.14) 
   Most Selective 2,342.25 3,374.53 2,342.25 3,374.53 
 (7,126.64) (9,277.37) (7,126.64) (9,277.37) 
Private Control -5,306.72 -15,700.37** -5,306.72 -15,700.37** 
 (4,937.10) (5,808.98) (4,937.10) (5,808.98) 
2-Year or Less 2,750.34 6,874.48 2,750.34 6,874.48 
 (7,249.09) (9,587.85) (7,249.09) (9,587.85) 
College GPA 2,490.20 8,676.49* 2,490.20 8,676.49* 
 (2,404.49) (3,529.09) (2,404.49) (3,529.09) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.13 0.62+ 0.13 0.62+ 
 (0.29) (0.35) (0.29) (0.35) 
Married -3,881.40 265.14 -3,881.40 265.14 
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 (3,497.78) (6,557.51) (3,497.78) (6,557.51) 
Dependents -6,701.79 -7,704.67 -6,701.79 -7,704.67 
 (5,582.31) (7,494.47) (5,582.31) (7,494.47) 
Constant 13,972.49 -19,890.15 13,972.49 -19,890.15 
 (30,180.34) (49,393.76) (30,180.34) (49,393.76) 
Observations 440 440 440 440 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career 
occupation salary. Models run solely for students self-identifying as Asian. Standard errors 
in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A78 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1.36*** 1.36*** 1.31*** 1.31*** 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) 
Father’s Education 3.89 3.89 2.96 2.96 
 (2.47) (2.47) (2.39) (2.39) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.63+ -0.63+ -0.51 -0.51 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) 
Age 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.08 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) (0.31) 
Female -0.28 -0.28 -0.21 -0.21 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
Prior Income -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 2.10 2.10 2.32 2.32 
 (2.49) (2.49) (2.40) (2.40) 
   Selective 2.11 2.11 1.86 1.86 
 (2.10) (2.10) (2.00) (2.00) 
   Most Selective 2.31 2.31 2.13 2.13 
 (2.15) (2.15) (2.05) (2.05) 
Private Control 1.08 1.08 0.86 0.86 
 (1.13) (1.13) (1.11) (1.11) 
2-Year or Less 3.14 3.14 2.96 2.96 
 (2.18) (2.18) (2.08) (2.08) 
College GPA -0.55 -0.55 -0.20 -0.20 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Married 0.86 0.86 1.12 1.12 
 (1.12) (1.12) (1.09) (1.09) 
Dependents -3.42+ -3.42+ -3.35+ -3.35+ 
 (1.82) (1.82) (1.71) (1.71) 
Constant -4.96 -4.96 -4.66 -4.66 
 (7.96) (7.96) (7.75) (7.75) 
Observations 440 440 440 440 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.57 (0.211) 0.56 (0.455) 1.78 (0.183) 0.41 (0.523) 
Minimum eigenvalue 7.96 7.96 8.12 8.12 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 1.33 (0.514) 0.41 (0.815) 1.10 (0.577) 0.50 (0.779) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as Asian. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A79 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Asian 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.06 0.11 0.06+ 0.11 
 (0.04) (0.18) (0.04) (0.17) 
Age -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.05 
 (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) (0.17) 
Female -0.23** -0.49+ -0.24** -0.50+ 
 (0.08) (0.29) (0.08) (0.29) 
Prior Income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00 0.00** -0.00 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.02 1.03 0.01 1.03 
 (0.36) (1.33) (0.35) (1.34) 
   Selective -0.10 0.08 -0.09 0.13 
 (0.32) (1.39) (0.31) (1.37) 
   Most Selective -0.13 0.11 -0.13 0.15 
 (0.34) (1.39) (0.33) (1.37) 
Private Control -0.23 -0.52 -0.22 -0.49 
 (0.22) (0.60) (0.22) (0.59) 
2-Year or Less -0.21 -0.59 -0.20 -0.54 
 (0.34) (1.48) (0.33) (1.46) 
College GPA 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.10 
 (0.09) (0.38) (0.09) (0.37) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.13 -0.21 -0.14 -0.23 
 (0.23) (0.88) (0.23) (0.88) 
Dependents -0.16 1.01 -0.15 0.99 
 (0.40) (0.65) (0.40) (0.64) 
Constant 10.26*** 5.65 10.25*** 5.70 
 (1.08) (4.09) (1.09) (4.09) 
Observations 440 440 440 440 
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Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.57 (0.211) 0.56 (0.455) 1.78 (0.183) 0.41 (0.523) 
Minimum eigenvalue 7.96 7.96 8.12 8.12 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 1.33 (0.514) 0.41 (0.815) 1.10 (0.577) 0.50 (0.779) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as Asian. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; 
** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A80 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
0.012 -0.026 0.004 -0.034 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age -0.076 -0.108 -0.071 -0.101 
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) 
Female -0.186* -0.157 -0.183* -0.152 
 (0.09) (0.27) (0.09) (0.27) 
Prior Income -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.000 -0.000 0.000+ -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.549+ -0.048 -0.525+ 0.002 
 (0.29) (0.40) (0.30) (0.39) 
   Selective -0.338 -0.477 -0.323 -0.426 
 (0.22) (0.33) (0.22) (0.32) 
   Most Selective -0.112 -0.635 -0.116 -0.621 
 (0.26) (0.43) (0.26) (0.42) 
Private Control 0.193 -1.127* 0.189 -1.147* 
 (0.17) (0.48) (0.17) (0.48) 
2-Year or Less -0.248 -0.558 -0.227 -0.508 
 (0.23) (0.45) (0.23) (0.43) 
College GPA 0.002 -0.184 -0.004 -0.177 
 (0.10) (0.28) (0.10) (0.28) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.179 0.605+ 0.165 0.602+ 
 (0.13) (0.35) (0.13) (0.35) 
Dependents 0.138+ 0.022 0.143* 0.027 
 (0.07) (0.32) (0.07) (0.32) 
Constant 11.924*** 11.491*** 11.904*** 11.338*** 
 (1.17) (2.47) (1.16) (2.44) 
Observations 280 280 280 280 
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Note: Models run solely for students self-identifying as American Indian/Alaskan Native, 
Native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander, other, or more than one race. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A81 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-734.53 1,615.94 -734.53 1,615.94 
 (1,678.37) (3,362.07) (1,678.37) (3,362.07) 
Father’s Education -27,375.55* -614.94 -27,375.55* -614.94 
 (12,136.99) (23,411.32) (12,136.99) (23,411.32) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
3,691.31* -174.61 3,691.31* -174.61 
 (1,718.17) (3,350.86) (1,718.17) (3,350.86) 
Age -1,033.85 -2,206.95 -1,033.85 -2,206.95 
 (1,514.07) (2,101.03) (1,514.07) (2,101.03) 
Female -7,166.31* -8,383.80* -7,166.31* -8,383.80* 
 (2,891.67) (3,459.90) (2,891.67) (3,459.90) 
Prior Income 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
4.58 9.87 4.58 9.87 
 (7.85) (10.61) (7.85) (10.61) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -13,788.93 -15,808.87 -13,788.93 -15,808.87 
 (9,000.55) (13,616.80) (9,000.55) (13,616.80) 
   Selective -7,976.82 -11,314.89 -7,976.82 -11,314.89 
 (8,268.10) (12,926.27) (8,268.10) (12,926.27) 
   Most Selective 395.99 -11,244.95 395.99 -11,244.95 
 (10,508.44) (14,663.03) (10,508.44) (14,663.03) 
Private Control 5,877.20 -8,908.81 5,877.20 -8,908.81 
 (7,934.48) (9,241.07) (7,934.48) (9,241.07) 
2-Year or Less -5,141.35 -11,618.07 -5,141.35 -11,618.07 
 (8,686.40) (13,489.18) (8,686.40) (13,489.18) 
College GPA 390.22 -2,867.02 390.22 -2,867.02 
 (2,519.65) (3,500.00) (2,519.65) (3,500.00) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.50 0.04 -0.50 0.04 
 (0.50) (0.57) (0.50) (0.57) 
Married 73.19 3,955.64 73.19 3,955.64 
 314 
 (3,467.19) (5,467.10) (3,467.19) (5,467.10) 
Dependents 1,845.33 -369.13 1,845.33 -369.13 
 (2,029.73) (3,885.45) (2,029.73) (3,885.45) 
Constant 61,786.62+ 84,359.31+ 61,786.62+ 84,359.31+ 
 (32,589.90) (45,698.12) (32,589.90) (45,698.12) 
Observations 280 280 280 280 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career 
occupation salary. Models run solely for students self-identifying as American 
Indian/Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/other Pacific Islander, other, or more than one 
race. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A82 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1.35* 1.35* 1.19+ 1.19+ 
 (0.65) (0.65) (0.64) (0.64) 
Father’s Education 5.80 5.80 5.44 5.44 
 (4.97) (4.97) (4.99) (4.99) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.54 -0.54 -0.53 -0.53 
 (0.66) (0.66) (0.65) (0.65) 
Age 0.61+ 0.61+ 0.70* 0.70* 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) 
Female 0.58 0.58 0.61 0.61 
 (0.55) (0.55) (0.54) (0.54) 
Prior Income -0.00+ -0.00+ -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 3.67+ 3.67+ 4.32* 4.32* 
 (2.00) (2.00) (2.11) (2.11) 
   Selective 2.56 2.56 3.50+ 3.50+ 
 (1.86) (1.86) (1.85) (1.85) 
   Most Selective 0.29 0.29 0.66 0.66 
 (2.05) (2.05) (2.02) (2.02) 
Private Control -1.20 -1.20 -1.53 -1.53 
 (1.09) (1.09) (1.08) (1.08) 
2-Year or Less 4.24* 4.24* 4.80* 4.80* 
 (1.95) (1.95) (1.96) (1.96) 
College GPA -0.58 -0.58 -0.24 -0.24 
 (0.63) (0.63) (0.62) (0.62) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00+ 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Married -1.68 -1.68 -1.38 -1.38 
 (1.14) (1.14) (1.15) (1.15) 
Dependents 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.23 
 (0.65) (0.65) (0.63) (0.63) 
Constant -16.24* -16.24* -18.24* -18.24* 
 (7.47) (7.47) (7.45) (7.45) 
Observations 280 280 280 280 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.82 (0.179) 0.41 (0.524) 2.13 (0.146) 0.38 (0.537) 
Minimum eigenvalue 4.29 4.287 2.98 2.98 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 2.79 (0.248) 0.13 (0.937) 2.73 (0.255) 0.13 (0.937) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as American Indian/Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/other Pacific 
Islander, other, or more than one race. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A83 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Other Race 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.07+ -0.11 0.09 -0.13 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.12) 
Age -0.11 -0.06 -0.13 -0.04 
 (0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.14) 
Female -0.21* -0.12 -0.22* -0.10 
 (0.10) (0.25) (0.11) (0.25) 
Prior Income 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.76* 0.23 -0.86* 0.39 
 (0.35) (0.55) (0.40) (0.65) 
   Selective -0.48+ -0.29 -0.60+ -0.10 
 (0.27) (0.44) (0.34) (0.53) 
   Most Selective -0.10 -0.65 -0.13 -0.60 
 (0.29) (0.49) (0.33) (0.45) 
Private Control 0.24 -1.19* 0.29 -1.26** 
 (0.19) (0.47) (0.20) (0.48) 
2-Year or Less -0.43 -0.32 -0.53 -0.15 
 (0.30) (0.47) (0.37) (0.52) 
College GPA 0.04 -0.23 0.02 -0.20 
 (0.10) (0.26) (0.11) (0.26) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 0.00* -0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.28+ 0.47 0.28 0.47 
 (0.17) (0.36) (0.18) (0.38) 
Dependents 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.09 
 (0.09) (0.31) (0.10) (0.32) 
Constant 12.18*** 11.16*** 12.54*** 10.60*** 
 (1.28) (2.54) (1.38) (2.79) 
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030 
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Wu-Hausman (p-value) 28.96 (0.000) 9.220 (0.002) 30.60 (0.000) 9.13 (0.003) 
Minimum eigenvalue 26.27 26.27 24.07 24.07 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 3.04 (0.219) 1.01 (0.604) 2.44 (0.295) 1.16 (0.561) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students self-identifying as American Indian/Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian/other Pacific 
Islander, other, or more than one race. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A84 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.006* 0.007** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.167*** 0.165*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Latino 0.128*** 0.129*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Asian 0.190*** 0.192*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race 0.109* 0.108* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.049 0.046 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
   Selective 0.111* 0.109* 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.179** 0.177** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control -0.022 -0.024 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less -0.082+ -0.079+ 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
College GPA 0.050** 0.051** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.009 0.007 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Dependents -0.035 -0.034 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.069 -0.077 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Observations 2220 2220 
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Note: The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed from 
2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same 
period (federal loan). Models run solely for students with prior income at or below the 
25th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p 
< .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A85 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
-0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Mother’s Education 0.01 0.01 
 (0.17) (0.17) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.17*** 0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Latino 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Asian 0.19*** 0.19*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race 0.11* 0.11* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.06 0.06 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
   Selective 0.12* 0.12* 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.18** 0.18** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less -0.10+ -0.10+ 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
College GPA 0.05** 0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00+ 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.01 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
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Dependents -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.03 0.03 
 (0.20) (0.20) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Note: Reduced form equation for the IV model of undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
aspirations. Models run solely for students with prior income at or below the 25th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A86 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
1.07*** 0.93*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
Mother’s Education 3.65** 2.86* 
 (1.37) (1.36) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.56** -0.42* 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
Female 0.03 0.08 
 (0.18) (0.18) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 1.36*** 1.33*** 
 (0.23) (0.23) 
   Latino -0.04 -0.19 
 (0.28) (0.28) 
   Asian -0.78* -0.76* 
 (0.36) (0.36) 
   Other Race 0.25 0.35 
 (0.39) (0.39) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 1.00* 1.09* 
 (0.45) (0.47) 
   Selective 0.75+ 0.84* 
 (0.40) (0.42) 
   Most Selective -0.33 -0.08 
 (0.55) (0.56) 
Private Control 0.01 0.29 
 (0.37) (0.38) 
2-Year or Less -0.58 -0.70+ 
 (0.41) (0.42) 
College GPA -0.23 -0.22 
 (0.15) (0.15) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.23 0.15 
 (0.63) (0.63) 
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Dependents -0.13 -0.23 
 (0.23) (0.23) 
Constant -0.48 0.01 
 (1.57) (1.55) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.25 (0.264) 1.29 (0.256) 
Minimum eigenvalue 11.43 9.42 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.38 (0.826) 0.43 (0.806) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students with prior income at or below the 25th percentile. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A87 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Low-Income. 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Latino 0.12*** 0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Asian 0.17*** 0.17*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race 0.11* 0.12* 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.07 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
   Selective 0.13* 0.13* 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.17** 0.18** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) 
2-Year or Less -0.10+ -0.11+ 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
College GPA 0.04* 0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00+ 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.00 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Dependents -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.07 0.07 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.25 (0.264) 1.29 (0.256) 
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Minimum eigenvalue 11.43 9.42 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.38 (0.826) 0.43 (0.806) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students with prior income at or below the 25th percentile. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A88 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.008*** 0.007** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.209*** 0.208*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Latino 0.095** 0.093** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Asian 0.093* 0.092* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race 0.057 0.055 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.074 -0.077 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
   Selective 0.020 0.018 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.044 0.042 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control -0.054 -0.058 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less -0.160** -0.164** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
College GPA 0.084*** 0.083*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.004 -0.007 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Dependents 0.057 0.058 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Constant -0.050 -0.034 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Observations 2220 2220 
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Note: The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed from 
2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same 
period (federal loan). Models run solely for students with prior income above the 25th 
percentile and up to and including the 50th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p 
< 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A89 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
-0.04 -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Mother’s Education -0.22 -0.22 
 (0.36) (0.36) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
0.03 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Female 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.22*** 0.22*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
   Latino 0.09* 0.09* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Asian 0.09* 0.09* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race 0.06 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
   Selective 0.02 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.03 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
2-Year or Less -0.18*** -0.18*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
College GPA 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.17) (0.17) 
 330 
Dependents 0.06 0.06 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
Constant 0.30 0.30 
 (0.38) (0.38) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Note: Reduced form equation for the IV model of undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
aspirations. Models run solely for students with prior income above the 25th percentile 
and up to and including the 50th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = 
p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A90 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
First Stage full model; Subpopulations: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
0.77+ 0.90* 
 (0.40) (0.39) 
Mother’s Education 4.66 5.80* 
 (3.01) (2.90) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.66+ -0.83* 
 (0.39) (0.38) 
Female 0.09 0.10 
 (0.18) (0.18) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.83** 0.99** 
 (0.30) (0.31) 
   Latino -0.74* -0.60+ 
 (0.34) (0.34) 
   Asian -0.94* -0.95* 
 (0.47) (0.47) 
   Other Race -0.36 -0.15 
 (0.39) (0.39) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  -0.00+ -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.17 0.12 
 (0.49) (0.52) 
   Selective -0.44 -0.26 
 (0.42) (0.45) 
   Most Selective -1.79** -1.67** 
 (0.55) (0.57) 
Private Control -0.30 0.22 
 (0.38) (0.37) 
2-Year or Less -1.73*** -1.46** 
 (0.44) (0.46) 
College GPA -0.53** -0.48** 
 (0.17) (0.17) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.13 0.22 
 (1.76) (1.72) 
 332 
Dependents -0.14 -0.36 
 (0.98) (0.92) 
Constant 4.28 2.17 
 (3.13) (3.04) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.38 (0.240) 1.37 (0.242) 
Minimum eigenvalue 1.16 1.59 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.09 (0.954) 0.12 (0.940) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students with prior income above the 25th percentile and up to and including the 50th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A91 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.06 -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
Female 0.07** 0.07** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.27*** 0.27*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
   Latino 0.05 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.05) 
   Asian 0.03 0.04 
 (0.09) (0.08) 
   Other Race 0.03 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.05) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00* 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.08 -0.07 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
   Selective -0.01 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
   Most Selective -0.08 -0.06 
 (0.15) (0.12) 
Private Control -0.07 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.05) 
2-Year or Less -0.28+ -0.25* 
 (0.15) (0.11) 
College GPA 0.05 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.01 0.01 
 (0.21) (0.20) 
Dependents 0.05 0.04 
 (0.11) (0.10) 
Constant 0.61 0.46 
 (0.72) (0.51) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 1.38 (0.240) 1.37 (0.242) 
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Minimum eigenvalue 1.16 1.59 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.09 (0.954) 0.12 (0.940) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students with prior income above the 25th percentile and up to and including the 50th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A92 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.002 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.095*** 0.095*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.051 0.050 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Latino 0.100* 0.100* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Asian 0.095* 0.096* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race 0.035 0.035 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.014 0.013 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
   Selective 0.096+ 0.095+ 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.111+ 0.111+ 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control 0.034 0.034 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less -0.146** -0.147** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
College GPA 0.083*** 0.083*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.080 0.086 
 (0.29) (0.30) 
Dependents 0.035 0.032 
 (0.24) (0.24) 
Constant -0.044 -0.045 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Observations 2220 2220 
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Note: The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed from 
2003-2004 to 2008-2009 (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same 
period (federal loan). Models run solely for students with prior income above the 50th 
percentile and up to and including the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p 
< 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A93 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
-0.08+ -0.08+ 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Mother’s Education -0.55+ -0.55+ 
 (0.33) (0.33) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
0.07 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Female 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.05 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Latino 0.09* 0.09* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Asian 0.09* 0.09* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race 0.03 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.02 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
   Selective 0.10+ 0.10+ 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.11+ 0.11+ 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control 0.04 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less -0.16** -0.16** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
College GPA 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.08 0.08 
 (0.28) (0.28) 
Dependents 0.03 0.03 
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 (0.24) (0.24) 
Constant 0.63+ 0.63+ 
 (0.34) (0.34) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Note: Reduced form equation for the IV model of undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
aspirations. Models run solely for students with prior income above the 50th percentile 
and up to and including the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = 
p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A94 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
-0.04 -0.11 
 (0.61) (0.58) 
Mother’s Education -0.20 -1.40 
 (4.39) (4.16) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
0.04 0.19 
 (0.62) (0.58) 
Female 0.01 0.01 
 (0.20) (0.19) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 1.41*** 1.70*** 
 (0.37) (0.37) 
   Latino 0.26 0.16 
 (0.39) (0.39) 
   Asian -1.68** -1.81*** 
 (0.54) (0.50) 
   Other Race -0.37 -0.27 
 (0.50) (0.48) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  -0.00+ -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.58 0.89 
 (0.61) (0.61) 
   Selective 0.50 0.80 
 (0.50) (0.49) 
   Most Selective -1.25* -1.00+ 
 (0.60) (0.58) 
Private Control 1.53*** 1.49*** 
 (0.37) (0.36) 
2-Year or Less -0.62 -0.31 
 (0.53) (0.52) 
College GPA -0.44* -0.42* 
 (0.18) (0.18) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 5.33*** 2.06 
 (0.72) (2.36) 
 340 
Dependents -2.30+ -0.76 
 (1.25) (1.82) 
Constant 8.50+ 8.03+ 
 (4.47) (4.25) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.06 (0.806) 0.06 (0.800) 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.01 0.11 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.74 (0.689) 2.72 (0.256) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students with prior income above the 50th percentile and up to and including the 75th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A95 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.18 -0.04 
 (1.60) (0.19) 
Female 0.09* 0.10*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American -0.20 0.12 
 (2.25) (0.32) 
   Latino 0.05 0.11* 
 (0.43) (0.05) 
   Asian 0.40 0.02 
 (2.69) (0.35) 
   Other Race 0.10 0.02 
 (0.60) (0.07) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -0.09 0.05 
 (0.93) (0.19) 
   Selective 0.01 0.13 
 (0.80) (0.16) 
   Most Selective 0.33 0.07 
 (2.00) (0.20) 
Private Control -0.24 0.10 
 (2.44) (0.29) 
2-Year or Less -0.04 -0.16+ 
 (0.99) (0.09) 
College GPA 0.16 0.07 
 (0.70) (0.08) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.87 0.17 
 (8.51) (0.43) 
Dependents 0.45 -0.00 
 (3.67) (0.32) 
Constant -1.52 0.27 
 (13.18) (1.37) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.06 (0.806) 0.06 (0.800) 
 342 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.01 0.11 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.74 (0.689) 2.72 (0.256) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students with prior income above the 50th percentile and up to and including the 75th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A96 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.002 0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.057** 0.058** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.099+ 0.100+ 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   Latino -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Asian 0.061 0.060 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race 0.051 0.050 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.072 0.073 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
   Selective 0.111 0.111 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
   Most Selective 0.119+ 0.119+ 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Private Control -0.035 -0.035 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
2-Year or Less -0.084 -0.083 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
College GPA 0.097*** 0.096*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.517*** -0.519*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Dependents --- --- 
 --- --- 
Constant -0.124 -0.121 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Observations 2220 2220 
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Note: The primary covariate of interest in the models is cumulative loans borrowed from 
2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same 
period (federal loan). Models run solely for students with prior income above the 75th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Coefficients for dependents measure not included due to lack of variation. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines.
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Table A97 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
0.12+ 0.12+ 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Mother’s Education 1.03* 1.03* 
 (0.44) (0.44) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
-0.10 -0.10 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Female 0.06** 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 0.10* 0.10* 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   Latino 0.02 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
   Asian 0.06 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race 0.05 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.07 0.07 
 (0.08) (0.08) 
   Selective 0.11 0.11 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
   Most Selective 0.12 0.12 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Private Control -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
2-Year or Less -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
College GPA 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.53*** -0.53*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
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Dependents --- --- 
 --- --- 
Constant -1.22** -1.22** 
 (0.46) (0.46) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Note: Reduced form equation for the IV model of undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
aspirations. Models run solely for students with prior income above the 75th percentile. 
Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Coefficients for dependents measure not included due to lack of variation. Observations are 
rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A98 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees 
-0.15 -0.39 
 (0.83) (0.77) 
Mother’s Education 0.56 -1.22 
 (6.52) (6.19) 
Change in Average Tuition and 
Fees * Mother’s Education 
0.16 0.36 
 (0.82) (0.76) 
Female 0.34 0.23 
 (0.21) (0.20) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American 2.16*** 2.08*** 
 (0.56) (0.56) 
   Latino 0.67 0.66 
 (0.50) (0.48) 
   Asian -0.47 -0.33 
 (0.52) (0.50) 
   Other Race -0.68 -0.70 
 (0.49) (0.46) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  -0.00** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective -1.01 -1.46+ 
 (0.87) (0.81) 
   Selective -1.34* -1.35* 
 (0.67) (0.64) 
   Most Selective -1.97** -2.02** 
 (0.72) (0.69) 
Private Control 0.31 0.50 
 (0.40) (0.39) 
2-Year or Less -1.58* -2.06** 
 (0.72) (0.68) 
College GPA -0.30 -0.07 
 (0.21) (0.20) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00+ 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -3.91*** -3.24*** 
 (0.33) (0.31) 
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Dependents --- --- 
 --- --- 
Constant 7.90 9.46 
 (6.65) (6.30) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 3.38 (0.066) 1.98 (0.160) 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.63 0.55 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.91 (0.636) 1.81 (0.405) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students with prior income above the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + 
= p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Coefficients for dependents measure not 
included due to lack of variation. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A99 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.12 0.10 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
Female 0.02 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: White)   
   African American -0.15 -0.11 
 (0.26) (0.25) 
   Latino -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
   Asian 0.12 0.09 
 (0.09) (0.07) 
   Other Race 0.13 0.12 
 (0.11) (0.10) 
Entrance Examination (in SAT)  0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity (Reference: 
Nonselective) 
  
   Less Selective 0.19 0.22 
 (0.17) (0.21) 
   Selective 0.27 0.25 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
   Most Selective 0.35 0.32 
 (0.25) (0.26) 
Private Control -0.07 -0.08 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
2-Year or Less 0.10 0.12 
 (0.21) (0.26) 
College GPA 0.13** 0.10*** 
 (0.05) (0.03) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.07 -0.20 
 (0.44) (0.38) 
Dependents -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant -1.10 -0.91 
 (0.98) (0.94) 
Observations 2220 2220 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 3.38 (0.066) 1.98 (0.160) 
 350 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.63 0.55 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.91 (0.636) 1.81 (0.405) 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees, mother’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with mother’s education. Models run solely 
for students with prior income above the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + 
= p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Coefficients for dependents measure not 
included due to lack of variation. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A100 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
-0.007** -0.006* -0.005* -0.004+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.023** -0.023* -0.023** -0.024* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female -0.030 0.010 -0.030 0.009 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White) 
    
   African American 0.132*** 0.166*** 0.132*** 0.166*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
   Latino 0.062+ 0.097** 0.061+ 0.097** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
   Asian 0.003 0.069+ 0.006 0.071+ 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race -0.074+ 0.019 -0.072+ 0.021 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.000* 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.055 0.048 0.056 0.049 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
   Selective 0.082+ 0.070 0.082+ 0.071 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.101+ 0.121* 0.104+ 0.124* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control 0.038 0.056 0.041 0.058 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less 0.010 0.054 0.010 0.054 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
College GPA 0.172*** 0.187*** 0.174*** 0.189*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.072** -0.079** -0.071** -0.078** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
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Dependents 0.023 0.040+ 0.022 0.040+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.048 -0.056 0.019 -0.075 
 (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Note: Models run solely for students with a prior income equal to or below the 25th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A101 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Father’s Education 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female -0.03+ 0.01 -0.03+ 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Latino 0.06+ 0.10** 0.06+ 0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Asian 0.00 0.07+ 0.00 0.07+ 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race -0.08+ 0.01 -0.08+ 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00* 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
   Selective 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.10+ 0.12* 0.10+ 0.12* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control 0.05 0.07+ 0.05 0.07+ 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
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College GPA 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** -0.08** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Dependents 0.03 0.04+ 0.03 0.04+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.27 0.12 0.27 0.12 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school enrollment. Models run solely for students with a prior income equal to or below the 
25th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p 
< .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A102 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.90*** 0.90*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Father’s Education 2.44 2.44 1.69 1.69 
 (1.49) (1.49) (1.50) (1.50) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.32 -0.32 -0.22 -0.22 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Age 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Female 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.26 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White)     
   African American 0.95*** 0.95*** 1.19*** 1.19*** 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) 
   Latino -0.00 -0.00 -0.21 -0.21 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) 
   Asian -0.88** -0.88** -0.72* -0.72* 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) 
   Other Race -0.32 -0.32 -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00** -0.00** -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.19 -0.19 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.54) (0.54) (0.58) (0.58) 
   Selective 0.19 0.19 0.41 0.41 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.49) (0.49) 
   Most Selective -0.69 -0.69 -0.33 -0.33 
 (0.52) (0.52) (0.55) (0.55) 
Private Control -1.50*** -1.50*** -1.44*** -1.44*** 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32) 
2-Year or Less 1.24** 1.24** 1.56** 1.56** 
 (0.48) (0.48) (0.51) (0.51) 
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College GPA -0.40* -0.40* -0.24 -0.24 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.58* -0.58* -0.66* -0.66* 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) 
Dependents 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) 
Constant 1.40 1.40 0.19 0.19 
 (2.18) (2.18) (2.22) (2.22) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 8.22 (0.004) 4.90 (0.027) 9.81 (0.002)  5.71 (0.017) 
Minimum eigenvalue 21.86 21.86 20.59 20.59 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 3.89 (0.143) 2.11 (0.347) 3.12 (0.210) 1.68 (0.432) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income equal to or below the 25th percentile. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A103 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.05** -0.04* -0.05** -0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Latino 0.05 0.09* 0.04 0.08* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Asian -0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Other Race -0.09* 0.00 -0.09+ 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
   Selective 0.09+ 0.08 0.10+ 0.09 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
   Most Selective 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.11+ 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
2-Year or Less 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.09 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
College GPA 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.10** -0.10** -0.11*** -0.11** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
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Dependents 0.04 0.05* 0.04 0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.42+ 0.25 0.35 0.19 
 (0.26) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 8.22 (0.004) 4.90 (0.027) 9.81 (0.002)  5.71 (0.017) 
Minimum eigenvalue 21.86 21.86 20.59 20.59 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 3.89 (0.143) 2.11 (0.347) 3.12 (0.210) 1.68 (0.432) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income equal to or below the 25th percentile. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A104 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
-0.003 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.012 -0.025+ -0.012 -0.025+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.019 0.029 0.019 0.029 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White) 
    
   African American 0.188*** 0.244*** 0.188*** 0.244*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Latino 0.020 0.030 0.020 0.031 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
   Asian 0.105** 0.121*** 0.106** 0.123*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Other Race 0.119* 0.108* 0.119* 0.108* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.008 -0.013 -0.008 -0.013 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
   Selective 0.002 0.013 0.002 0.013 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
   Most Selective 0.018 0.056 0.018 0.057 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control 0.037 0.013 0.037 0.013 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less -0.045 0.007 -0.045 0.006 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
College GPA 0.192*** 0.209*** 0.193*** 0.210*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.022 -0.037 -0.021 -0.037 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
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Dependents -0.017 0.005 -0.018 0.005 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant -0.325 -0.082 -0.332 -0.091 
 (0.28) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Note: Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 25th percentile and up 
to and including the 50th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A105 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.05* -0.06** -0.05* -0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Father’s Education -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age -0.02 -0.03* -0.02 -0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.23*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Latino 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
   Asian 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Other Race 0.11* 0.10+ 0.11* 0.10+ 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
   Selective 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
   Most Selective 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Private Control 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
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College GPA 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Dependents -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 0.05 0.44 0.05 0.44 
 (0.33) (0.31) (0.33) (0.31) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school enrollment. Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 25th 
percentile and up to and including the 50th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p 
< 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A106 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulations: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.85*** 0.85*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Father’s Education 1.49 1.49 1.48 1.48 
 (1.60) (1.60) (1.62) (1.62) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.27 -0.27 -0.28 -0.28 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Age 0.21* 0.21* 0.22* 0.22* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Female 0.20 0.20 0.12 0.12 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White)     
   African American 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
   Latino -0.78* -0.78* -0.95** -0.95** 
 (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
   Asian -1.21*** -1.21*** -1.35*** -1.35*** 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
   Other Race 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.02 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.41) (0.41) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00+ -0.00+ -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.16 0.16 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.53) 
   Selective -0.10 -0.10 -0.21 -0.21 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.44) 
   Most Selective -0.37 -0.37 -0.58 -0.58 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) 
Private Control -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.10 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.36) (0.36) 
2-Year or Less 0.72 0.72 0.43 0.43 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) 
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College GPA -0.57** -0.57** -0.49* -0.49* 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.51+ -0.51+ -0.44 -0.44 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Dependents 0.32+ 0.32+ 0.31 0.31 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Constant 0.88 0.88 0.98 0.98 
 (2.61) (2.61) (2.67) (2.67) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 12.23 (0.000) 23.160 (0.000) 12.84 (0.000) 22.91 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 18.26 18.26 14.43 14.43 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.64 (0.725) 1.04 (0.593) 0.39 (0.823) 1.44 (0.487) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income above the 25th percentile and up to and including the 50th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A107 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.06** -0.08*** -0.07** -0.09*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 0.03 0.04+ 0.02 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.20*** 0.26*** 0.20*** 0.26*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Latino -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
   Asian 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Other Race 0.12* 0.11+ 0.11* 0.10 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00* 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
   Selective 0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
   Most Selective 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
Private Control 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
2-Year or Less -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
College GPA 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 366 
Dependents 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.13 0.56+ 0.15 0.58 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 12.23 (0.000) 23.160 (0.000) 12.84 (0.000) 22.91 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 18.26 18.26 14.43 14.43 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.64 (0.725) 1.04 (0.593) 0.39 (0.823) 1.44 (0.487) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income above the 25th percentile and up to and including the 50th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A108 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulations: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
-0.006** -0.006* -0.005* -0.006** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.044* -0.032+ -0.045* -0.033+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female -0.001 0.030 -0.001 0.030 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White) 
    
   African American 0.063 0.195*** 0.061 0.193*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Latino 0.038 0.105* 0.037 0.104* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Asian 0.083+ 0.118* 0.083+ 0.118* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Other Race 0.034 0.013 0.034 0.011 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.025 -0.021 -0.025 -0.020 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
   Selective 0.072 0.047 0.071 0.047 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.153** 0.103+ 0.152** 0.102+ 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Private Control 0.131** 0.062 0.130** 0.063 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less 0.026 0.033 0.024 0.032 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
College GPA 0.156*** 0.188*** 0.157*** 0.188*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.118* -0.139** -0.118* -0.139** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
 368 
Dependents 0.022 0.063 0.022 0.064 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 0.508 0.163 0.508 0.181 
 (0.34) (0.37) (0.34) (0.37) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Note: Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 50th percentile and up 
to and including the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A109 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.00 -0.07+ 0.00 -0.07+ 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Father’s Education 0.24 -0.33 0.24 -0.33 
 (0.32) (0.30) (0.32) (0.30) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Age -0.05** -0.04* -0.05** -0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.06 0.19*** 0.06 0.19*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Latino 0.02 0.09* 0.02 0.09* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Asian 0.08 0.11* 0.08 0.11* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Other Race 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
   Selective 0.08+ 0.05 0.08+ 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
   Most Selective 0.16** 0.11+ 0.16** 0.11+ 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Private Control 0.14*** 0.07 0.14*** 0.07 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
 370 
College GPA 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.09+ -0.12* -0.09+ -0.12* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Dependents 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Constant 0.72 0.86+ 0.72 0.86+ 
 (0.48) (0.47) (0.48) (0.47) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school enrollment. Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 50th 
percentile and up to and including the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p 
< 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A110 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.50 0.50 0.37 0.37 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) 
Father’s Education -0.52 -0.52 -1.22 -1.22 
 (2.78) (2.78) (2.66) (2.66) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.02 -0.02 0.07 0.07 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.38) (0.38) 
Age 0.05 0.05 -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Female 0.31 0.31 0.31+ 0.31+ 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White)     
   African American -0.07 -0.07 -0.39 -0.39 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.43) (0.43) 
   Latino -0.00 -0.00 -0.13 -0.13 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) 
   Asian -0.37 -0.37 -0.36 -0.36 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) 
   Other Race -0.69 -0.69 -0.88 -0.88 
 (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.89 0.89 1.00+ 1.00+ 
 (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) (0.58) 
   Selective 0.77+ 0.77+ 0.72 0.72 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) 
   Most Selective 0.38 0.38 0.18 0.18 
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.55) (0.55) 
Private Control 1.06* 1.06* 1.05* 1.05* 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.42) 
2-Year or Less 1.61** 1.61** 1.29* 1.29* 
 (0.52) (0.52) (0.51) (0.51) 
 372 
College GPA -0.55** -0.55** -0.51* -0.51* 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.56 -0.56 -0.57 -0.57 
 (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) 
Dependents 0.33 0.33 0.56 0.56 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) 
Constant 6.47 6.47 9.64* 9.64* 
 (4.53) (4.53) (4.41) (4.41) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 11.81 (0.000) 7.37 (0.007) 11.26 (0.001) 6.30 (0.012) 
Minimum eigenvalue 7.58 7.58 6.36 6.37 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 7.62 (0.022) 5.94 (0.051) 7.88 (0.019) 6.80 (0.033) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income above the 50th percentile and up to and including the 75th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A111 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.08** -0.07* -0.09** -0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Age -0.05* -0.04 -0.06** -0.05+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 0.02 0.05+ 0.02 0.05+ 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.05 0.19*** 0.03 0.16** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
   Latino 0.04 0.11* 0.03 0.10* 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Asian 0.05 0.09+ 0.05 0.09+ 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
   Other Race -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
   Selective 0.14* 0.10 0.13* 0.10 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
   Most Selective 0.18** 0.13+ 0.17* 0.12+ 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Private Control 0.22*** 0.14* 0.23*** 0.14* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
2-Year or Less 0.13+ 0.12 0.11 0.10 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
College GPA 0.11*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.14* -0.16* -0.14* -0.16* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
 374 
Dependents 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.11+ 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Constant 1.36* 0.88+ 1.58** 1.03+ 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.60) (0.60) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 11.81 (0.000) 7.37 (0.007) 11.26 (0.001) 6.30 (0.012) 
Minimum eigenvalue 7.58 7.58 6.36 6.37 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 7.62 (0.022) 5.94 (0.051) 7.88 (0.019) 6.80 (0.033) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with prior income above the 50th percentile and up to and including the 75th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A112 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age -0.020 -0.008 -0.020 -0.008 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 0.045* 0.027 0.045* 0.028 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White) 
    
   African American 0.097+ 0.184*** 0.098+ 0.186*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Latino 0.060 0.062 0.060 0.062 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Asian 0.052 0.021 0.050 0.019 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Other Race 0.050 0.019 0.050 0.019 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.034 -0.148+ -0.032 -0.146+ 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
   Selective 0.024 -0.052 0.024 -0.052 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
   Most Selective 0.023 -0.002 0.022 -0.004 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Private Control 0.004 -0.018 0.005 -0.017 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less -0.028 -0.112 -0.028 -0.111 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
College GPA 0.164*** 0.226*** 0.164*** 0.225*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.067 -0.155 -0.070 -0.156 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
 376 
Dependents -0.111+ -0.127+ -0.107+ -0.122+ 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Constant -0.271 -0.397 -0.254 -0.376 
 (0.32) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Note: Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 75th percentile. 
Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A113 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.15 0.03 -0.15 0.03 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) 
Father’s Education -0.71 0.58 -0.71 0.58 
 (0.81) (0.95) (0.81) (0.95) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
0.10 -0.08 0.10 -0.08 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) 
Age -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.09+ 0.18*** 0.09+ 0.18*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Latino 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Asian 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
   Other Race 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.04 -0.15+ -0.04 -0.15+ 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
   Selective 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
   Most Selective 0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Private Control 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
2-Year or Less -0.07 -0.15* -0.07 -0.15* 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
 378 
College GPA 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.16*** 0.22*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.04 -0.11 -0.04 -0.11 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Dependents -0.10 -0.13+ -0.10 -0.13+ 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Constant 0.88 -0.51 0.88 -0.51 
 (0.90) (1.04) (0.90) (1.04) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate 
school enrollment. Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 75th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A114 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1.07 1.07 1.77* 1.77* 
 (1.00) (1.00) (0.74) (0.74) 
Father’s Education 7.42 7.42 13.10* 13.10* 
 (7.49) (7.49) (5.32) (5.32) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.95 -0.95 -1.59* -1.59* 
 (0.99) (0.99) (0.74) (0.74) 
Age -0.12 -0.12 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
Female 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.12 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White)     
   African American 1.06+ 1.06+ 1.06* 1.06* 
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.53) (0.53) 
   Latino 0.22 0.22 0.10 0.10 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.44) (0.44) 
   Asian -1.27* -1.27* -1.43** -1.43** 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.47) 
   Other Race 0.73 0.73 0.25 0.25 
 (0.53) (0.53) (0.52) (0.52) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 1.51* 1.51* 1.38+ 1.38+ 
 (0.77) (0.77) (0.75) (0.75) 
   Selective 0.53 0.53 0.28 0.28 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.62) (0.62) 
   Most Selective -0.41 -0.41 -0.77 -0.77 
 (0.69) (0.69) (0.67) (0.67) 
Private Control 1.18** 1.18** 0.87* 0.87* 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.37) (0.37) 
2-Year or Less 0.59 0.59 0.34 0.34 
 (0.73) (0.73) (0.70) (0.70) 
 380 
College GPA -0.37 -0.37 -0.29 -0.29 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.24 0.24 -0.99 -0.99 
 (1.03) (1.03) (1.04) (1.04) 
Dependents 2.23*** 2.23*** 2.67** 2.67** 
 (0.65) (0.65) (0.94) (0.94) 
Constant 4.26 4.26 -3.71 -3.71 
 (8.74) (8.74) (6.87) (6.87) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 9.82 (0.002) 6.444 (0.011) 6.62 (0.010) 4.63 (0.031) 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.53 0.53 1.99 1.99 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.67 (0.715) 2.07 (0.355) 3.68 (0.159) 6.78 (0.034) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income above the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = 
p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A115 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.24 -0.20 -0.11* -0.09+ 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.05) (0.05) 
Age -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Female 0.06 0.04 0.06+ 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.35 0.40+ 0.21* 0.28** 
 (0.27) (0.24) (0.10) (0.09) 
   Latino 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.07 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) 
   Asian -0.26 -0.24 -0.10 -0.11 
 (0.30) (0.27) (0.10) (0.10) 
   Other Race 0.22 0.16 0.07 0.04 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.08) (0.07) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.33 0.16 0.11 -0.02 
 (0.38) (0.34) (0.13) (0.14) 
   Selective 0.15 0.06 0.06 -0.02 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.10) (0.10) 
   Most Selective -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 
 (0.21) (0.19) (0.11) (0.11) 
Private Control 0.30 0.23 0.10 0.07 
 (0.28) (0.25) (0.07) (0.07) 
2-Year or Less 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10 
 (0.22) (0.20) (0.11) (0.11) 
College GPA 0.07 0.15+ 0.13*** 0.20*** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.01 -0.10 -0.18 -0.25 
 (0.30) (0.24) (0.19) (0.17) 
 382 
Dependents 0.42 0.32 0.15 0.10 
 (0.49) (0.43) (0.19) (0.18) 
Constant 2.87 2.24 0.97 0.68 
 (2.88) (2.57) (0.76) (0.77) 
Observations 2460 2460 2460 2460 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 9.82 (0.002) 6.444 (0.011) 6.62 (0.010) 4.63 (0.031) 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.53 0.53 1.99 1.99 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.67 (0.715) 2.07 (0.355) 3.68 (0.159) 6.78 (0.034) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income above the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = 
p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A116 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
0.007 -0.007 0.003 -0.012 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Age -0.001 0.034 -0.001 0.034 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Female -0.235*** -0.251* -0.234*** -0.249* 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American -0.085 -0.570* -0.084 -0.563* 
 (0.06) (0.23) (0.06) (0.23) 
   Latino 0.003 -0.204 0.004 -0.208 
 (0.06) (0.22) (0.06) (0.22) 
   Asian 0.017 -0.357 0.013 -0.362 
 (0.07) (0.25) (0.07) (0.25) 
   Other Race 0.015 -0.303 0.012 -0.303 
 (0.07) (0.24) (0.07) (0.24) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.001** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.005 -0.071 0.005 -0.067 
 (0.10) (0.27) (0.10) (0.27) 
   Selective 0.080 -0.201 0.081 -0.197 
 (0.08) (0.23) (0.08) (0.23) 
   Most Selective 0.242* 0.017 0.238* 0.016 
 (0.10) (0.26) (0.10) (0.25) 
Private Control -0.120+ -0.194 -0.126* -0.200 
 (0.06) (0.18) (0.06) (0.18) 
2-Year or Less -0.022 -0.317 -0.020 -0.308 
 (0.09) (0.25) (0.09) (0.25) 
College GPA 0.010 0.084 0.008 0.084 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.028 -0.001 -0.030 -0.006 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13) 
 384 
Dependents 0.079* 0.097 0.080* 0.098 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Constant 10.224*** 8.743*** 10.255*** 8.761*** 
 (0.34) (1.15) (0.34) (1.15) 
Observations 2010    2010       2010      2010 
Note: Models run solely for students with a prior income equal to or below the 25th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A117 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
889.14 760.32 889.14 760.32 
 (817.61) (1,458.99) (817.61) (1,458.99) 
Father’s Education 3,025.32 9,516.01 3,025.32 9,516.01 
 (6223.47) (10,894.98) (6,223.47) (10,894.98) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s education 
-363.91 -1,485.61 -363.91 -1,485.61 
 (865.35) (1,517.96) (865.35) (1,517.96) 
Age -93.01 784.02 -93.01 784.02 
 (431.77) (587.51) (431.77) (587.51) 
Female -7,403.27*** -12,083.84*** -7,403.27*** -12,083.84*** 
 (872.42) (1,228.68) (872.42) (1,228.68) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White) 
    
   African American -1,128.08 -1,627.77 -1,128.08 -1,627.77 
 (1,350.99) (1,998.93) (1,350.99) (1,998.93) 
   Latino 236.23 1,977.63 236.23 1,977.63 
 (1,405.83) (2,284.06) (1,405.83) (2,284.06) 
   Asian 3,211.93 6,051.11* 3,211.93 6,051.11* 
 (1,985.77) (2,808.59) (1,985.77) (2,808.59) 
   Other Race -263.53 -4,668.58+ -263.53 -4,668.58+ 
 (2,079.04) (2,770.92) (2,079.04) (2,770.92) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
2.91 12.73** 2.91 12.73** 
 (2.55) (4.11) (2.55) (4.11) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -616.25 -3,586.46 -616.25 -3,586.46 
 (2,439.56) (3,342.20) (2,439.56) (3,342.20) 
   Selective 2,089.49 -1,141.42 2,089.49 -1,141.42 
 (2,164.72) (3,010.31) (2,164.72) (3,010.31) 
   Most Selective 7,435.33** 5,093.62 7,435.33** 5,093.62 
 (2,539.84) (3,520.50) (2,539.84) (3,520.50) 
Private Control -2,590.65 -2,445.39 -2,590.65 -2,445.39 
 (1,775.62) (2,544.03) (1,775.62) (2,544.03) 
2-Year or Less -465.96 -3,967.33 -465.96 -3,967.33 
 (2,254.60) (3,098.40) (2,254.60) (3,098.40) 
 386 
College GPA 1,817.08* 3,322.92* 1,817.08* 3,322.92* 
 (911.81) (1,298.41) (911.81) (1,298.41) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.02 
 (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.17) 
Married -1,403.25 -1,060.69 -1,403.25 -1,060.69 
 (1,147.08) (1,684.80) (1,147.08) (1,684.80) 
Dependents 2,462.71* 868.09 2,462.71* 868.09 
 (1,005.17) (1,113.70) (1,005.17) (1,113.70) 
Constant 21,349.82+ 7,373.79 21,349.82+ 7,373.79 
 (11,047.75) (16,068.90) (11,047.75) (16,068.90) 
Observations 2010    2010       2010      2010 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career 
occupation salary. Models run solely for students with a prior income equal to or below the 
25th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p 
< .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A118 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.90*** 0.90*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Father’s Education 3.39* 3.39* 2.59 2.59 
 (1.72) (1.72) (1.71) (1.71) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.44+ -0.44+ -0.34 -0.34 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Age 0.16+ 0.16+ 0.16+ 0.16+ 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Female 0.32+ 0.32+ 0.34+ 0.34+ 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.87** 0.87** 1.18*** 1.18*** 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
   Latino 0.18 0.18 -0.09 -0.09 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.36) (0.36) 
   Asian -0.88* -0.88* -0.78* -0.78* 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
   Other Race -0.58 -0.58 -0.28 -0.28 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00+ -0.00+ -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.12 0.12 0.28 0.28 
 (0.58) (0.58) (0.62) (0.62) 
   Selective 0.29 0.29 0.50 0.50 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.53) (0.53) 
   Most Selective -0.79 -0.79 -0.49 -0.49 
 (0.56) (0.56) (0.60) (0.60) 
Private Control -1.50*** -1.50*** -1.31*** -1.31*** 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) 
2-Year or Less 1.27* 1.27* 1.61** 1.61** 
 (0.52) (0.52) (0.55) (0.55) 
 388 
College GPA -0.46* -0.46* -0.25 -0.25 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.53+ -0.53+ -0.65* -0.65* 
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) 
Dependents 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) 
Constant -0.20 -0.20 -1.50 -1.50 
 (2.55) (2.55) (2.59) (2.59) 
Observations 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 2.85 (0.092) 0.14 (0.711) 3.35 (0.068) 0.12 (0.731) 
Minimum eigenvalue 14.42 14.42 13.70 13.70 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.01 (0.952) 2.94 (0.230) 0.03 (0.983) 2.98 (0.225) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income equal to or below the 25th percentile. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A119 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.05+ 0.02 0.05+ 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.11) 
Age -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Female -0.25*** -0.26** -0.25*** -0.26* 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American -0.11+ -0.59* -0.13+ -0.59* 
 (0.06) (0.24) (0.07) (0.24) 
   Latino 0.01 -0.20 0.02 -0.20 
 (0.06) (0.22) (0.06) (0.22) 
   Asian 0.07 -0.32 0.07 -0.33 
 (0.08) (0.29) (0.08) (0.28) 
   Other Race 0.05 -0.28 0.03 -0.29 
 (0.08) (0.26) (0.07) (0.25) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 
 (0.10) (0.28) (0.10) (0.28) 
   Selective 0.06 -0.21 0.05 -0.21 
 (0.08) (0.24) (0.08) (0.24) 
   Most Selective 0.28** 0.04 0.26** 0.03 
 (0.10) (0.27) (0.10) (0.26) 
Private Control -0.05 -0.15 -0.06 -0.17 
 (0.08) (0.25) (0.07) (0.23) 
2-Year or Less -0.07 -0.35 -0.08 -0.34 
 (0.09) (0.27) (0.09) (0.29) 
College GPA 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.09 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.11) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.16) 
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Dependents 0.07+ 0.09 0.07+ 0.09 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.09) 
Constant 9.89*** 8.52*** 9.98*** 8.61*** 
 (0.40) (1.46) (0.38) (1.34) 
Observations 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 2.85 (0.092) 0.14 (0.711) 3.35 (0.068) 0.12 (0.731) 
Minimum eigenvalue 14.42 14.42 13.70 13.70 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.01 (0.952) 2.94 (0.230) 0.03 (0.983) 2.98 (0.225) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income equal to or below the 25th percentile. Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A120 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
0.008+ 0.006 0.004 0.013 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Age 0.010 -0.053 0.011 -0.053 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) 
Female -0.265*** -0.291** -0.264*** -0.292** 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American -0.054 -0.543* -0.052 -0.545* 
 (0.06) (0.24) (0.06) (0.24) 
   Latino 0.039 -0.177 0.038 -0.171 
 (0.06) (0.20) (0.06) (0.20) 
   Asian -0.030 -1.013*** -0.033 -1.004*** 
 (0.07) (0.30) (0.07) (0.30) 
   Other Race -0.139 -0.074 -0.139 -0.073 
 (0.10) (0.23) (0.10) (0.23) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.000 0.001+ -0.000 0.001+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.011 -0.031 -0.010 -0.030 
 (0.10) (0.23) (0.10) (0.23) 
   Selective 0.006 -0.194 0.006 -0.193 
 (0.09) (0.19) (0.09) (0.19) 
   Most Selective 0.162+ 0.089 0.161+ 0.092 
 (0.10) (0.22) (0.10) (0.22) 
Private Control -0.111+ -0.244 -0.108+ -0.245 
 (0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.16) 
2-Year or Less -0.017 -0.400+ -0.015 -0.398+ 
 (0.09) (0.23) (0.09) (0.23) 
College GPA -0.031 0.017 -0.033 0.019 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.112** 0.019 0.111* 0.021 
 (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.13) 
 392 
Dependents 0.050 0.016 0.051 0.013 
 (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) 
Constant 10.287*** 10.898*** 10.318*** 10.847*** 
 (0.47) (1.59) (0.47) (1.60) 
Observations 2010    2010       2010      2010 
Note: Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 25th percentile and up 
to and including the 50th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A121 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
2,316.85* 2,971.92+ 2,316.85* 2,971.92+ 
 (919.22) (1,548.10) (919.22) (1,548.10) 
Father’s Education 1,927.87 10,323.74 1,927.87 10,323.74 
 (6,851.82) (11,406.79) (6,851.82) (11,406.79) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-620.34 -1,599.43 -620.34 -1,599.43 
 (959.45) (1,613.82) (959.45) (1,613.82) 
Age 491.82 921.88 491.82 921.88 
 (617.79) (1,199.92) (617.79) (1,199.92) 
Female -8,235.41*** -11,536.83*** -8,235.41*** -11,536.83*** 
 (808.28) (1,366.78) (808.28) (1,366.78) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White) 
    
   African American -102.70 -1,382.32 -102.70 -1,382.32 
 (1,370.50) (2,058.84) (1,370.50) (2,058.84) 
   Latino 1,748.59 2,551.57 1,748.59 2,551.57 
 (1,471.79) (2,091.52) (1,471.79) (2,091.52) 
   Asian 1,037.45 852.62 1,037.45 852.62 
 (1,696.03) (2,719.80) (1,696.03) (2,719.80) 
   Other Race -2,381.76 -468.63 -2,381.76 -468.63 
 (1,911.57) (3,112.84) (1,911.57) (3,112.84) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
1.38 6.84+ 1.38 6.84+ 
 (2.45) (3.67) (2.45) (3.67) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -2,780.18 -2,623.62 -2,780.18 -2,623.62 
 (2,149.38) (3,077.24) (2,149.38) (3,077.24) 
   Selective -918.19 -874.41 -918.19 -874.41 
 (1,890.79) (2,713.79) (1,890.79) (2,713.79) 
   Most Selective 3,307.06 3,650.84 3,307.06 3,650.84 
 (2,239.63) (3,162.48) (2,239.63) (3,162.48) 
Private Control -4,280.68** -7,198.06** -4,280.68** -7,198.06** 
 (1,505.01) (2,314.53) (1,505.01) (2,314.53) 
2-Year or Less 85.96 -863.46 85.96 -863.46 
 (2,055.28) (2,976.46) (2,055.28) (2,976.46) 
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College GPA 608.02 2,226.76+ 608.02 2,226.76+ 
 (831.14) (1,271.10) (831.14) (1,271.10) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.06 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.10) (0.15) 
Married 1,574.39 -108.73 1,574.39 -108.73 
 (1,081.95) (1,745.67) (1,081.95) (1,745.67) 
Dependents 1,584.48+ 4,300.13 1,584.48+ 4,300.13 
 (862.81) (2,760.46) (862.81) (2,760.46) 
Constant 10,403.86 -2,142.13 10,403.86 -2,142.13 
 (14,193.15) (26,029.59) (14,193.15) (26,029.59) 
Observations 2010    2010       2010      2010 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career 
occupation salary. Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 25th 
percentile and up to and including the 50th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p 
< 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A122 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.75** 0.75** 0.67* 0.67* 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
Father’s Education 1.35 1.35 1.36 1.36 
 (2.15) (2.15) (2.20) (2.20) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
Age 0.20+ 0.20+ 0.18 0.18 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Female 0.28 0.28 0.21 0.21 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.54+ 0.54+ 0.44 0.44 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.32) 
   Latino -0.49 -0.49 -0.71* -0.71* 
 (0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34) 
   Asian -1.00** -1.00** -1.16** -1.16** 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) 
   Other Race 0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.48) (0.48) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00+ -0.00+ -0.00+ -0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.54) (0.54) (0.57) (0.57) 
   Selective -0.16 -0.16 -0.19 -0.19 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.49) (0.49) 
   Most Selective -0.39 -0.39 -0.49 -0.49 
 (0.52) (0.52) (0.56) (0.56) 
Private Control 0.23 0.23 0.09 0.09 
 (0.36) (0.36) (0.38) (0.38) 
2-Year or Less 0.52 0.52 0.23 0.23 
 (0.49) (0.49) (0.53) (0.53) 
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College GPA -0.43* -0.43* -0.36+ -0.36+ 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.46 -0.46 -0.37 -0.37 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
Dependents 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.30 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
Constant 1.60 1.60 1.99 1.99 
 (3.15) (3.15) (3.24) (3.24) 
Observations 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 14.46 (0.000) 5.87 (0.015) 15.18 (0.000) 5.5 (0.019) 
Minimum eigenvalue 9.90 9.90 6.91 6.91 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.13 (0.938) 6.95 (0.031) 0.23 (0.893) 6.64 (0.036) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income above the 25th percentile and up to and including the 50th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A123 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Mid- to Low-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.14** 0.25+ 0.16** 0.29+ 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.06) (0.17) 
Age -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.09 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.10) 
Female -0.30*** -0.36** -0.29*** -0.35** 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.12) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American -0.11 -0.66* -0.11 -0.65* 
 (0.07) (0.26) (0.08) (0.26) 
   Latino 0.10 -0.06 0.14+ 0.02 
 (0.07) (0.23) (0.08) (0.25) 
   Asian 0.09 -0.77* 0.14 -0.69+ 
 (0.09) (0.34) (0.11) (0.36) 
   Other Race -0.13 -0.06 -0.12 -0.04 
 (0.11) (0.26) (0.12) (0.27) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.12) (0.26) (0.13) (0.28) 
   Selective 0.01 -0.18 0.02 -0.16 
 (0.10) (0.21) (0.11) (0.23) 
   Most Selective 0.20+ 0.17 0.23+ 0.21 
 (0.11) (0.25) (0.13) (0.28) 
Private Control -0.16* -0.34+ -0.14+ -0.31 
 (0.08) (0.20) (0.08) (0.20) 
2-Year or Less -0.04 -0.45+ -0.01 -0.38 
 (0.11) (0.25) (0.12) (0.27) 
College GPA 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.14 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 -0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.15* 0.10 0.15* 0.09 
 (0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.16) 
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Dependents 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 -0.10 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.16) 
Constant 9.28*** 8.97*** 9.18*** 8.77*** 
 (0.66) (2.02) (0.73) (2.14) 
Observations 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 14.46 (0.000) 5.87 (0.015) 15.18 (0.000) 5.5 (0.019) 
Minimum eigenvalue 9.90 9.90 6.91 6.91 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.13 (0.938) 6.95 (0.031) 0.23 (0.893) 6.64 (0.036) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income above the 25th percentile and up to and including the 50th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A124 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
0.004 0.022+ 0.003 0.021+ 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Age 0.027 -0.097 0.027 -0.096 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) 
Female -0.153*** -0.312** -0.153*** -0.312** 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American -0.065 -0.318 -0.064 -0.312 
 (0.07) (0.28) (0.07) (0.28) 
   Latino -0.074 -0.144 -0.074 -0.142 
 (0.07) (0.24) (0.07) (0.24) 
   Asian 0.055 -0.112 0.054 -0.117 
 (0.09) (0.29) (0.09) (0.29) 
   Other Race -0.063 0.014 -0.064 0.012 
 (0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.23) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.000 0.001** -0.000 0.001** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.064 0.326 -0.063 0.327 
 (0.09) (0.39) (0.09) (0.39) 
   Selective -0.169* 0.363 -0.168* 0.367 
 (0.07) (0.33) (0.07) (0.33) 
   Most Selective -0.171+ -0.014 -0.169+ -0.007 
 (0.09) (0.38) (0.09) (0.38) 
Private Control -0.151* -0.315 -0.150* -0.313 
 (0.07) (0.24) (0.07) (0.24) 
2-Year or Less -0.136+ 0.354 -0.135+ 0.360 
 (0.08) (0.36) (0.08) (0.36) 
College GPA 0.003 -0.022 0.003 -0.024 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.389*** 0.170 0.388*** 0.167 
 (0.07) (0.28) (0.07) (0.28) 
 400 
Dependents -0.242** 0.158 -0.242** 0.155 
 (0.09) (0.22) (0.09) (0.22) 
Constant 9.850*** 10.340*** 9.861*** 10.345*** 
 (0.48) (1.74) (0.48) (1.75) 
Observations 2010    2010       2010      2010 
Note: Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 50th percentile and up 
to and including the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 
0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A125 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
497.68 2,877.00 497.68 2,877.00 
 (1,539.05) (1,978.01) (1,539.05) (1,978.01) 
Father’s Education -4,773.63 16,859.15 -4,773.63 16,859.15 
 (10,928.67) (13,790.10) (10,928.67) (13,790.10) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
1,043.26 -2,539.38 1,043.26 -2,539.38 
 (1,545.64) (2,021.85) (1,545.64) (2,021.85) 
Age 804.01 -1,346.77 804.01 -1,346.77 
 (624.68) (991.55) (624.68) (991.55) 
Female -4,343.15*** -7,938.52*** -4,343.15*** -7,938.52*** 
 (792.50) (1,151.81) (792.50) (1,151.81) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White) 
    
   African American -1,246.07 -1,707.90 -1,246.07 -1,707.90 
 (1,763.83) (2,573.27) (1,763.83) (2,573.27) 
   Latino -576.39 1,164.15 -576.39 1,164.15 
 (1,554.70) (2,665.67) (1,554.70) (2,665.67) 
   Asian 2,414.51 5,664.63+ 2,414.51 5,664.63+ 
 (2,213.30) (3,369.96) (2,213.30) (3,369.96) 
   Other Race 1,468.70 -678.91 1,468.70 -678.91 
 (2,813.56) (3,485.24) (2,813.56) (3,485.24) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.31 10.75** 0.31 10.75** 
 (2.59) (3.84) (2.59) (3.84) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -1,063.90 866.26 -1,063.90 866.26 
 (2,200.75) (3,092.96) (2,200.75) (3,092.96) 
   Selective -4,396.79* -401.42 -4,396.79* -401.42 
 (1,734.77) (2,393.39) (1,734.77) (2,393.39) 
   Most Selective -3,096.56 -980.04 -3,096.56 -980.04 
 (2,153.19) (3,060.72) (2,153.19) (3,060.72) 
Private Control -4,133.03** -6,297.75** -4,133.03** -6,297.75** 
 (1,543.50) (2,442.21) (1,543.50) (2,442.21) 
2-Year or Less -2,333.31 1,791.71 -2,333.31 1,791.71 
 (1,945.56) (2,759.16) (1,945.56) (2,759.16) 
 402 
College GPA 793.38 282.12 793.38 282.12 
 (838.76) (1,213.83) (838.76) (1,213.83) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.13 0.34* 0.13 0.34* 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.10) (0.15) 
Married 10,517.80*** 8,416.37* 10,517.80*** 8,416.37* 
 (2,395.20) (3,374.23) (2,395.20) (3,374.23) 
Dependents -7,355.55** -3,803.02 -7,355.55** -3,803.02 
 (2,313.11) (2,868.06) (2,313.11) (2,868.06) 
Constant 11,909.75 34,853.27 11,909.75 34,853.27 
 (16,662.62) (23,273.25) (16,662.62) (23,273.25) 
Observations 2010    2010       2010      2010 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career 
occupation salary. Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 50th 
percentile and up to and including the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p 
< 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A126 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.44 0.44 0.36 0.36 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.40) (0.40) 
Father’s Education -2.18 -2.18 -2.58 -2.58 
 (2.97) (2.97) (2.85) (2.85) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
0.13 0.13 0.20 0.20 
 (0.42) (0.42) (0.40) (0.40) 
Age -0.10 -0.10 -0.17 -0.17 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) 
Female 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.24 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.14 0.14 -0.16 -0.16 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.46) (0.46) 
   Latino -0.15 -0.15 -0.23 -0.23 
 (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.42) 
   Asian -0.58 -0.58 -0.39 -0.39 
 (0.54) (0.54) (0.53) (0.53) 
   Other Race -0.44 -0.44 -0.36 -0.36 
 (0.59) (0.59) (0.58) (0.58) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00** -0.00** -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 1.07+ 1.07+ 1.07+ 1.07+ 
 (0.63) (0.63) (0.62) (0.62) 
   Selective 0.98+ 0.98+ 0.83+ 0.83+ 
 (0.51) (0.51) (0.49) (0.49) 
   Most Selective 0.78 0.78 0.47 0.47 
 (0.61) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60) 
Private Control 1.12* 1.12* 1.09* 1.09* 
 (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) 
2-Year or Less 1.78** 1.78** 1.54** 1.54** 
 (0.57) (0.57) (0.55) (0.55) 
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College GPA -0.54* -0.54* -0.48* -0.48* 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.59 -0.59 -0.45 -0.45 
 (0.61) (0.61) (0.60) (0.60) 
Dependents 0.57 0.57 0.75 0.75 
 (0.51) (0.51) (0.50) (0.50) 
Constant 10.11* 10.11* 11.07* 11.07* 
 (4.89) (4.89) (4.77) (4.77) 
Observations 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 2.44 (0.118) 4.69 (0.030) 2.82 (0.093) 4.74 (0.030) 
Minimum eigenvalue 8.57 8.57 8.23 8.23 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 11.09 (0.004) 0.04 (0.981) 4.74 (0.030) 0.05 (0.974) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income above the 50th percentile and up to and including the 75th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A127 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: Mid- to High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.05 0.23+ 0.06 0.24 
 (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) (0.14) 
Age 0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.11) 
Female -0.16*** -0.34** -0.16*** -0.35** 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.11) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American -0.07 -0.34 -0.05 -0.27 
 (0.08) (0.29) (0.08) (0.30) 
   Latino -0.07 -0.12 -0.06 -0.10 
 (0.08) (0.26) (0.08) (0.26) 
   Asian 0.08 0.02 0.08 -0.03 
 (0.09) (0.31) (0.09) (0.31) 
   Other Race -0.04 0.11 -0.04 0.09 
 (0.12) (0.28) (0.12) (0.29) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.12 0.10 -0.12 0.09 
 (0.10) (0.42) (0.10) (0.43) 
   Selective -0.22** 0.15 -0.21** 0.18 
 (0.08) (0.36) (0.08) (0.35) 
   Most Selective -0.21* -0.18 -0.19* -0.11 
 (0.10) (0.41) (0.10) (0.41) 
Private Control -0.21** -0.59+ -0.22** -0.59+ 
 (0.08) (0.34) (0.08) (0.34) 
2-Year or Less -0.21* 0.05 -0.20* 0.09 
 (0.09) (0.40) (0.09) (0.39) 
College GPA 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.09 
 (0.04) (0.15) (0.04) (0.15) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.40*** 0.22 0.40*** 0.19 
 (0.08) (0.29) (0.08) (0.29) 
 406 
Dependents -0.28** 0.01 -0.29** -0.04 
 (0.10) (0.26) (0.10) (0.27) 
Constant 9.17*** 7.34** 9.08*** 7.16** 
 (0.70) (2.59) (0.72) (2.69) 
Observations 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 2.44 (0.118) 4.69 (0.030) 2.82 (0.093) 4.74 (0.030) 
Minimum eigenvalue 8.57 8.57 8.23 8.23 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 11.09 (0.004) 0.04 (0.981) 4.74 (0.030) 0.05 (0.974) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income above the 50th percentile and up to and including the 75th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A128 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
-0.004 0.012 -0.004 0.013 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Age 0.009 -0.267+ 0.009 -0.267+ 
 (0.03) (0.15) (0.03) (0.15) 
Female -0.117*** -0.184+ -0.117*** -0.185+ 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.10) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American -0.048 -0.655+ -0.048 -0.656+ 
 (0.10) (0.38) (0.10) (0.38) 
   Latino 0.091 -0.206 0.091 -0.204 
 (0.08) (0.26) (0.08) (0.26) 
   Asian 0.057 -0.210 0.055 -0.206 
 (0.11) (0.26) (0.11) (0.25) 
   Other Race 0.085 -0.037 0.082 -0.029 
 (0.09) (0.26) (0.08) (0.26) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.000 0.001* -0.000 0.001* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.065 0.526 0.065 0.528 
 (0.12) (0.34) (0.12) (0.34) 
   Selective 0.021 0.115 0.020 0.118 
 (0.10) (0.31) (0.10) (0.31) 
   Most Selective 0.174 0.446 0.173 0.450 
 (0.11) (0.33) (0.11) (0.33) 
Private Control 0.016 0.197 0.016 0.199 
 (0.06) (0.21) (0.06) (0.21) 
2-Year or Less 0.095 0.146 0.093 0.151 
 (0.11) (0.35) (0.11) (0.35) 
College GPA -0.021 -0.094 -0.021 -0.095 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.11) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.618*** 1.097*** 0.616*** 1.101*** 
 (0.13) (0.28) (0.13) (0.29) 
 408 
Dependents 0.004 -1.152 0.004 -1.149 
 (0.08) (0.83) (0.08) (0.83) 
Constant 10.200*** 14.564*** 10.200*** 14.576*** 
 (0.53) (2.83) (0.53) (2.83) 
Observations 2010    2010       2010      2010 
Note: Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 75th percentile. 
Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A129 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
2,392.86 633.44 2,392.86 633.44 
 (4,176.11) (7,121.05) (4,176.11) (7,121.05) 
Father’s Education 14,212.96 -235.82 14,212.96 -235.82 
 (30,967.77) (52,463.35) (30,967.77) (52,463.35) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-1,185.75 -380.23 -1,185.75 -380.23 
 (4,146.50) (7,080.78) (4,146.50) (7,080.78) 
Age 292.35 -2,306.25* 292.35 -2,306.25* 
 (749.68) (1,117.70) (749.68) (1,117.70) 
Female -4,769.16*** -8,531.66*** -4,769.16*** -8,531.66*** 
 (883.07) (1,439.33) (883.07) (1,439.33) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White) 
    
   African American 559.09 -4,303.97 559.09 -4,303.97 
 (2,296.80) (2,833.69) (2,296.80) (2,833.69) 
   Latino 3,919.00+ -13.09 3,919.00+ -13.09 
 (2,068.02) (2,865.91) (2,068.02) (2,865.91) 
   Asian 3,136.84 -870.34 3,136.84 -870.34 
 (2,377.45) (4,605.68) (2,377.45) (4,605.68) 
   Other Race 4,005.53 -505.81 4,005.53 -505.81 
 (3,895.26) (3,296.54) (3,895.26) (3,296.54) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.46 2.09 -0.46 2.09 
 (2.75) (4.12) (2.75) (4.12) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 1,269.37 4,091.17 1,269.37 4,091.17 
 (3,050.13) (4,168.67) (3,050.13) (4,168.67) 
   Selective 202.33 654.49 202.33 654.49 
 (2,525.09) (3,824.38) (2,525.09) (3,824.38) 
   Most Selective 5,134.66+ 7,314.89+ 5,134.66+ 7,314.89+ 
 (2,762.28) (4,141.48) (2,762.28) (4,141.48) 
Private Control -2,051.56 -5,417.19* -2,051.56 -5,417.19* 
 (1,619.89) (2,360.56) (1,619.89) (2,360.56) 
2-year or Less 2,801.90 2,311.50 2,801.90 2,311.50 
 (2,846.52) (4,230.70) (2,846.52) (4,230.70) 
 410 
College GPA 943.72 426.16 943.72 426.16 
 (862.95) (1,429.73) (862.95) (1,429.73) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.03 0.37* 0.03 0.37* 
 (0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16) 
Married 21,752.20*** 22,223.76** 21,752.20*** 22,223.76** 
 (6,140.81) (7,041.74) (6,140.81) (7,041.74) 
Dependents -1,653.92 -11,772.15+ -1,653.92 -11,772.15+ 
 (4,009.75) (6,443.31) (4,009.75) (6,443.31) 
Constant 1,176.22 79,183.47 1,176.22 79,183.47 
 (35,836.21) (58,787.31) (35,836.21) (58,787.31) 
Observations 2010    2010       2010      2010 
Note: Reduced form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career 
occupation salary. Models run solely for students with a prior income above the 75th 
percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < 
.001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A130 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1.10 1.10 1.76* 1.76* 
 (1.04) (1.04) (0.80) (0.80) 
Father’s Education 7.39 7.39 13.06* 13.06* 
 (7.68) (7.68) (5.63) (5.63) 
Change in Average 
tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.94 -0.94 -1.57* -1.57* 
 (1.03) (1.03) (0.79) (0.79) 
Age -0.21 -0.21 -0.17 -0.17 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) 
Female 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.13 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.71 0.71 0.81 0.81 
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.61) (0.61) 
   Latino 0.45 0.45 0.31 0.31 
 (0.51) (0.51) (0.49) (0.49) 
   Asian -1.15+ -1.15+ -1.50** -1.50** 
 (0.62) (0.62) (0.57) (0.57) 
   Other Race 0.98+ 0.98+ 0.36 0.36 
 (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 1.89* 1.89* 1.74* 1.74* 
 (0.83) (0.83) (0.81) (0.81) 
   Selective 0.82 0.82 0.59 0.59 
 (0.70) (0.70) (0.68) (0.68) 
   Most Selective -0.22 -0.22 -0.51 -0.51 
 (0.76) (0.76) (0.74) (0.74) 
Private Control 1.01* 1.01* 0.80+ 0.80+ 
 (0.44) (0.44) (0.42) (0.42) 
2-Year or Less 1.02 1.02 0.68 0.68 
 (0.79) (0.79) (0.77) (0.77) 
 412 
College GPA -0.30 -0.30 -0.26 -0.26 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.10 0.10 -0.17 -0.17 
 (1.21) (1.21) (1.11) (1.11) 
Dependents 2.26** 2.26** 2.20* 2.20* 
 (0.72) (0.72) (0.97) (0.97) 
Constant 4.91 4.91 -2.22 -2.22 
 (9.05) (9.05) (7.26) (7.26) 
Observations 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 12.34 (0.000) 0.12 (0.725) 12.02 (0.001) 0.002 (0.967) 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.70 0.70 1.98 1.98 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.12 (0.943) 2.10 (0.350) 0.44 (0.801) 2.38 (0.304) 
Note: Excluded instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income above the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = 
p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A131 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model; Subpopulation: High-Income 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.36 0.11 0.22* 0.01 
 (0.31) (0.26) (0.11) (0.13) 
Age 0.10 -0.24 0.06 -0.27+ 
 (0.11) (0.17) (0.06) (0.16) 
Female -0.13 -0.19+ -0.14* -0.18+ 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American -0.30 -0.72+ -0.22 -0.65+ 
 (0.34) (0.44) (0.19) (0.40) 
   Latino -0.06 -0.25 0.03 -0.20 
 (0.24) (0.28) (0.14) (0.26) 
   Asian 0.48 -0.09 0.39+ -0.22 
 (0.45) (0.36) (0.23) (0.29) 
   Other Race -0.27 -0.13 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.37) (0.36) (0.16) (0.26) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.62 0.34 -0.32 0.54 
 (0.68) (0.56) (0.29) (0.39) 
   Selective -0.29 0.03 -0.11 0.12 
 (0.38) (0.36) (0.20) (0.31) 
   Most Selective 0.26 0.47 0.29 0.45 
 (0.31) (0.35) (0.21) (0.34) 
Private Control -0.37 0.09 -0.18 0.21 
 (0.38) (0.35) (0.15) (0.23) 
2-Year or Less -0.21 0.06 -0.01 0.15 
 (0.42) (0.39) (0.22) (0.34) 
College GPA 0.09 -0.06 0.04 -0.10 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.07) (0.10) 
     
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.57 1.08*** 0.66* 1.10*** 
 (0.46) (0.32) (0.28) (0.28) 
 414 
Dependents -0.81 -1.37 -0.43 -1.14 
 (0.75) (0.99) (0.34) (0.80) 
Constant 5.10 13.18** 7.33*** 14.67*** 
 (4.61) (4.97) (1.72) (3.63) 
Observations 2010 2010 2010 2010 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 12.34 (0.000) 0.12 (0.725) 12.02 (0.001) 0.002 (0.967) 
Minimum eigenvalue 0.70 0.70 1.98 1.98 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.12 (0.943) 2.10 (0.350) 0.44 (0.801) 2.38 (0.304) 
Note: Excluded instrument: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and 
change in average tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Models run solely for 
students with a prior income above the 75th percentile. Standard errors in parentheses. + = 
p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A132 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
State Fixed Effects 
 Home State Post-College State 
 Loan Federal Loan Loan Federal 
Loan 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 (Log) 
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.128*** 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
   Latino 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
   Asian 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
   Other Race 0.055* 0.054* 0.057** 0.056* 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Prior Income 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.001 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) 
   Selective 0.074** 0.073** 0.066* 0.065* 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
   Most Selective 0.079* 0.078* 0.065* 0.064+ 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
Private Control -0.019 -0.020 -0.023 -0.024 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
2-Year or Less -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.137*** -0.137*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
College GPA 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 416 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) 
Dependents -0.026 -0.025 -0.022 -0.021 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Constant -0.009 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.065) (0.064) 
Observations 8880 8880 8870 8870 
Note: State fixed effects are included for either the legal residence (home state) or the post-
college enrollment state (post-college state). The primary covariate of interest in the 
models is cumulative loans borrowed from 2003–2004 to 2008–2009 (loan) and 
cumulative federal loans borrowed over the same period (federal loan). Standard errors in 
parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A133 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations (Full Model) 
State Fixed Effects 
 Home State Post-College State 
 Loan Federal Loan Loan Federal Loan 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.03+ -0.03+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Mother’s Education -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees * 
Mother’s Education 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Latino 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Other Race 0.06* 0.06* 0.06** 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior Income 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination 
(in SAT)  
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Selective 0.08** 0.08** 0.07* 0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.08* 0.08* 0.06+ 0.06+ 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 418 
Private Control -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Dependents -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.26 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
Observations 8880 8880 8870 8870 
Note: State fixed effects are included for either the legal residence (home state) or the post-
college enrollment state (post-college state). Reduced form equation for the IV model of 
undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate aspirations. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 
0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A134 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
First Stage Full Model; State Fixed Effects 
 Home State Post-College State 
 Loan Federal Loan Loan Federal 
Loan 
Change in Average Tuition 
and Fees 
0.96*** 0.92*** 1.00*** 0.95*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) 
Mother’s Education 4.25*** 3.85** 4.48*** 4.06** 
 (1.24) (1.20) (1.31) (1.27) 
Change in Average Tuition 
and Fees * Mother’s 
Education 
-0.58*** -0.52** -0.61*** -0.55** 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) 
Female 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White) 
    
   African American 1.42*** 1.48*** 1.32*** 1.40*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
   Latino 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.11 
 (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) 
   Asian -0.71** -0.64** -0.87*** -0.83*** 
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) 
   Other Race -0.09 0.03 -0.15 -0.01 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior Income 0.00* 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.48 0.65* 0.43 0.61* 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) 
   Selective 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.36 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) 
   Most Selective -0.64* -0.47 -0.62* -0.43 
 (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
Private Control 0.90*** 1.02*** 0.98*** 1.07*** 
 420 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) 
2-Year or Less -1.02*** -0.90*** -1.07*** -0.97*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
College GPA -0.37*** -0.30*** -0.36*** -0.30*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.03 0.17 -0.08 0.13 
 (0.59) (0.58) (0.60) (0.59) 
Dependents -0.47* -0.57** -0.48* -0.59** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Constant 1.48 1.03 1.29 0.83 
 (1.40) (1.37) (1.48) (1.45) 
Observations 8880 8880 8870 8870 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 3.18 (0.075) 3.15 (0.076) 5.83 (0.016) 5.83 (0.016) 
Minimum eigenvalue 12.30 12.85 11.69 12.35 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.92 (0.631) 1.03 (0.560) 0.91 (0.635) 1.02 (0.601) 
Note: State fixed effects are included for either the legal residence (home state) or the post-
college enrollment state (post-college state). Excluded instruments: change in average 
tuition and fees, mother’s education, and change in average tuition and fees interacted with 
mother’s education. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** 
= p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A135 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Aspirations 
Second Stage Full Model; State Fixed Effects 
 Home State Post-College State 
 Loan Federal Loan Loan Federal 
Loan 
Cumulative Loans 
(Log) 
-0.02 -0.02 -0.04+ -0.04+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Latino 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.08** 0.08** 0.07** 0.07** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Other Race 0.05* 0.06* 0.05* 0.06* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Prior Income 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00+ -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination 
(in SAT)  
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Selective 0.08** 0.09** 0.08* 0.08** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.06+ 0.07+ 0.04 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Private Control 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
2-Year or Less -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.19*** -0.19*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
College GPA 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 
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 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00** 0.00* 0.00** 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Dependents -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05+ 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 0.23 0.21 0.34* 0.31+ 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) 
Observations 8880 8880 8870 8870 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 3.18 (0.075) 3.15 (0.076) 5.83 (0.016) 5.83 (0.016) 
Minimum eigenvalue 12.30 12.85 11.69 12.35 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 0.92 (0.631) 1.03 (0.560) 0.91 (0.635) 1.02 (0.601) 
Note: State fixed effects are included for either the legal residence (home state) or the post-
college enrollment state (post-college state). Excluded instrument: change in average 
tuition and fees, mother’s education, and change in average tuition and fees interacted with 
mother’s education. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** 
= p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A136 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Home State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
-0.003** -0.002+ -0.003* -0.002+ 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age -0.017** -0.018** -0.017** -0.018** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Female 0.008 0.024* 0.008 0.024* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.114*** 0.182*** 0.113*** 0.182*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
   Latino 0.024 0.055** 0.023 0.055** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
   Asian 0.056** 0.079*** 0.056** 0.079*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
   Other Race 0.032 0.041 0.031 0.040 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
Prior Income -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.025 -0.001 0.025 -0.001 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) 
   Selective 0.059* 0.039 0.059* 0.039 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) 
   Most Selective 0.067* 0.073* 0.067* 0.073* 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032) 
Private Control 0.029 0.019 0.028 0.019 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
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2-Year or Less 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.015 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) 
College GPA 0.184*** 0.215*** 0.185*** 0.215*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married -0.068*** -0.080*** -0.068*** -0.080*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
Dependents 0.006 0.025 0.006 0.025 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Constant -0.126 -0.108 -0.130 -0.107 
 (0.133) (0.137) (0.133) (0.137) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the state of legal residence (home state). Standard 
errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are 
rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A137 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Home State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.03* -0.04* -0.03* -0.04* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Father’s Education 0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age -0.02** -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.00 0.02* 0.00 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Latino 0.02 0.05* 0.02 0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.06** 0.07*** 0.06** 0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Other Race 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior Income -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Selective 0.06* 0.04 0.06* 0.04 
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 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.07* 0.08* 0.07* 0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Private Control 0.04+ 0.03 0.04+ 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dependents 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant 0.09 0.20 0.09 0.20 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the state of legal residence (home state). Reduced 
form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate school enrollment. 
Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A138 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model; Home State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.86*** 0.86*** 0.79*** 0.79*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Father’s Education 2.91** 2.91** 2.51* 2.51* 
 (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.43** -0.43** -0.38** -0.38** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Age 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female 0.19* 0.19* 0.19* 0.19* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White)     
   African American 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.65*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
   Latino 0.13 0.13 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
   Asian -0.67*** -0.67*** -0.70*** -0.70*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
   Other Race 0.20 0.20 0.05 0.05 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
   Selective 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.31 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
   Most Selective -0.21 -0.21 -0.28 -0.28 
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 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Private Control 0.49* 0.49* 0.40* 0.40* 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
2-Year or Less 0.98*** 0.98*** 0.88** 0.88** 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) 
College GPA -0.60*** -0.60*** -0.50*** -0.50*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.32+ -0.32+ -0.39* -0.39* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Dependents 0.33** 0.33** 0.37** 0.37** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Constant 4.04* 4.04* 4.02* 4.02* 
 (1.58) (1.58) (1.59) (1.59) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 26.04 (0.000) 29.17 (0.000) 27.21 (0.000)  29.72 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 30.44 30.44  28.33 28.33 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 4.74 (0.094) 2.54 (0.282) 3.95 (0.139) 1.98 (0.372) 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the state of legal residence (home state). Excluded 
instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and change in average 
tuition and fees interacted with father’s education.  Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 
0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A139 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model; Home State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age -0.02* -0.02** -0.02* -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.02 0.03** 0.02 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.22*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Latino 0.03 0.06* 0.02 0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Other Race 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00+ 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00+ 0.00* 0.00+ 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Selective 0.08** 0.07+ 0.08** 0.06+ 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.06+ 0.06 0.05 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Private Control 0.06** 0.06* 0.06* 0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
2-Year or Less 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
College GPA 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
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Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.08*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.10*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dependents 0.03+ 0.05** 0.03* 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.51* 0.59** 0.51* 0.59** 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 26.04 (0.000) 29.17 (0.000) 27.21 (0.000)  29.72 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 30.44 30.44  28.33 28.33 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 4.74 (0.094) 2.54 (0.282) 3.95 (0.139) 1.98 (0.372) 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the state of legal residence (home state). Excluded 
instrument: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and change in average 
tuition and fees interacted with father’s education.  Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 
0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A140 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Post-college State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
-0.003** -0.002+ -0.003** -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** -0.019** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Female 0.007 0.022* 0.007 0.022* 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.120*** 0.181*** 0.120*** 0.181*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
   Latino 0.031 0.062** 0.030 0.062** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
   Asian 0.055** 0.080*** 0.056** 0.080*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
   Other Race 0.030 0.041 0.029 0.041 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
Prior Income -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.025 -0.009 0.024 -0.008 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.034) 
   Selective 0.061* 0.034 0.061* 0.034 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) 
   Most Selective 0.079** 0.074* 0.079** 0.074* 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) 
Private Control 0.036+ 0.021 0.035+ 0.021 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
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2-Year or Less 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.015 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) 
College GPA 0.184*** 0.215*** 0.184*** 0.215*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married -0.063*** -0.072*** -0.064*** -0.073*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) 
Dependents 0.009 0.026+ 0.009 0.027+ 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) 
Constant -0.110 -0.119 -0.116 -0.119 
 (0.133) (0.138) (0.133) (0.138) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the post-college enrollment state. Standard errors 
in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A141 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment (Full Model) 
Post-College State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
-0.03* -0.04** -0.03* -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Father’s Education 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.00 0.02+ 0.00 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Latino 0.03 0.06** 0.03 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.06** 0.08*** 0.06** 0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Other Race 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior Income -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Selective 0.06* 0.04 0.06* 0.04 
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 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Most Selective 0.08** 0.08* 0.08** 0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Private Control 0.04* 0.03 0.04* 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
College GPA 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.06** -0.07*** -0.06** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dependents 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.20 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the post-college enrollment state. Reduced form 
model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on graduate school enrollment. 
Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A142 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
First Stage Full Model; Post-College State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.83*** 0.83*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Father’s Education 2.78** 2.78** 2.41* 2.41* 
 (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) (0.98) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.41** -0.41** -0.36** -0.36** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
Age 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female 0.19* 0.19* 0.19* 0.19* 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White)     
   African American 0.59*** 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.60*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
   Latino 0.09 0.09 -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
   Asian -0.72*** -0.72*** -0.75*** -0.75*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
   Other Race 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.02 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.37 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
   Selective 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
   Most Selective -0.27 -0.27 -0.32 -0.32 
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 (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
Private Control 0.30 0.30 0.22 0.22 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
2-Year or Less 1.00*** 1.00*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) 
College GPA -0.57*** -0.57*** -0.47*** -0.47*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.43* -0.43* -0.50** -0.50** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Dependents 0.31* 0.31* 0.34** 0.34** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Constant 4.76** 4.76** 4.62** 4.62** 
 (1.56) (1.56) (1.58) (1.58) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 27.57 (0.000) 31.88 (0.000) 28.64 (0.000) 32.28 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 30.06 30.06 28.64 27.62 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 4.10 (0.128) 2.13 (0.344) 3.44 (0.180) 1.67 (0.434) 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the post-college enrollment state. Excluded 
instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and change in average 
tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 
0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A143 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Graduate School Enrollment 
Second Stage Full Model; Post-College State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age -0.02* -0.02** -0.02* -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.02 0.03** 0.02 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.15*** 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.22*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Latino 0.03 0.06* 0.02 0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
   Asian 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
   Other Race 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
   Selective 0.09** 0.06+ 0.09** 0.06+ 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
   Most Selective 0.06+ 0.06 0.06+ 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Private Control 0.06** 0.05* 0.06* 0.04+ 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
2-Year or Less 0.05 0.07+ 0.05 0.06 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
College GPA 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
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Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Dependents 0.03* 0.05** 0.04* 0.06** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant 0.58** 0.66** 0.58** 0.65** 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) 
Observations 9820 9820 9820 9820 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 27.57 (0.000) 31.88 (0.000) 28.64 (0.000) 32.28 (0.000) 
Minimum eigenvalue 30.06 30.06 28.64 27.62 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 4.10 (0.128) 2.13 (0.344) 3.44 (0.180) 1.67 (0.434) 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the post-college enrollment state. Excluded 
instrument: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and change in average 
tuition and fees interacted with father’s education.  Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 
0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
 
 439 
 
Table A144 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Home State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.003 0.008 0.002 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
Age 0.014 -0.044 0.014 -0.044 
 (0.011) (0.043) (0.011) (0.043) 
Female -0.191*** -0.263*** -0.190*** -0.263*** 
 (0.017) (0.049) (0.017) (0.049) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American -0.069+ -0.491*** -0.068+ -0.491*** 
 (0.036) (0.137) (0.036) (0.137) 
   Latino -0.008 -0.154 -0.007 -0.153 
 (0.034) (0.116) (0.034) (0.116) 
   Asian 0.001 -0.453** 0.000 -0.454** 
 (0.041) (0.145) (0.041) (0.145) 
   Other Race -0.024 -0.111 -0.023 -0.111 
 (0.046) (0.123) (0.046) (0.123) 
Prior Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
-0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.043 0.135 -0.042 0.135 
 (0.05) (0.16) (0.05) (0.16) 
   Selective -0.047 -0.007 -0.046 -0.006 
 (0.043) (0.141) (0.043) (0.141) 
   Most Selective 0.067 0.142 0.067 0.142 
 (0.051) (0.156) (0.051) (0.156) 
Private Control -0.067* -0.082 -0.066* -0.081 
 (0.033) (0.097) (0.033) (0.097) 
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2-Year or Less -0.070 -0.069 -0.069 -0.068 
 (0.046) (0.155) (0.046) (0.155) 
College GPA -0.011 -0.007 -0.012 -0.008 
 (0.018) (0.054) (0.018) (0.054) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.114*** 0.060 0.113*** 0.061 
 (0.029) (0.086) (0.029) (0.086) 
Dependents 0.061** 0.043 0.061** 0.043 
 (0.024) (0.078) (0.024) (0.078) 
Constant 10.135*** 10.356*** 10.152*** 10.367*** 
 (0.228) (0.858) (0.228) (0.858) 
Observations 8030    8030       8030      8030 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the state of legal residence (home state). Standard 
errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are 
rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A145 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Home State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1,412.11* 1,355.67 1,412.11* 1,355.67 
 (593.07) (1,021.55) (593.07) (1,021.55) 
Father’s Education -524.43 5,046.16 -524.43 5,046.16 
 (4,318.05) (7,310.05) (4,318.05) (7,310.05) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
35.62 -893.74 35.62 -893.74 
 (603.10) (1,027.83) (603.10) (1,027.83) 
Age 478.70 469.77 478.70 469.77 
 (292.11) (476.72) (292.11) (476.72) 
Female -6,161.86*** -10,173.16*** -6,161.86*** -10,173.16*** 
 (423.74) (646.86) (423.74) (646.86) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American -550.09 -2,523.87* -550.09 -2,523.87* 
 (800.11) (1,186.59) (800.11) (1,186.59) 
   Latino 512.64 63.87 512.64 63.87 
 (826.99) (1,297.42) (826.99) (1,297.42) 
   Asian 1,902.84+ 2,344.34 1,902.84+ 2,344.34 
 (1,043.17) (1,675.66) (1,043.17) (1,675.66) 
   Other Race 574.95 -2,036.86 574.95 -2,036.86 
 (1,362.30) (1,619.17) (1,362.30) (1,619.17) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
1.45 7.95*** 1.45 7.95*** 
 (1.30) (2.00) (1.30) (2.00) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -1,668.90 -1,290.15 -1,668.90 -1,290.15 
 (1,229.55) (1,693.86) (1,229.55) (1,693.86) 
   Selective -1,371.78 -809.20 -1371.78 -809.20 
 442 
 (1,035.41) (1,468.00) (1,035.41) (1,468.00) 
   Most Selective 2,552.55* 3,115.89+ 2,552.55* 3,115.89+ 
 (1,238.86) (1,752.65) (1,238.86) (1,752.65) 
Private Control -2,539.03** -4,956.40*** -2,539.03** -4,956.40*** 
 (889.00) (1,318.51) (889.00) (1,318.51) 
2-Year or Less -1,056.97 -1,146.27 -1,056.97 -1,146.27 
 (1,127.79) (1,604.02) (1,127.79) (1,604.02) 
College GPA 1,198.11** 2,021.06** 1,198.11** 2,021.06** 
 (438.55) (658.33) (438.55) (658.33) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
-0.07 0.15+ -0.07 0.15+ 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) 
Married 2,531.07*** 2,228.67* 2,531.07*** 2,228.67* 
 (735.10) (1,100.12) (735.10) (1,100.12) 
Dependents 1,694.37** 2,248.11 1,694.37** 2,248.11 
 (622.53) (1,427.49) (622.53) (1,427.49) 
Constant 13,360.56+ 17,709.02 13,360.56+ 17,709.02 
 (7,532.21) (12,064.89) (7,532.21) (12,064.89) 
Observations 8030    8030       8030      8030 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the state of legal residence (home state). Reduced 
form model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career occupation 
salary. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A146 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model; Home State Fixed Effect 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.86*** 0.86*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Father’s Education 3.13* 3.13* 2.76* 2.76* 
 (1.23) (1.23) (1.23) (1.23) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.46** -0.46** -0.41* -0.41* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Age 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Female 0.22* 0.22* 0.24* 0.24* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
   Latino 0.26 0.26 0.08 0.08 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
   Asian -0.59** -0.59** -0.61** -0.61** 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
   Other Race 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.07 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.45 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) 
   Selective 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.38 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.28) 
   Most Selective -0.15 -0.15 -0.23 -0.23 
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 (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
Private Control 0.51* 0.51* 0.45* 0.45* 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
2-Year or Less 1.04*** 1.04*** 0.93** 0.93** 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
College GPA -0.58*** -0.58*** -0.47*** -0.47*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.26 -0.26 -0.30 -0.30 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Dependents 0.30* 0.30* 0.31* 0.31* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Constant 3.79* 3.79* 3.64+ 3.64+ 
 (1.88) (1.88) (1.90) (1.90) 
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 27.65 (0.000) 6.55 (0.010) 29.66 (0.000) 6.39 (0.011) 
Minimum eigenvalue 21.97 21.97 20.75 20.75 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 4.34 (0.114) 0.873 (0.646) 3.36 (0.186) 1.09 (0.581) 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the state of legal residence (home state). Excluded 
instrument: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and change in average 
tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 
0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
 
 445 
 
Table A147 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model; Home State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.11*** 0.16+ 0.12*** 0.17+ 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Age 0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Female -0.21*** -0.29*** -0.21*** -0.29*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American -0.14** -0.59*** -0.14** -0.59*** 
 (0.04) (0.15) (0.05) (0.15) 
   Latino -0.03 -0.19 -0.01 -0.16 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) 
   Asian 0.07 -0.35* 0.08 -0.34* 
 (0.05) (0.16) (0.05) (0.16) 
   Other Race -0.03 -0.12 -0.02 -0.11 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13) 
Prior Income 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.10 0.05 -0.10 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.18) 
   Selective -0.10+ -0.09 -0.10+ -0.08 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.15) 
   Most Selective 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.17 
 (0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.16) 
Private Control -0.13** -0.18 -0.13** -0.17 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.11) 
2-Year or Less -0.16** -0.19 -0.15* -0.18 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.17) 
College GPA 0.06* 0.09 0.05+ 0.08 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) 
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Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 -0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.14*** 0.10 0.14*** 0.10 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) 
Dependents 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Constant 9.00*** 8.71*** 9.01*** 8.79*** 
 (0.39) (1.28) (0.39) (1.27) 
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 27.65 (0.000) 6.55 (0.010) 29.66 (0.000) 6.39 (0.011) 
Minimum eigenvalue 21.97 21.97 20.75 20.75 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 4.34 (0.114) 0.873 (0.646) 3.36 (0.186) 1.09 (0.581) 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the state of legal residence (home state). Excluded 
instrument: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and change in average 
tuition and fees interacted with father’s education.  Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 
0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A148 
 
Results of OLS, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Post-College State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans 
Borrowed 2009 
(Log) 
0.003+ 0.008 0.002 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
Age 0.015 -0.039 0.015 -0.039 
 (0.011) (0.043) (0.011) (0.043) 
Female -0.190*** -0.254*** -0.190*** -0.254*** 
 (0.017) (0.049) (0.017) (0.049) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American -0.078* -0.508*** -0.077* -0.508*** 
 (0.035) (0.137) (0.035) (0.137) 
   Latino -0.020 -0.195+ -0.019 -0.193 
 (0.034) (0.118) (0.034) (0.118) 
   Asian -0.010 -0.498*** -0.011 -0.498*** 
 (0.041) (0.145) (0.041) (0.145) 
   Other Race -0.033 -0.077 -0.033 -0.077 
 (0.045) (0.121) (0.045) (0.121) 
Prior Income -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
-0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -0.045 0.159 -0.044 0.159 
 (0.050) (0.165) (0.050) (0.165) 
   Selective -0.043 0.015 -0.043 0.015 
 (0.042) (0.142) (0.042) (0.142) 
   Most Selective 0.067 0.161 0.066 0.161 
 (0.050) (0.156) (0.050) (0.156) 
Private Control -0.055+ -0.063 -0.054+ -0.062 
 (0.032) (0.098) (0.032) (0.098) 
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2-Year or Less -0.075 -0.071 -0.073 -0.070 
 (0.046) (0.156) (0.046) (0.156) 
College GPA -0.011 -0.009 -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.018) (0.054) (0.018) (0.054) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.116*** 0.062 0.115*** 0.062 
 (0.029) (0.086) (0.029) (0.086) 
Dependents 0.060* 0.045 0.060* 0.045 
 (0.024) (0.078) (0.024) (0.078) 
Constant 10.103*** 10.008*** 10.121*** 10.019*** 
 (0.226) (0.867) (0.225) (0.867) 
Observations 8030    8030       8030      8030 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the post-college enrollment state. Standard errors 
in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded 
due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A149 
 
Results of OLS Reduced Form, Dependent Variable: Salary (Full Model) 
Post-College State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
1,374.77* 1,537.53 1,374.77* 1,537.53 
 (596.78) (1,028.98) (596.78) (1,028.98) 
Father’s Education -212.19 6,421.16 -212.19 6,421.16 
 (4,326.03) (7,350.74) (4,326.03) (7,350.74) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
30.08 -1,034.74 30.08 -1,034.74 
 (604.48) (1,032.89) (604.48) (1,032.89) 
Age 522.31+ 510.94 522.31+ 510.94 
 (288.28) (471.37) (288.28) (471.37) 
Female -6,152.31*** -10,070.76*** -
6,152.31*** 
-10,070.76*** 
 (419.79) (643.05) (419.79) (643.05) 
Race/Ethnicity 
(Reference: White) 
    
   African American -821.10 -2,606.36* -821.10 -2,606.36* 
 (797.58) (1,170.19) (797.58) (1,170.19) 
   Latino 52.46 -173.43 52.46 -173.43 
 (828.98) (1,259.84) (828.98) (1,259.84) 
   Asian 1,447.43 1,904.69 1,447.43 1,904.69 
 (1,035.42) (1,649.31) (1,035.42) (1,649.31) 
   Other Race 316.98 -1,903.63 316.98 -1,903.63 
 (1,342.64) (1,589.59) (1,342.64) (1,589.59) 
Prior Income -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00 0.00+ 0.00 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance 
Examination (in SAT)  
1.17 7.96*** 1.17 7.96*** 
 (1.29) (2.00) (1.29) (2.00) 
Institutional 
Selectivity 
(Reference: 
Nonselective) 
    
   Less Selective -1,727.80 -1201.05 -1,727.80 -1,201.05 
 (1,218.18) (1,706.27) (1,218.18) (1,706.27) 
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   Selective -1,271.82 -591.32 -1,271.82 -591.32 
 (1,030.04) (1,490.39) (1,030.04) (1,490.39) 
   Most Selective 2,603.65* 3,495.80* 2,603.65* 3,495.80* 
 (1,227.41) (1,749.35) (1,227.41) (1,749.35) 
Private Control -2,032.84* -3,954.16** -2,032.84* -3,954.16** 
 (876.22) (1,287.34) (876.22) (1,287.34) 
2-Year or Less -1,266.89 -1,204.83 -1,266.89 -1,204.83 
 (1,124.65) (1,617.09) (1,124.65) (1,617.09) 
College GPA 1,155.00** 1,867.42** 1,155.00** 1,867.42** 
 (432.03) (654.52) (432.03) (654.52) 
Entering Tuition & 
Fees 
-0.09 0.07 -0.09 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) 
Married 2,707.39*** 2,473.91* 2,707.39*** 2,473.91* 
 (736.57) (1,099.56) (736.57) (1,099.56) 
Dependents 1,682.52** 2,236.58 1,682.52** 2,236.58 
 (627.39) (1,425.60) (627.39) (1,425.60) 
Constant 12,630.95+ 12,103.42 12,630.95+ 12,103.42 
 (7,447.46) (12,010.85) (7,447.46) (12,010.85) 
Observations 8030    8030       8030      8030 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the post-college enrollment state. Reduced form 
model of the IV model for undergraduate debt’s effect on early-career occupation salary. 
Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. 
Observations are rounded due to NCES guidelines. 
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Table A150 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
First Stage Full Model; Post-College State Fixed Effect 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees 
0.83*** 0.83*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Father’s Education 2.99* 2.99* 2.63* 2.63* 
 (1.21) (1.21) (1.22) (1.22) 
Change in Average 
Tuition and Fees *  
Father’s Education 
-0.45** -0.45** -0.39* -0.39* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Age 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Female 0.22* 0.22* 0.24* 0.24* 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American 0.64*** 0.64*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
   Latino 0.20 0.20 0.02 0.02 
 (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
   Asian -0.65** -0.65** -0.68** -0.68** 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
   Other Race 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.05 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Prior Income -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
-0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective 0.52+ 0.52+ 0.53 0.53 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) 
   Selective 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.41 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
   Most Selective -0.21 -0.21 -0.25 -0.25 
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 (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
Private Control 0.38+ 0.38+ 0.32 0.32 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
2-Year or Less 1.05*** 1.05*** 0.97** 0.97** 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
College GPA -0.54*** -0.54*** -0.44*** -0.44*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Entering Tuition & Fees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married -0.36+ -0.36+ -0.39* -0.39* 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) 
Dependents 0.27+ 0.27+ 0.29* 0.29* 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Constant 4.49* 4.49* 4.21* 4.21* 
 (1.85) (1.85) (1.87) (1.87) 
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 25.60 (0.000) 7.69 (0.006) 27.41 (0.000) 7.59 (0.006) 
Minimum eigenvalue 21.31 21.31 19.66 19.66 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 4.30 (0.117) 0.70 (0.704) 3.40 (0.182) 0.85 (0.653) 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the post-college enrollment state. Excluded 
instruments: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and change in average 
tuition and fees interacted with father’s education. Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 
0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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Table A151 
 
Results of Two-Stage Least Squares, Dependent Variable: Salary 
Second Stage Full Model; Post-College State Fixed Effects 
 Loan Federal Loan 
 2009 2012 2009 2012 
Cumulative Loans (Log) 0.11*** 0.18* 0.11*** 0.18* 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Age 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Female -0.21*** -0.29*** -0.21*** -0.29*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Race/Ethnicity (Reference: 
White)     
   African American -0.14** -0.61*** -0.14** -0.61*** 
 (0.04) (0.15) (0.05) (0.15) 
   Latino -0.04 -0.22+ -0.02 -0.19 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) 
   Asian 0.07 -0.37* 0.07 -0.36* 
 (0.05) (0.16) (0.05) (0.16) 
   Other Race -0.04 -0.09 -0.03 -0.08 
 (0.05) (0.13) (0.05) (0.13) 
Prior Income 0.00** 0.00+ 0.00** 0.00+ 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior Income * Prior 
Income 
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Entrance Examination (in 
SAT)  
0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Institutional Selectivity 
(Reference: Nonselective)     
   Less Selective -0.11+ 0.06 -0.11+ 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.18) (0.06) (0.18) 
   Selective -0.10+ -0.07 -0.10+ -0.07 
 (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.15) 
   Most Selective 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.20 
 (0.06) (0.16) (0.06) (0.17) 
Private Control -0.11* -0.15 -0.10* -0.14 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11) 
2-Year or Less -0.16** -0.21 -0.16** -0.20 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.17) 
College GPA 0.05* 0.10 0.05+ 0.08 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) 
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Entering Tuition & Fees -0.00+ -0.00* -0.00+ -0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Married 0.15*** 0.12 0.16*** 0.13 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.10) 
Dependents 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Constant 8.94*** 8.12*** 8.95*** 8.19*** 
 (0.40) (1.33) (0.40) (1.31) 
Observations 8030 8030 8030 8030 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 25.60 (0.000) 7.69 (0.006) 27.41 (0.000) 7.59 (0.006) 
Minimum eigenvalue 21.31 21.31 19.66 19.66 
F-bias crit, F-size crit 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 13.91, 22.3 
Sargan (p-value) 4.30 (0.117) 0.70 (0.704) 3.40 (0.182) 0.85 (0.653) 
Note: State fixed effects are included for the post-college enrollment state. Excluded 
instrument: change in average tuition and fees, father’s education, and change in average 
tuition and fees interacted with father’s education.  Standard errors in parentheses. + = p < 
0.10; * = p < 0.05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001. Observations are rounded due to NCES 
guidelines. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
INVESTIGATION 2 APPENDIX 
 
Item B1 
 
Email sent to students for participation in phase one. 
 
Greetings, 
 
Hello, my name is Dominique Baker. I am working on my doctorate at Vanderbilt University 
and am reaching out to you about participation in a new study I am conducting. 
 
I am studying college students’ experiences with financial aid. My goal is to improve 
research and, ultimately, policy and practice that supports students as they make choices 
about their financial aid options.  I am very interested in hearing about your experiences 
with financial aid as a graduate of [insert University here].  I’m emailing to ask if you would 
be willing to talk with me about this at your convenience.  The interview will: 
 Last about 45 minutes 
 Be confidential 
 Occur at a time most convenient to you 
 
If you are interested in learning more about this project and talking with me about your 
experiences with financial aid please email me, Dominique Baker, at 
d.baker@vanderbilt.edu.  If you decide to participate, to thank you for your time you will 
receive a $25 dollar gift certificate at the end of the interview.  I am hoping to conduct the 
interviews the week of [insert date here] though if you are interested and that week does 
not work, I am happy to schedule a different time that is convenient for you 
 
Again, I appreciate your time and thank you for considering this opportunity.  Hope to hear 
from you soon! 
 
Best, 
Dominique Baker  
Email: d.baker@vanderbilt.edu 
Website: https://my.vanderbilt.edu/dominiquebaker/ 
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Item B2 
Interview protocol for phase one interviews. 
I. Introduction 
 
Hello, this is Dominique Baker. We previously arranged to meet to talk about a research 
study for my dissertation. Are you ready to talk? 
 
Excellent. Again, I want to reiterate that your participation in this study is voluntary and 
that you are free at any time to stop this interview or not answer a question. 
 
The interview should take no more than 45 minutes of your time and should likely only 
take 30 minutes. 
 
Are you ready? Okay, let’s begin. 
 
II. Undergraduate Debt and Repayment 
 
Tell me about how much money you borrowed to attend undergrad. 
 
How do you feel about that amount?  
 
Do you feel that it was worthwhile to borrow this amount to finance your education? Please 
explain why. 
 
Would you have been willing to borrow more?  Please explain why you would say yes or 
no. 
 
Did you ever consider how you would repay those loans?  How? 
 
Tell me about the sources you’ve consulted to make your decision about how to repay your 
loans. 
 
III. Postbaccalaureate Decision-Making 
 
Tell me about your plans after graduation. 
 
Have those plans been influenced by the amount of debt you have?  If so, why?  If not, why 
do you think that is? 
 
If you did not have any undergraduate debt, what would your plans be after you graduate? 
 
IV. Conclusion 
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Is there anything else you might like to add? 
 
Would it be okay if I contact you again in the fall with any follow up questions? 
 
Thank you again for your time!  I appreciate your taking the time to share your views. 
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Item B3 
Interview protocol for phase two interviews. 
I. Introduction 
 
Hello, this is Dominique Baker. We previously spoke about your perceptions about your 
undergraduate debt and you agreed to participate in a follow-up interview. Are you ready 
to talk? 
 
Excellent. Again, I want to reiterate that your participation in this study is voluntary and 
that you are free at any time to stop this interview or not answer a question. 
 
The interview should take no more than 45 minutes of your time and should likely only 
take 30 minutes. 
 
Are you ready? Okay, let’s begin. 
 
II. Undergraduate Debt and Repayment 
 
Tell me about how much money you borrowed to attend undergrad. 
 
How do you feel as you near repayment on those loans about that amount?  
 
Do you feel that it was worthwhile to borrow this amount to finance your education? Please 
explain why. 
 
Would you have been willing to borrow more?  Please explain why you would say yes or 
no. 
 
Did you ever consider how you would repay those loans?  How? 
 
Tell me about the sources you’ve consulted to make your decision about how to repay your 
loans. 
 
Have you thought about how much a monthly payment will be depending on your options? 
 
 
III. Postbaccalaureate Decision-Making 
 
Tell me about what you’ve been doing since we last spoke. 
What are your plans for the next few years? 
 
Are you thinking about graduate school?  Please explain why or why not. 
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What type of career would you like to have eventually? 
 
Have those plans been influenced by the amount of debt you have?  If so, why?  If not, why 
do you think that is? 
 
If you did not have any undergraduate debt, what would your plans be after you graduate? 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Is there anything else you might like to add? 
 
Would it be okay if I contact you again in the fall with any follow up questions? 
 
Thank you again for your time!  I appreciate your taking the time to share your views. 
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